Kategoria: Usuluhishi
Kukadiria Gharama ya Mashauri ya Madai !!
KITUO cha Kitaifa cha Mahakama za Serikali (NCSC) ilitengeneza kielelezo cha makadirio ya gharama ambayo yanatokana na muda uliotumiwa na mawakili katika shughuli mbalimbali za madai katika kesi mbalimbali za madai zilizowasilishwa katika mahakama za serikali.. Mizunguko ya kesi inawasilishwa katika blogu nyingine.
NCSC ilichapisha makadirio ya saa za kutumika katika visa tofauti. Mfano huo una aina tatu za kesi kutoka kwa kiwango cha utata na inadhania kuna wakili mkuu, wakili mdogo na mwanasheria anayehusika katika kila kesi. Mtindo huo una aina sita za mashtaka na wakati unaotumiwa na mawakili ni kusuluhisha adha ya "kawaida" ya gari., dhima ya majengo, makosa ya kitaaluma, uvunjaji wa mkataba, mgogoro wa ajira, na migogoro ya mali isiyohamishika.
Mfano hutumia viwango vitatu vya utata wa kesi. Juhudi zilizokadiriwa kwa kila ngazi inakadiriwa kulingana na uchunguzi wa afisa wa wakili tofauti. Wastani wa asilimia ya juhudi huonyeshwa katika Kielelezo 1, ambapo kila aina ya kesi imegawanywa katika hatua sita tofauti za madai. Hatua za shauri zitatofautiana kutoka kesi hadi nyingine kulingana na aina ya kesi.
Mfano pia unahusika na shahidi kama parameta tofauti. Mfano haukuzingatia gharama ya uzalishaji wa nyenzo, gharama ya mawasiliano, kunakili au kunakili, binging, uzalishaji wa nakala, gharama ya kufanya, gharama za huduma na ada za Mahakama. Nambari ya kawaida ya ugunduzi haijumuishi gharama ya uchunguzi. Katika tathmini yangu gharama itaongezeka kwa takriban 150% kwa wastani ikiwa tutaongeza uchunguzi, na gharama nyinginezo. Ada za Mahakama ni ndogo sana kulinganisha na gharama zingine.
Ili kuelewa gharama ya uchunguzi. Kwa kila saa ya uchunguzi, masaa mawili ya maandalizi yanahitajika kwa wastani na karibu $350 kutengeneza nakala. kawaida 2 siku za mitihani ambayo itagharimu takriban 6 siku za ada ya kisheria pamoja na kuhusu $5600 kutoa nakala na gharama nyingine zinazohusika na waandishi wa habari. Gharama ya kufanya, kuchunguza ahadi na kubadilishana barua kwa upande mwingine. Gharama ya uchapishaji au kurudia itakuwa takriban $1 kwa kila ukurasa na gharama ya kufunga ni malipo. Gharama ya kutuma au kupokea faksi ni takriban $2 kwa kila ukurasa. Gharama ya kusoma barua pepe au simu iko ndani 6 nyongeza za dakika. Kumbuka kwamba gharama ya kutuma 10 barua pepe 1 mstari kila mmoja kwa mwanasheria gharama 1 hr kusoma na 1 saa moja kujibu kama mawakili watakavyotoza 6 dakika kwa kila barua pepe kusoma na kujibu.
Kielelezo 2 – Kielelezo 13 onyesha gharama tofauti za mradi za kesi tofauti na gharama inaweza kufikia mamia ya maelfu ya dola kwa gharama ya kisheria pekee.
Kielelezo 1 Wastani wa juhudi katika mashtaka sita ya utesaji wa magari, dhima ya majengo, makosa ya kitaaluma, uvunjaji wa mkataba, mgogoro wa ajira, na migogoro ya mali isiyohamishika.
Kielelezo 2 Gharama iliyokadiriwa ya kesi za utesaji wa magari bila shahidi mtaalam. Kesi hizo zimeundwa kama viwango vitatu tofauti vya ugumu.
Kielelezo 3 Gharama iliyokadiriwa ya kesi za utesaji wa magari na shahidi mtaalam. Kesi hizo zimeundwa kama viwango vitatu tofauti vya ugumu.
Kielelezo 4 Makadirio ya Gharama ya kesi za Uovu bila shahidi mtaalamu. Kesi hizo zimeundwa kama viwango vitatu tofauti vya ugumu.
Kielelezo 5 Makadirio ya Gharama ya kesi za Uovu na shahidi mtaalamu. Kesi hizo zimeundwa kama viwango vitatu tofauti vya ugumu.
Kielelezo 6 Makadirio ya Gharama ya kesi za migogoro ya Ajira bila shahidi mtaalam. Kesi hizo zimeundwa kama viwango vitatu tofauti vya ugumu.
Kielelezo 7 Makadirio ya Gharama ya kesi za migogoro ya Ajira na shahidi mtaalam. Kesi hizo zimeundwa kama viwango vitatu tofauti vya ugumu.
Kielelezo 8 Makadirio ya Gharama ya kesi za dhima ya majengo bila shahidi mtaalam. Kesi hizo zimeundwa kama viwango vitatu tofauti vya ugumu.
Kielelezo 9 Makadirio ya Gharama ya kesi za dhima ya majengo na shahidi mtaalam. Kesi hizo zimeundwa kama viwango vitatu tofauti vya ugumu.
Kielelezo 10 Makadirio ya Gharama ya kesi za Mali Halisi bila shahidi mtaalam. Kesi hizo zimeundwa kama viwango vitatu tofauti vya ugumu.
Kielelezo 11 Makadirio ya Gharama ya kesi za Mali Halisi na shahidi mtaalam. Kesi hizo zimeundwa kama viwango vitatu tofauti vya ugumu.
Kielelezo 12 Makadirio ya Gharama ya kesi za Mzozo wa Mkataba bila shahidi mtaalam. Kesi hizo zimeundwa kama viwango vitatu tofauti vya ugumu.
Kielelezo 13 Makadirio ya Gharama ya kesi za Mzozo wa Mkataba na shahidi mtaalam. Kesi hizo zimeundwa kama viwango vitatu tofauti vya ugumu.
Kanusho :
Chapisho hili ni kwa madhumuni ya habari pekee na halitoi ushauri wa kisheria. Nyenzo kwenye tovuti hii zimechapishwa na Wael Badawy na kuwapa wageni habari bila malipo kuhusu sheria na sera zilizoelezwa.. Hata hivyo, tovuti hii haijaundwa kwa madhumuni ya kutoa ushauri wa kisheria kwa watu binafsi. Wageni hawapaswi kutegemea maelezo kwenye tovuti hii kama mbadala wa ushauri wa kibinafsi wa kisheria. Ingawa tunafanya kila juhudi kutoa maelezo sahihi ya tovuti, sheria zinaweza kubadilika na dosari kutokea licha ya juhudi zetu bora. Ikiwa una shida ya kibinafsi ya kisheria, unapaswa kutafuta ushauri wa kisheria kutoka kwa wakili katika mkoa/jimbo lako.
Mzunguko wa kesi.
Kwa vile kesi inaweza kuwa ngumu sana au rahisi sana inaweza kuigwa kwa hatua sita. Hatua ni Kuanzishwa kwa Kesi, Ugunduzi, Suluhu, Mwendo wa Majaribio, Jaribio, Utoaji wa Baada.
Kwa aina zote za kesi, kesi ni hatua moja ya muda mrefu zaidi ya kesi, inayojumuisha kati ya theluthi moja na nusu ya muda wote wa kesi katika kesi zinazoendelea katika kesi. Ugunduzi ni hatua ya pili inayotumia wakati mwingi, inayojumuisha kati ya moja ya tano na robo ya jumla ya saa za wakili. Hatua zilizobaki za madai kila moja ilihitaji chini ya 15 asilimia ya muda wote wa wakili.
Suluhu inaweza kutokea katika hatua yoyote. Rufaa itaanza pia katika hatua 1, Ugunduzi unaweza usiwe wa kina kama mzunguko wa asili.
Shughuli katika kila hatua zimefafanuliwa hapa chini.
Jukwaa 1: Kuanzishwa kwa kesi
Uchunguzi wa ukweli wa awali; utafiti wa kisheria; rasimu ya malalamiko/jibu, madai mtambuka, dai la kupinga au la mtu wa tatu; hoja ya kufutwa kwa misingi ya kiutaratibu; ulinzi kwa mwendo wa taratibu; kukutana na kushauriana kuhusu upangaji wa kesi na ugunduzi.
Hatua ya 2: Ugunduzi
Rasimu na faili ufichuzi wa lazima; rasimu/jibu maswali; kujibu maombi ya utengenezaji wa hati; kutambua na kushauriana na wataalam; kagua ripoti za wataalam; kutambua na kuwahoji mashahidi wasio wataalamu; kuwaondoa mashahidi wa wapinzani; jitayarishe na uhudhurie madai ya wapinzani; kutatua masuala ya habari iliyohifadhiwa kielektroniki; kagua ugunduzi/ tathmini ya kesi; kutatua migogoro ya ugunduzi.
Jukwaa 3: Suluhu
Hudhuria ADR ya lazima; mazungumzo ya suluhu; mikutano ya makazi; rasimu ya makubaliano ya makazi; rasimu na hoja ya kuwasilisha kufutwa.
Jukwaa 4: Mwendo/Maombi ya Kabla ya Jaribio
Utafiti wa kisheria; rasimu ya hoja katika kikomo; rasimu ya hoja za uamuzi wa muhtasari; kujibu hoja za wapinzani; kujiandaa kwa mashauri ya hoja; hoja za hoja.
Jukwaa 5: Jaribio
Utafiti wa kisheria; kuandaa mashahidi na wataalam; kukutana na wanasheria wenza (timu ya majaribio); jitayarishe kwa shida; mwendo wa kukamata; kuandaa taarifa za ufunguzi na kufunga; kujiandaa kwa moja kwa moja (na msalaba) uchunguzi; kuandaa maagizo ya jury; kupendekeza matokeo ya ukweli na hitimisho la sheria; kupendekeza amri; kufanya majaribio.
Jukwaa 6: Utoaji wa Baada
Fanya mazungumzo ya utatuzi wa baada ya ugawaji; rasimu ya hoja za kusikilizwa upya, JNOV, imeongezwa, inatolewa, kutekeleza hukumu; shughuli yoyote ya rufaa.
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Kanusho :
Chapisho hili ni kwa madhumuni ya habari pekee na halitoi ushauri wa kisheria. Nyenzo kwenye tovuti hii zimechapishwa na Wael Badawy na kuwapa wageni habari bila malipo kuhusu sheria na sera zilizoelezwa.. Hata hivyo, tovuti hii haijaundwa kwa madhumuni ya kutoa ushauri wa kisheria kwa watu binafsi. Wageni hawapaswi kutegemea maelezo kwenye tovuti hii kama mbadala wa ushauri wa kibinafsi wa kisheria. Ingawa tunafanya kila juhudi kutoa maelezo sahihi ya tovuti, sheria zinaweza kubadilika na dosari kutokea licha ya juhudi zetu bora. Ikiwa una shida ya kibinafsi ya kisheria, unapaswa kutafuta ushauri wa kisheria kutoka kwa wakili katika mkoa/jimbo lako.
MKATABA.—I. HISTORIA.
Na Oliver Wendell Holmes, Mdogo.
Fundisho la mkataba limerekebishwa kikamilifu ili kukidhi mahitaji ya nyakati za kisasa, kwamba kuna kidogo hapa kuliko mahali pengine kwa utafiti wa kihistoria. Imejadiliwa kwa ustadi kiasi kwamba kuna nafasi ndogo hapa mahali pengine kwa uchambuzi mpya. Lakini ufupi wa ukuaji wa mafundisho ya kisasa, iwe ni lazima au la, angalau itakuwa ya kuvutia, wakati uchambuzi wa sifa zao kuu hauwezi kuachwa, na inaweza kuwasilisha vipengele vipya.
Inaaminika kuwa aina za zamani zaidi za mkataba zinazojulikana kwa sheria yetu ni agano na deni, na ni za mapema, hakuna shaka. Lakini kuna mikataba mingine ambayo bado inatumika, ingawa kwa kiwango fulani wameweka fomu za kisasa, angalau kupendekeza swali kama hawakuwa na mwonekano wa mapema sawa.
Moja ya haya, kiapo cha ahadi, sio tena msingi wa haki zozote katika sheria za kibinafsi. Inatumika, lakini hasa kama sherehe inayohusiana na kuingia kwenye ofisi ya umma. Jaji anaapa kwamba atatekeleza haki kwa mujibu wa sheria, juryman kwamba atapata hukumu yake kwa mujibu wa sheria na ushahidi, raia mpya aliyepitishwa kuwa atakuwa na imani ya kweli na utii kwa serikali anayoichagua.
Lakini kuna mkataba mwingine ambao una sehemu muhimu zaidi. Inaweza, labda, sauti ya kitendawili kutaja mkataba wa udhamini. Udhamini, siku hizi, ni wajibu wa nyongeza tu, ambayo inapendekeza ahadi kuu, na ambayo, hadi sasa asili ya mkataba inakwenda, ni kama nyingine yoyote. Lakini, kama ilivyoonyeshwa na Laferriere, /1/ na uwezekano mkubwa wa waandishi wa awali, mdhamini wa sheria ya kale alikuwa mateka, na kuwapa watu mateka hakukuwa tu kwa shughuli za kimataifa.
Katika mapenzi ya kitambo ya zamani ya Huon wa Bordeaux, Huon, baada ya kumuua mtoto wa Charlemagne, inahitajika na Kaisari kufanya mambo mbalimbali yanayoonekana kutowezekana kama bei ya msamaha. Huon anaanza kazi, akiwaacha wapiganaji wake kumi na wawili kama mateka. /2/ Anarudi kwa mafanikio, lakini mwanzoni Mfalme anafanywa kuamini kwamba maagizo yake yamepuuzwa. Hapo Charlemagne analia, “Ninaita hapa ahadi za Huon. nitazitundika, wala hawatakuwa na fidia.” /3/ Hivyo, wakati Huon atapigana duwa, kwa njia ya kuthibitisha ukweli au uwongo wa shtaka dhidi yake, kila chama huanza kwa kutoa baadhi ya marafiki zake kama mateka.
Wakati mateka wanatolewa kwa ajili ya duwa ambayo ni kuamua ukweli au uongo wa mashtaka, shughuli hiyo iko karibu sana na kutoa usalama sawa katika kesi ya kesi mahakamani. Kwa kweli hii ilikuwa njia ya kawaida ya utaratibu wa Kijerumani. Itakumbukwa kwamba kuonekana kwa sheria mapema zaidi ilikuwa kama mbadala wa ugomvi wa kibinafsi kati ya familia au koo.. Lakini wakati mshtakiwa ambaye hakuwasilisha kwa amani mamlaka ya mahakama anaweza kuwekwa nje ya ulinzi wa sheria., ili mtu ye yote amuue mbele ya macho yake, mwanzoni hakukuwa na njia ya kupata fidia ambayo mlalamikaji alikuwa na haki isipokuwa mshtakiwa alichagua kutoa usalama huo.. /1/
Desturi za Kiingereza ambazo zimehifadhiwa kwetu ni za juu zaidi, lakini moja ya sifa zinazoonekana katika utaratibu wao ni kutoa usalama katika kila hatua. Wanasheria wote watakumbuka athari ya hii katika hadithi ya uwongo ya John Doe na Richard Roe, ahadi za mlalamikaji kushtaki hatua yake. Lakini mfano muhimu zaidi unapatikana katika sheria inayorudiwa katika sheria nyingi za mwanzo, kwamba mshtakiwa anayetuhumiwa kwa makosa lazima aidha apate usalama au aende gerezani. /2/ Usalama huu ulikuwa mateka wa siku za awali, na baadaye, wakati vitendo vya adhabu na kurekebisha vilipotenganishwa kutoka kwa kila mmoja, ikawa dhamana ya sheria ya jinai. Dhima bado ilitungwa kwa njia sawa na wakati dhamana ilipoweka mwili wake mwenyewe katika mamlaka ya chama kilichopatikana..
Moja ya nyongeza za Charlemagne kwenye Lex Salica inazungumza juu ya mtu huru ambaye amejitolea kwa nguvu ya mwingine kwa njia ya dhamana.. /3/ Maneno haya yamenakiliwa katika sheria za Kiingereza za Henry I. /4/ Tumeona hii ilimaanisha nini katika hadithi ya Huon wa Bordeaux. Kioo cha Majaji /5/ Anasema kwamba Mfalme Canute alikuwa akiwahukumu wafungwa kama wakuu wakati wakuu wao hawakuwa katika hukumu., lakini Mfalme Henry I. iliweka sheria ya Canute kwa wafungwa wakuu ambao walikuwa wakikubali ukweli.
Hadi wakati wa utawala wa Edward III., Shard, hakimu wa Kiingereza, baada ya kusema sheria kama ilivyo, dhamana hiyo ni wafungwa, na atashtakiwa akitoroka, anaona, kwamba wengine wanasema kwamba dhamana itanyongwa badala yake. /1/ Hii ilikuwa ni sheria katika kesi inayofanana ya mlinzi wa jela. /2/ Dhana ya zamani inapaswa kufuatiliwa katika fomu ambayo bado inatolewa na waandishi wa kisasa kwa ajili ya kutekeleza dhamana kwa kosa.. Wamefungwa “mwili kwa mwili,” /3/ na vitabu vya sheria vya kisasa vinaona kuwa ni muhimu kusema kwamba hii haiwafanyi kuwajibika kwa adhabu ya mkosaji mkuu ikiwa hatatokea., lakini kwa faini tu. /4/ Mkataba pia ulitofautiana na mawazo yetu ya kisasa katika mfumo wa utekelezaji. Ilikuwa ni kukiri wazi kwa dhima mbele ya afisa aliyeidhinishwa kuichukua. Saini ya dhamana haikuwa lazima, /5/ na haikuwa sharti kwamba mtu aliyepewa dhamana ajifunge kama chama. /6/
Lakini sifa hizi zimerekebishwa au kuondolewa kwa sheria, na nimekaa juu ya kesi hiyo, sio zaidi ya aina maalum ya mkataba tofauti na zingine zote kwani historia ya asili yake inaonyesha moja ya maonyesho ya kwanza ya mkataba katika sheria yetu.. Inapaswa kufuatiliwa hadi kuongezeka kwa imani hatua kwa hatua kwa heshima ya mateka ikiwa kesi inayomtaka ajisalimishe itafika., na matokeo yake kulegezwa kwa kifungo halisi. Mfano unaweza kupatikana katika njia sambamba ya kushughulika na mfungwa mwenyewe. Dhamana yake, ambaye mwili wake unatakiwa kutolewa, kuwa na haki ya kumkamata wakati wowote na mahali popote, lakini anaruhusiwa kwenda nje hadi ajisalimishe. Itakuwa niliona kwamba aina hii ya mkataba, kama deni kama ilivyoshughulikiwa na sheria ya Kirumi ya Majedwali Kumi na Mbili, na kwa nia hiyo hiyo, ingawa kwa mchakato tofauti, iliangalia mwili wa mhusika kama kuridhika.
Deni ni mgombea mwingine na maarufu zaidi kwa heshima ya kipaumbele. Tangu wakati wa Savigny, kuonekana kwa mara ya kwanza kwa mkataba katika sheria za Kirumi na Ujerumani mara nyingi kumehusishwa na kesi ya uuzaji na ajali iliyobaki bila kukamilika.. Swali halionekani kuwa la maana kubwa kifalsafa. Ili kueleza jinsi wanadamu walivyojifunza kwanza kuahidi, lazima tuende kwenye metafizikia, na ujue jinsi ilivyowahi kutunga wakati ujao. Asili ya ahadi mahususi ambayo ilitekelezwa kwa mara ya kwanza katika mfumo fulani haiwezi kusababisha ukweli wowote wa umuhimu wa jumla. Lakini historia ya hatua ya deni inafundisha, ingawa kwa njia ya unyenyekevu. Ni muhimu kujua kitu juu yake ili kuelewa sheria zilizoangaziwa ambazo zinaunda sheria ya mkataba kwa wakati huu..
Katika andiko la Glanvill hatua ya deni inapatikana tayari kuwa mojawapo ya tiba zinazojulikana sana. Lakini sheria ya siku hizo ilikuwa bado katika hali ya zamani, na itafikiriwa kwa urahisi kwamba aina ya hatua ambayo inarudi nyuma hadi ambayo haikuanzishwa kwa ubaguzi wowote dhaifu.. Ilikuwa, kama nitajaribu kuonyesha moja kwa moja, fomu ya jumla ambayo dai lolote la pesa lilikusanywa, isipokuwa madai yasiyo na kikomo ya uharibifu kwa nguvu, ambayo ilikusudiwa suluhisho la jumla sawa la kosa.
Imefikiriwa kwamba hatua hiyo ilipitishwa kutoka kwa utaratibu wa wakati huo uliostaarabika zaidi wa sheria ya Kirumi. Maoni ya asili, kwa kuona kwamba waandishi wote wa kwanza wa sheria wa Kiingereza wanachukua misemo na uainishaji wao kutoka Roma. Bado inaonekana zaidi kuwa hatua hiyo ni ya asili ya Kijerumani. Ina sifa za utaratibu wa awali ambao unapatikana kwenye Bara, kama ilivyoelezwa na Laband. /1/
Kiini cha madai ya mlalamikaji kama ilivyofafanuliwa katika hati ya deni ni kwamba mshtakiwa anadaiwa sana na anaizuia kimakosa.. Haijalishi, kwa madai yaliyoandaliwa kama hiyo, jinsi wajibu wa mshtakiwa unavyotokea. Sio tu kwenye mkataba. Imeridhika ikiwa kuna jukumu la kulipa kwa msingi wowote. Inasema hitimisho tu la sheria, si mambo ya hakika ambayo juu yake hitimisho hilo linategemea, na ambayo dhima hutokea. Malalamiko ya zamani ya Wajerumani yalikuwa, kwa namna hiyohiyo, “A ananidai sana.”
Ilikuwa ni tabia ya utaratibu wa Wajerumani kwamba mshtakiwa angeweza kukutana na malalamiko hayo kwa kujibu, kwa fomu ya jumla sawa, kwamba hakuwa na deni la mdai. Mdai alilazimika kufanya zaidi ya kudai tu deni, ikiwa atamzuia mshtakiwa kutoroka kwa njia hiyo. Nchini Uingereza, ikiwa mdai hakuwa na kitu cha kuonyesha kwa deni lake, kukana kwa mshtakiwa kumemfanya atoke nje ya mahakama; na hata kama alikuwa nayo, aliwajibika kushindwa kwa kuapishwa kwa mshtakiwa na baadhi ya marafiki zake kumuunga mkono kuwa hana deni lolote.. Sababu kuu kwa nini deni lilibadilishwa kwa karne nyingi na suluhisho la baadaye, kudhaniwa, ulikuwa uhai wa masalio haya ya siku za mwanzo.
Hatimaye, nchini Uingereza kama huko Ujerumani, deni la kuzuiliwa kwa pesa ni kaka pacha wa hatua iliyofikishwa kwa kushikilia vibaya aina nyingine yoyote ya mazungumzo.. Kiini cha malalamiko katika kesi zote mbili kilikuwa sawa.
Inaonekana ajabu kwamba bidhaa hii ghafi ya uchanga wa sheria inapaswa kuwa na umuhimu wowote kwetu kwa wakati huu. Walakini wakati wowote tunapofuatilia fundisho kuu la sheria kuu nyuma vya kutosha, kuna uwezekano mkubwa wa kupata hali fulani ya utaratibu iliyosahaulika kwenye chanzo chake. Vielelezo vya ukweli huu vimetolewa tayari. Hatua ya deni na vitendo vingine vya mkataba vitatoa wengine. Deni hutupa mwanga zaidi juu ya fundisho la kuzingatia.
Sheria yetu haitekelezi kila ahadi ambayo mwanadamu anaweza kutoa. Ahadi zilizotolewa kama ahadi tisini na tisa kati ya mia ni, kwa maneno ya mdomo au maandishi rahisi, hazilazimiki isipokuwa kama kuna mazingatio kwao. Hiyo ni, kama inavyoelezewa kawaida, isipokuwa aliyeahidi aidha ametoa manufaa kwa mtoa ahadi, au kupata madhara, kama kichocheo cha ahadi.
Imefikiriwa kuwa sheria hii ilikopwa kutoka kwa sheria ya Kirumi na Chancery, na, baada ya kufanyiwa marekebisho fulani hapo, kupitishwa katika sheria ya kawaida.
Lakini maelezo haya ya jambo hilo yanatia shaka angalau. Hadi sasa matumizi ya maneno yanaenda, Sijui kuwa kuzingatia kunaitwa kwa uwazi sababu kabla ya utawala wa Elizabeth; katika ripoti za awali daima inaonekana kama quid pro quo. Muonekano wake wa kwanza, mpaka nijuavyo, iko kwenye akaunti ya Fleta ya hatua ya deni, /1/ na ingawa nina mwelekeo wa kuamini kuwa kauli ya Fleta si ya kuaminiwa, kuzingatiwa kwa uangalifu kwa mpangilio wa matukio katika Vitabu vya Mwaka kutaonyeshwa, nafikiri, kwamba fundisho hilo lilikuzwa kikamilifu katika deni kabla ya kutajwa kwake katika usawa kupatikana. Mojawapo ya marejeleo ya mapema zaidi ya kile mtoa ahadi alipaswa kuwa nacho kwa ahadi yake ilikuwa katika hatua ya kudhani.. /1/ Lakini fundisho hilo hakika halikuanzia hapo. Kutajwa kwa kwanza kwa kuzingatia katika uhusiano na usawa ambayo nimeona ni katika mfumo wa quid pro quo., /2/ na hutokea baada ya hitaji kuthibitishwa kikamilifu katika deni. /3/
Ukweli mmoja kwamba mazingatio hayakuhitajika kamwe kwa mikataba iliyotiwa muhuri, isipokuwa Fleta itaaminika dhidi ya uzito mkubwa wa karibu ushahidi wa wakati mmoja, inaenda mbali zaidi kuonesha kuwa kanuni hiyo haiwezi kuwa imetokana na misingi ya sera kama sheria ya msingi. Na kinyume chake, sadfa ya fundisho na njia ya kipekee ya utaratibu inaelekeza kwa nguvu sana kwa uwezekano kwamba mahitaji ya kipekee na utaratibu wa kipekee viliunganishwa.. Itatupa mwanga juu ya swali kuweka pamoja ukweli machache usio na shaka, na kuzingatia ni matokeo gani yalifuata asili. Kwa hiyo itakuwa ni kuhitajika kuchunguza hatua ya deni kidogo zaidi. Lakini ni haki tu kukubali, mwanzoni, kwamba natoa ufafanuzi unaofuata kwa mashaka makubwa, na, nafikiri, kwa uthamini kamili wa pingamizi zinazoweza kusisitizwa.
Ilizingatiwa muda mfupi uliopita, hiyo, ili kupata nafuu dhidi ya mshtakiwa ambaye alikana deni lake, ilimbidi mdai aonyeshe kitu kwa ajili yake; vinginevyo alikabidhiwa mamlaka yenye mipaka ya mahakama za kiroho. /4/ Hitaji hili halikumaanisha ushahidi katika maana ya kisasa. Ilimaanisha tu kwamba lazima adumishe dhamira yake katika mojawapo ya njia zinazotambuliwa na sheria. Hawa walikuwa watatu, duwa, maandishi, na mashahidi. Pambano hilo halihitaji kujadiliwa, kwani hivi karibuni ilikoma kutumika katika deni, na haina uhusiano wowote na kile ninachosema. Kesi kwa maandishi na kwa mashahidi, Kwa upande mwingine, lazima zote mbili zichunguzwe kwa uangalifu. Itakuwa rahisi kufikiria mwisho kwanza na kujua mashahidi hawa walikuwa nini.
Jambo moja tunajua mwanzoni; hawakuwa mashahidi kama tunavyoelewa neno hilo. Hazikuwasilishwa mbele ya jury kwa uchunguzi na uchunguzi, wala ushahidi wao haukutegemea matokeo yake katika kuaminiwa na mahakama iliyosikiliza. Siku hizi, kesi haiamuliwi na ushahidi, lakini kwa hukumu, au ugunduzi wa ukweli, ikifuatiwa na hukumu. Kiapo cha shahidi hakina athari isipokuwa kikiaminiwa. Lakini wakati wa Henry II. kesi yetu na jury haikuwepo. Kiapo kiliporuhusiwa kuapishwa kilikuwa na athari sawa, iwe iliaminika au la. Hakukuwa na utoaji wa kuipepeta na mwili wa pili. Katika kesi hizo ambapo kesi na mashahidi iliwezekana, ikiwa chama kiliitishwa kwenda mbele kinaweza kupata idadi fulani ya wanaume ambao walikuwa tayari kuapa kwa fomu fulani, kulikuwa na mwisho wa jambo hilo.
Sasa hii inaonekana kama njia ya awali zaidi ya kuanzisha deni kuliko kutoa hati ya maandishi ya mshtakiwa., na ni nyenzo ya kugundua asili yake.
Kesi ambazo aina hii ya majaribio ilitumika zinaonekana kutoka kwa vitabu vya awali na ripoti kuwa karibu kabisa zilijikita kwenye madai yanayotokana na mauzo au mkopo.. Na swali linatokea mara moja, iwe hatuko kwenye athari za taasisi ambayo tayari ilikuwa ya zamani wakati Glanvill aliandika. Kwa karne nyingi kabla ya Conquest Anglo-Saxon sheria /1/ ilihitaji kuchaguliwa kwa idadi fulani ya mashahidi rasmi, wawili au watatu kati yao walipaswa kuitwa katika kila biashara ya mauzo. Lengo ambalo mashahidi hawa walianzishiwa sio kawaida kuwa uthibitisho wa madeni. Wanarudi nyuma wakati ambapo wizi na makosa kama hayo yalikuwa msingi wa kesi, na madhumuni ambayo waliteuliwa yalikuwa kupata njia ya kuamua kama mtu aliyeshtakiwa kwa kuiba mali aliipata kwa njia halali au la.. Mshtakiwa angeweza kujisafisha na hatia kwa kiapo chao kwamba alinunua au kupokea kitu hicho waziwazi kwa njia iliyowekwa na sheria..
Akiwa amekuwepo kwenye dili, mashahidi waliweza kuapa kwa kile walichokiona na kusikia, ikiwa swali lolote lilizuka kati ya wahusika. Ipasavyo, matumizi yao hayakuwekwa tu katika kuondoa shtaka la uhalifu. Lakini huduma hiyo maalum inabainisha mashahidi wa shughuli za kipindi cha Saxon. Sasa tunajua kwamba matumizi ya mashahidi hawa hayakupotea mara moja chini ya ushawishi wa Norman. Wanapatikana na kazi yao ya zamani katika sheria za William Mshindi. /1/ Lugha ya Glanvill inaonekana kuthibitisha kwamba walikuwa bado wanajulikana chini ya Henry II. Anasema hivyo, ikiwa mnunuzi hawezi kumwita mtu ambaye alinunua kutoka kwake, ili kumiliki mali kwake na kutetea shauri hilo, (kwani akifanya hivyo, hatari huhamishiwa kwa muuzaji,) basi ikiwa mnunuzi ana uthibitisho wa kutosha wa kuwa amenunua kitu hicho kihalali, wa alama yake halali, itamwondolea kosa. Lakini kama hana suti ya kutosha, atakuwa hatarini. /2/ Hii ni sheria ya William tena. Inafuata kwamba wanunuzi bado walitumia mashahidi wa shughuli.
Lakini Glanvill pia anaonekana kukubali matumizi ya shahidi kuanzisha madeni. /1/ Kwa kuwa mashahidi wa shughuli hiyo walipatikana hapo awali kwa madhumuni haya, Sioni sababu ya kuwa na shaka kuwa bado walikuwa, na kwamba anazungumza juu yao hapa pia. /2/ Aidha, kwa muda mrefu baada ya Henry II., wakati wowote hatua ililetwa kwa ajili ya deni ambalo hapakuwa na ushahidi wa maandishi, mlalamikaji, alipoulizwa ni nini anachotakiwa kukionyesha, alijibu kila mara “suti nzuri,” na kuwaleta mashahidi wake, ambao wakati mwingine walichunguzwa na mahakama. /3/ Nadhani si kukaza ushahidi kuthibitisha kwamba “suti nzuri” wa ripoti za baadaye alikuwa kizazi cha mashahidi wa shughuli ya Saxon, kama imeonyeshwa kuwa secta ya Glanvill ilikuwa. /4/
Kwa kuchukulia hatua hii katika hoja kuwa imechukuliwa, itakuwa vizuri kukumbuka tena kwa muda asili asili ya kiapo cha shahidi. Ilifungwa kwa ukweli ndani ya mashahidi’ maarifa kwa kuona na kusikia. Lakini kwa vile madhumuni ambayo mashahidi walitolewa yalihitaji tu uwepo wao wakati mali ilibadilisha mikono, kesi kuu ambayo wangeweza kuwa wa huduma kati ya wahusika kwenye biashara ilikuwa wakati deni lilipodaiwa kwa sababu ya utoaji wa mali.. Madhumuni hayakuhusu makubaliano ambayo yalikuwa ya utekelezaji wa pande zote mbili, kwa sababu hakuna suala la wizi linaweza kutokea. Na Glanvill anaonyesha kwamba katika wakati wake Mahakama ya Mfalme haikutekeleza makubaliano hayo. /1/ Sasa, ikiwa kiapo cha madhehebu kingetumika tu kuanzisha deni ambapo mashahidi wa shughuli wangeweza kuapa., itaonekana, kwa urahisi vya kutosha, jinsi ajali ya utaratibu inaweza kuwa imesababisha utawala muhimu zaidi wa sheria ya msingi.
Sheria kwamba mashahidi wanaweza tu kuapa kwa ukweli ndani ya ujuzi wao, pamoja na ajali kwamba mashahidi hawa hawakutumiwa katika shughuli ambazo zinaweza kusababisha deni, isipokuwa kwa ukweli fulani, yaani, utoaji wa mali, pamoja na ajali zaidi kwamba utoaji huu ulikuwa wa hali ya juu, ilikuwa sawa na kanuni hiyo, wakati deni lilipothibitishwa na mashahidi lazima kuwe na quid pro quo. Lakini madeni haya yalithibitishwa na mashahidi, badala ya by deed ndio tunaita simple contract madeni, na hivyo kuanza na deni, na baadaye kujitanua kwa mikataba mingine, imeanzishwa fundisho letu la pekee na muhimu zaidi ambalo kila mkataba rahisi lazima uzingatiwe. Hii haikuwa sheria ya deni au mikataba iliyothibitishwa kwa njia ya kawaida na muhuri wa mshtakiwa, na ukweli kwamba ilitumika tu kwa majukumu ambayo hapo awali yaliwekwa na utaratibu wa matumizi machache, huenda mbali kuonyesha kwamba uhusiano na utaratibu haukuwa wa bahati mbaya.
Njia ya uthibitisho ilibadilika hivi karibuni, lakini hadi wakati wa utawala wa Malkia Elizabeth tunapata athari ya uhusiano huu wa asili. Inasemekana, “Lakini sheria ya kawaida inahitaji kuwe na sababu mpya (i. e. kuzingatia), ambayo nchi inaweza kuwa na akili au maarifa kwa ajili ya majaribio yake, ikiwa ni lazima, hivyo kwamba ni muhimu kwa Mali ya Umma.” /1/ Bwana Mansfield alionyesha uvumbuzi wake wa misingi ya kihistoria ya sheria yetu aliposema, “Ninachukulia kwamba dhana ya zamani kuhusu kutozingatiwa ilikuwa kwa ajili ya ushahidi tu; kwa wakati inapunguzwa kwa maandishi, kama katika maagano, utaalamu, vifungo, na kadhalika., hapakuwa na pingamizi kwa kutaka kuzingatiwa.” /2/
Iwapo itapingwa kwamba hoja iliyotangulia ni lazima iwe na deni, ambapo hitaji la kuzingatia linatumika sawa kwa mikataba yote rahisi, jibu ni, kwamba kwa uwezekano wote sheria hiyo ilitokana na deni, na kuenea kutoka kwa deni hadi mikataba mingine.
Lakini, tena, inaweza kuulizwa kama hakukuwa na mikataba mingine iliyothibitishwa na mashahidi isipokuwa ile iliyotajwa. Je, hakukuwa na mikataba iliyothibitishwa kwa njia ambayo kuzingatia kwa bahati mbaya kulikuwa kunataka? Kwa hili pia kuna jibu rahisi. Mikataba inayotekelezwa na mahakama za kiraia, hata marehemu kama Henry II., walikuwa wachache na rahisi. Utaratibu wa mashahidi bila shaka ulikuwa mpana wa kutosha kwa mikataba yote ambayo ilifanywa hapo awali. Kando na zile za kuuza, mkopo, na kadhalika, ambazo zimetajwa, Ninapata lakini majukumu mawili ya kimkataba. Hizi zilikuwa dhamana zinazoambatana na uuzaji na udhamini ambazo zilirejelewa mwanzoni mwa Mhadhara.. Ya zamani, dhamana ya hati miliki ilichukuliwa kuwa ni wajibu uliotolewa na sheria nje ya uhusiano wa mnunuzi na muuzaji kuliko kama mkataba.. Dhamana nyingine za moja kwa moja zilikuwa ni mambo yaliyo katika ufahamu wa mashahidi wa shughuli hiyo, wakaapishwa nao katika nyakati za Saksoni. /1/
Lakini katika kipindi cha Norman udhamini ni kidogo sana kusikia, isipokuwa kuhusu ardhi, na kisha ikaamuliwa na duwa. Ilitoweka kabisa, isipokuwa pale ilipojumuishwa katika tendo, kwamba haiwezi kuwa na ushawishi juu ya sheria ya kuzingatia. Kwa hivyo nitadhani, bila maelezo zaidi, kwamba haikubaliani na kesi./1/
Kisha kuhusu ahadi au mdhamini. Hakulipa tena na mwili wake, isipokuwa katika kesi za kipekee sana, lakini dhima yake ilitafsiriwa kuwa pesa, na kutekelezwa katika hatua ya deni. Mkataba huu uliopitwa na wakati, kama madeni mengine ya wakati wa Glanvill, inaweza kuthibitishwa na shahidi bila maandishi, /2/ na katika kesi hii hapakuwa na maanani kama hiyo, faida kama hiyo kwa mtoa ahadi, kama sheria ilivyohitaji wakati fundisho lilipotangazwa kwa mara ya kwanza. Lakini hii pia sio muhimu, kwa sababu dhima yake juu ya kiapo cha shahidi ilifikia mwisho, pamoja na ile ya waranti, kabla ya misingi kuwekwa kwa kanuni ninayotaka kuieleza. Upesi uandishi ukahitajika, kama itakavyoonekana baada ya muda mfupi.
Matokeo hadi sasa ni, kwamba hatua pekee ya mkataba katika wakati wa Glanvill ilikuwa deni, kwamba madeni pekee yaliyolipwa bila maandishi ni yale ambayo yameelezwa, na kwamba moja tu kati ya hizi ambazo hazikuwa na quid pro quo zilikoma kupatikana tena kwa njia hiyo wakati wa utawala wa Edward III..
Lakini mabadiliko makubwa yalikuwa yanaanza katika utawala wa Henry II. Mikataba mbalimbali na ngumu zaidi ilikuja kutekelezwa hivi karibuni. Inaweza kuulizwa, Kwa nini wigo wa kiapo cha shahidi haukuongezwa, au, kama ushahidi wowote bora ungekuja, mbona madhehebu hayakuondolewa, na ushuhuda mwingine wa mdomo uliokubaliwa? Katika tukio lolote, sheria ya Henry II inaweza kuwa na wakati gani na kuzingatia, ambayo haikusikika hadi karne nyingi baadaye?
Ni wazi kuwa kiapo cha shahidi, ambayo huondoa kesi kwa ukweli rahisi kwamba imeapishwa, sio njia ya kuridhisha ya uthibitisho. Uandikishaji wa maandishi wa deni unaotolewa mahakamani, na kutambuliwa vya kutosha kama iliyotolewa na mshtakiwa, ni dhahiri bora zaidi. Jambo pekee dhaifu kuhusu uandishi ni njia ya kuitambulisha kama ya mshtakiwa, na ugumu huu ulitoweka mara tu matumizi ya mihuri yalipoanza kuwa ya kawaida. Hii ilikuwa imefanyika zaidi au kidogo wakati wa Glanvill, na kisha yote ambayo chama kilipaswa kufanya ni kutoa maandishi na kuridhisha mahakama kwa ukaguzi kwamba alama kwenye nta ilitoshea muhuri wa mpinzani wake.. /1/ Kiapo cha madhehebu kinaweza kufikiwa kwa mafanikio na sheria, /2/ hiyo ni, kwa kiapo cha kupinga sehemu ya mshtakiwa, na idadi sawa au mara mbili ya waapishaji wenzako iliyotolewa na mlalamikaji. Lakini maandishi yaliyothibitishwa kuwa ya mshtakiwa hayawezi kupingwa. /1/ Maana mtu akisema amefungwa, alikuwa amefungwa. Hakukuwa na swali la kuzingatia, kwa sababu bado hapakuwa na mafundisho kama hayo. Alikuwa amefungwa sawa ikiwa alikubali wajibu wote mahali popote kuwa na rekodi, kama vile mahakama kuu, ambayo kukiri kwake kungeweza kuthibitishwa. Hakika, hadi leo baadhi ya dhamana huchukuliwa kwa kukiri kwa mdomo mbele ya karani wa mahakama aliyoibainisha kwenye karatasi zake.. Faida ya uandishi haikuwa tu kwamba ilitoa uthibitisho bora katika kesi za zamani, lakini pia kwamba ilifanya iwezekane kutekeleza majukumu ambayo vinginevyo kusingekuwa na uthibitisho wowote.
Kile ambacho kimesemwa kinaeleza vya kutosha upendeleo wa uthibitisho kwa kuandika kwa uthibitisho kwa kiapo cha shahidi wa kizamani.. Lakini kulikuwa na sababu zingine nzuri kwa nini mwisho haupaswi kupanuliwa zaidi ya mipaka yake ya zamani. Mashahidi wa shughuli hiyo walikuwa wakipoteza sifa zao za kisheria na rasmi. Tayari katika wakati wa Glanvill njia za kawaida za kuthibitisha deni zilikuwa kwa duwa au kwa maandishi.. /2/ Miaka mia moja baadaye Bracton anaonyesha kuwa madhehebu hayo yalikuwa yamepungua kwa washikaji na kaya ya chama, na anasema kuwa kiapo chao hakitoi ila ni dhana ndogo tu. /3/
Aidha, aina mpya ya majaribio ilikuwa inakua, ambayo, ingawa haikutumika katika kesi hizi /4/ kwa muda mzuri, lazima iwe na mwelekeo wa kupunguza makadirio yaliyowekwa kwenye kiapo cha shahidi kwa kulinganisha. Huu ulikuwa mwanzo wa kesi yetu na jury. Ilikuwa ni mara ya kwanza uchunguzi wa majirani zaidi uwezekano wa kujua kuhusu suala la mgogoro wa ukweli. Walizungumza kutokana na ufahamu wao wenyewe, lakini walichaguliwa na ofisa wa mahakama badala ya wale waliopendezwa, na zilikusudiwa kutokuwa na upendeleo. /1/ Punde mashahidi wakaitwa mbele yao, sivyo, kama zamani, kwa kesi kwa kiapo chao, bali kusaidia uchunguzi kupata hukumu kwa ushuhuda wao. Pamoja na ujio wa utaratibu huu ulioangazwa, dhehebu liliacha kuamua kesi hiyo hivi karibuni, na inaweza kuulizwa kwa nini haikutoweka na kuacha athari yoyote.
Kwa kuzingatia uhafidhina wa sheria ya Kiingereza, na ukweli kwamba, kabla matendo hayajaingia, madeni pekee ambayo yalikuwa yametatuliwa yalikuwa ni madeni yaliyothibitishwa na mashahidi wa shughuli hiyo, isingekuwa jambo la kushangaza kukuta zabuni ya kesi ikiendelea katika kesi hizo. Lakini kulikuwa na sababu nyingine bado muhimu zaidi. Utetezi katika deni ambapo hapakuwa na hati ulikuwa wa malipo ya sheria. /2/ Sehemu ya Magna Charta ilitafsiriwa kuwa inakataza mtu kuwekwa kwa sheria yake juu ya maelezo ya mlalamikaji bila ushahidi mzuri.. /3/ Kwa hiyo, sheria ilihitaji shahidi - yaani, dhehebu—katika kila kesi ya deni ambapo mlalamikaji hakutegemea maandishi. Hivyo ikawa kwamba kesi iliendelea kutolewa katika kesi hizo ambapo ilikuwa ya zamani, /4/ na kama mshitakiwa, ikiwa hakukubali deni katika kesi kama hizo, siku zote alisimamia sheria yake, ilikuwa muda mrefu kabla ya uchunguzi kupata mengi ya msingi.
Kuweka deni ambalo lilitokea kwa njia ya ahadi au kukiri tu, na ambayo hapo awali hapakuwa na aina ya majaribio iliyotolewa, lazima uwe na maandishi, aina mpya ya uthibitisho ambayo iliiingiza katika sheria. Kanuni iliwekwa, “kwa parol chama hakilazimiki.” /1/ Lakini madeni ya zamani hayakufikiriwa kama yaliyotolewa na ahadi. /2/ Walikuwa a “wajibu” inayotokana na upokeaji wa mali ya mlalamikaji, ukweli ambao ungeweza kuonekana na kuapishwa. Katika kesi hizi sheria ya zamani ilidumishwa na hata kujipanua kidogo kwa mlinganisho mkali.
Lakini ahadi ya mdhamini, kwa namna yoyote ile ilikuwa imevaliwa, haikutokea kwa ukweli wowote kama huo. Ilikuwa imekuwa ya asili sawa na ahadi nyingine, na hivi karibuni ilitiliwa shaka ikiwa isithibitishwe na ushahidi uleule. /3/ Kwa utawala wa Edward III., iliamuliwa kuwa tendo lilikuwa la lazima, /4/ isipokuwa pale ambapo desturi za miji fulani zilikuwa zimeweka sheria ya zamani kuwa na nguvu. /5/
Utawala huu unaweza kuchukuliwa kuwa unawakilisha wakati ambapo mgawanyiko na kanuni za utaratibu zilianzishwa ambazo zimeendelea hadi leo.. Kwa hivyo inafaa kurudia na kujumlisha hali ya sheria wakati huo.
Bado ilikuwa ni lazima kwamba secta itolewe zabuni katika kila hatua ya deni ambayo hakuna maandishi yoyote yaliyotolewa. Kwa hii; kwa hili, na pia kwa sababu zingine zilizotajwa, nyanja ya vitendo kama hivyo haikuongezwa zaidi ya kesi zile ambazo hapo awali ziliwekwa na kiapo cha mashahidi.. Kwa vile udhamini haukuwa tena mojawapo ya haya, zilipunguzwa sana kwa kesi ambazo deni lilitokana na kupokelewa kwa quid pro quo.. Aidha hapakuwa na hatua nyingine ya mkataba ambayo inaweza kudumishwa bila maandishi. Aina mpya za mikataba sasa zilitekelezwa kwa kitendo cha agano, lakini kuna tendo lilikuwa muhimu kila wakati. Wakati huo huo secta ilikuwa imepungua kwa fomu, ingawa bado ilitolewa hoja kwamba kazi yake ilikuwa muhimu zaidi katika mkataba kuliko mahali pengine. Haikuweza tena kuchunguzwa mbele ya mahakama. /1/ Ilikuwa ni kuishi tu, na shahidi wa shughuli alikuwa amekoma kuwa taasisi. Kwa hiyo, ulazima wa kutoa kiapo cha shahidi haukuweka kikomo cha deni kwa mkataba rahisi isipokuwa kwa jadi, na haishangazi kupata kwamba hatua hiyo ilipanuliwa kidogo kwa mlinganisho kutoka kwa upeo wake katika wakati wa Glanvill..
Lakini deni lilibaki kwa kiasi kikubwa katika hatua ambayo nimeonyesha, na hakuna hatua mpya inayopatikana kwa mikataba rahisi iliyoanzishwa kwa karne moja. Wakati huo huo ubadilishaji ambao nimeelezea ulifanyika, na ni nini ajali ya utaratibu imekuwa fundisho la sheria thabiti. Mabadiliko yalikuwa rahisi wakati madeni ambayo yangeweza kutekelezwa bila hati yote yalitokana na faida kwa mdaiwa..
Ushawishi wa sheria ya Kirumi, hakuna shaka, kusaidiwa katika kuleta matokeo haya. Itakumbukwa kuwa katika utawala wa Henry II. mikataba rahisi na madeni ambayo hayakuwa na ushahidi wa tendo au shahidi yaliachwa kutekelezwa na mahakama za kikanisa., kadiri mamlaka yao yalivyopanuliwa. /2/ Labda ni hali hii ambayo ilisababisha Glanvill na warithi wake kutumia istilahi ya raia kwa madeni ya sheria za kawaida.. Lakini kama aliikopa kutoka kwa mahakama za kikanisa, au akaenda moja kwa moja kwenye chemchemi-kichwa, hakika ni kwamba Glanvill anatumia uainishaji na lugha ya kiufundi ya Corpus Juris katika kitabu chake chote cha kumi..
Kulikuwa na mikataba fulani maalum katika mfumo wa Kirumi inayoitwa halisi, ambayo ilimfunga mkandarasi ama kurudisha kitu fulani kilichowekwa mikononi mwake na mkandarasi, kama katika kesi ya kukodisha au mkopo, au kuwasilisha nakala zingine za aina sawa, kama wakati wa nafaka, mafuta, au pesa ilikopeshwa. Darasa hili haliendani, isipokuwa kwa njia ya juu juu, na madeni ya sheria ya kawaida. Lakini Glanvill alipitisha utaratibu wa majina, na waandishi wa baadaye walianza kupata hitimisho kutoka kwayo. Mwandishi wa Fleta, mwandishi kwa vyovyote vile si mwenye akili katika kuwafuata na kuwakubali watangulizi wake’ matumizi ya sheria ya Kirumi, /1/ anasema ili kuongeza deni ni lazima kuwe na si jambo fulani tu lililoahidiwa, lakini jambo fulani lililoahidiwa kama malipo. /2/
Ikiwa Fleta angefunga taarifa yake kwa madeni kwa mkataba rahisi, inaweza kuwa ilipendekezwa na hali iliyopo ya sheria. Lakini vile vile alihitaji maandishi na muhuri, pamoja na jambo lililotolewa au kuahidiwa kama malipo, fundisho lililowekwa na yeye ni vigumu kuwa na kushinda wakati wowote. Labda haikuwa chochote zaidi ya upotovu mdogo wa mawazo kulingana na mambo ya Kirumi ambayo aliazima kutoka kwa Bracton..
Inabakia tu kufuatilia mwonekano wa taratibu wa kuzingatia katika maamuzi. Kesi ya utawala wa Edward III. /1/ inaonekana kutofautisha kati ya wajibu wa paroli unaotokana na malipo ya hiari na mwajibikaji na ule unaotokana na malipo kwa ombi la mwajibikaji.. Pia inazungumzia deni au “wajibu” katika kesi hiyo kutokana na sababu ya malipo. Lugha inayofanana kwa kiasi fulani inatumika katika utawala unaofuata. /2/ Hivyo, katika mwaka wa kumi na mbili wa Henry IV., /3/ kuna njia ya kufikiria: “Ikiwa pesa imeahidiwa kwa mwanamume kwa ajili ya kufanya kutolewa, naye hufanya kuachiliwa, atakuwa na hatua nzuri ya deni katika suala hilo.” Katika utawala unaofuata /4/ iliamuliwa hivyo, katika hali kama hiyo, mlalamikaji hakuweza kupona bila kutekeleza uamuzi huo, ambayo inaelezwa na mhariri kwa msingi kuwa ex nudo pacto non oritur actio. Lakini ukweli muhimu zaidi ni, kutoka kwa Edward I. wawili Henry VI. hatuoni kesi ambapo deni lilipatikana, isipokuwa mazingatio yamepokelewa.
Ukweli mwingine wa kuzingatiwa ni, kwamba tangu Edward III. madeni yanayotokana na muamala bila maandishi yanasemekana yanatokana na mkataba, tofauti na madeni yanayotokana na wajibu. /5/ Kwa hiyo, wakati kuzingatiwa kulihitajika kama hivyo, ilihitajika katika mikataba isiyo chini ya muhuri, iwe madeni au la. Chini ya Henry VI. quid pro quo ikawa hitaji la lazima katika mikataba yote kama hiyo. Katika mwaka wa tatu wa utawala huo /6/ ilipingwa au kuchukua hatua juu ya dhana ya kutojenga kinu, kwamba haikuonyeshwa kile ambacho mshtakiwa alipaswa kuwa nacho kwa kufanya hivyo. Katika mwaka wa thelathini na sita wa utawala huohuo (A.D. 1459), fundisho hilo linaonekana kuwa kamili, na inachukuliwa kuwa ya kawaida. /1/
Kesi hiyo iligeuka swali ambalo lilijadiliwa kwa karne nyingi kabla ya kutatuliwa, ikiwa deni lingetokana na kiasi cha pesa alichoahidi mshtakiwa kwa mlalamikaji ikiwa angeoa binti ya mshtakiwa. Lakini wakati hapo awali mjadala ulikuwa ikiwa ahadi hiyo haikuwa tukio la ndoa hadi sasa kwamba ilikuwa ya mamlaka ya mahakama za kiroho pekee., sasa iligusa shaka ya kawaida kama mshtakiwa alikuwa na quid pro quo.
Itakumbukwa kuwa ukweli ulioapishwa awali na mashahidi wa shughuli hiyo ulikuwa ni faida kwa mshtakiwa., yaani, utoaji wa vitu vilivyouzwa au pesa alizokopeshwa. Kesi kama hizo, pia, toa njia iliyo wazi zaidi ya kuzingatia. Swali la asili ni, kile ambacho mtoa ahadi alipaswa kuwa nacho kwa ajili ya ahadi yake. /2/ Ni kwa uchanganuzi pekee ndipo sera inayodhaniwa kuwa ya sheria inaonekana kuridhika sawa na madhara yanayoletwa na aliyeahidiwa.. Kwa hiyo si unnaturally kilichotokea kwamba majaji, walipoweka sheria kwa mara ya kwanza kwamba lazima kuwe na quid pro quo, hawakuchelewa kutambua madhara kwa mkandarasi kama kukidhi matakwa ambayo yalikuwa yamewekwa. Katika kesi hiyo ambayo nimeitaja baadhi ya majaji walikuwa na mwelekeo wa kushikilia kuwa kumuondoa binti yake ilikuwa ni faida tosha kwa mshitakiwa kumfanya kuwa mdaiwa wa fedha hizo alizoahidi.; na kulikuwa na wazo fulani la maoni, kwamba kumuoa mwanamke huyo lilikuwa jambo la kuzingatia, kwa sababu ilikuwa ni madhara kwa aliyeahidiwa. /1/ Lakini maoni mengine yalishinda, angalau kwa muda, kwa sababu mshtakiwa hakuwa na chochote kutoka kwa mdai cha kuongeza deni. /2/
Kwa hivyo ilionekana kuwa huduma iliyotolewa kwa mtu wa tatu kwa ombi la mshtakiwa na ahadi ya tuzo haitoshi., /3/ ingawa si bila maoni yenye nguvu kinyume chake, na kwa muda matukio ya awali yalitatuliwa. Ikawa sheria iliyoanzishwa kwamba hatua ya deni itategemea tu kuzingatia kupokea na kudumisha kwa manufaa ya mdaiwa..
Ilikuwa, hata hivyo, hakuna upekee wa hatua au mkataba wa deni ambao ulisababisha maoni haya, lakini nadharia isiyokamilika ya kuzingatia iliyokuwepo kati ya enzi za Henry VI. na Elizabeth. Nadharia hiyo hiyo katika assumpsit, /4/ na kwa usawa. /5/ Popote mazingatio yalipotajwa, ilikuwa daima kama quid pro quo, kama kile ambacho mkandarasi alipaswa kuwa nacho kwa mkataba wake.
Aidha, kabla ya kuzingatiwa kuwahi kusikika, deni lilikuwa suluhisho la muda kwa kila wajibu wa kulipa pesa unaotekelezwa na sheria, isipokuwa dhima ya fidia kwa kosa. /6/ Imeonyeshwa tayari kwamba mdhamini anaweza kushtakiwa kwa deni hadi wakati wa Edward III. bila maandishi, lakini mdhamini hapati faida yoyote kutokana na kushughulika na mkuu wake wa shule. Kwa mfano, ikiwa mtu anauza mahindi kwa A, na B anasema, “Nitalipa ikiwa A hatalipa,” mauzo hayafai B hadi sasa kama inavyoonekana na masharti ya biashara. Kwa sababu hii, deni haliwezi kudumishwa sasa dhidi ya mdhamini katika kesi kama hiyo.
Haikuwa hivyo kila wakati. Sio hivyo hadi leo ikiwa kuna wajibu chini ya muhuri. Kwa maana hio, haijalishi jinsi wajibu ulivyotokea, au kama kulikuwa na mazingatio juu yake au la. Lakini uandishi ulikuwa njia ya jumla zaidi ya kuanzisha deni wakati wa Glanvill kuliko shahidi, na ni upuuzi kuamua upeo wa hatua kwa kuzingatia tu tabaka moja la deni linalotekelezwa nayo.. Aidha, uandishi wa muda mrefu ulikuwa mwingine tu, ingawa ni muadilifu zaidi, njia ya uthibitisho. Msingi wa hatua ulikuwa sawa, hata hivyo ilithibitishwa. Hii ilikuwa ni wajibu au “wajibu” /1/ kwa mlalamikaji, kwa maneno mengine, hizo pesa alitakiwa, hata iweje, kama mtu yeyote awezavyo kuona kwa kusoma Vitabu vya Mwaka wa mapema. Kwa hiyo ilikuwa, deni hilo liko sawa juu ya hukumu, /2/ ambayo ilianzisha wajibu huo kwa suala la kumbukumbu, au baada ya kupokelewa kwa mshtakiwa kurekodiwa kwa njia hiyo hiyo. /3/
Kujumlisha, hatua ya deni imepitia hatua tatu. Mara ya kwanza, ilikuwa ni dawa pekee ya kurejesha pesa zinazodaiwa, isipokuwa wakati dhima ilikuwa tu kulipa fidia kwa kitendo kiovu. Ilikuwa ni sawa na - kwa kweli ilikuwa ni tawi la - hatua ya aina yoyote ya mali ya kibinafsi ambayo mshtakiwa alikuwa amefungwa kwa mkataba au vinginevyo kukabidhi kwa mlalamikaji.. /4/ Ikiwa kulikuwa na mkataba wa kulipa pesa, swali pekee lilikuwa ni jinsi gani unaweza kuthibitisha. Mkataba wowote kama huo, ambayo inaweza kuthibitishwa na njia yoyote inayojulikana kwa sheria ya mapema, ilijumuisha deni. Hakukuwa na nadharia ya kuzingatia, na kwa hiyo, bila shaka, hakuna kikomo kwa hatua au mkataba kulingana na asili ya kuzingatia kupokelewa.
Hatua ya pili ilikuwa wakati fundisho la kuzingatia lilipoanzishwa katika umbo lake la awali la manufaa kwa mtoa ahadi. Hii ilitumika kwa mikataba yote ambayo haijafungwa wakati inakuwepo, lakini ilianzishwa wakati deni lilikuwa ni hatua pekee ya fedha zinazolipwa na mikataba hiyo. Watangulizi ni, kwa sehemu kubwa, matukio katika madeni.
Hatua ya tatu ilifikiwa wakati mtazamo mkubwa ulizingatiwa, na ilionyeshwa katika suala la madhara kwa aliyeahidiwa. Mabadiliko haya yalikuwa mabadiliko ya sheria ya msingi, na kimantiki ilipaswa kutumika kote. Lakini ilitokea kwa namna nyingine na ya baadaye ya hatua, chini ya hali zinazohusiana na kitendo hicho, kama itakavyoelezwa baadaye. Tokeo likawa kwamba fundisho jipya lilishinda katika tendo jipya, na wazee katika zamani, na kwamba kile ambacho hasa kilikuwa ni hitilafu ya nadharia zisizolingana zilizotekelezwa bega kwa bega ilijificha kwa namna ya kizuizi juu ya hatua ya deni.. Hatua hiyo haikubaki, kama zamani, suluhisho la mikataba yote inayofunga kulipa pesa, lakini, hadi sasa mikataba ya paroli ilivyokuwa, inaweza tu kutumika pale ambapo kuzingatiwa kulikuwa faida iliyopokelewa na mtoa ahadi. Kuhusiana na majukumu yanayotokea kwa njia nyingine yoyote, imebakia bila kubadilika.
Ni lazima sasa nitoe maneno machache kwa athari juu ya sheria yetu ya njia nyingine ya uthibitisho ambayo nimeitaja. Ninamaanisha mikataba. Hati ilikuwa ni maandishi tu. Kama wachache wangeweza kuandika, watu wengi walipaswa kuthibitisha hati kwa njia nyingine, kwa mfano, kwa kuweka alama zao. Hii ilikuwa, kwa kweli, mazoezi ya ulimwengu wote nchini Uingereza hadi kuanzishwa kwa desturi za Norman. /1/ Pamoja nao mihuri ikaingia. Lakini marehemu kama Henry II. yalisemwa na Jaji Mkuu wa Uingereza kuwa ni mali ya wafalme tu na watu wakuu sana. /2/ Sijui sababu ya kufikiria kuwa hati halisi ilikuwa na athari kidogo wakati huo ikiwa haiko chini ya muhuri kuliko wakati ilitiwa muhuri.. /3/ Ilikuwa ushahidi tu kwa njia yoyote, na inaitwa hivyo katika visa vingi vya mwanzo. /4/ Inaweza kuondolewa, na suti ikitolewa mahali pake. /5/ Athari yake ya mwisho ilitokana na hali ya kuridhisha ya ushahidi, sio kwa muhuri. /6/
Lakini mihuri ilipoanza kutumika ni wazi ilifanya ushahidi wa hati hiyo kuwa bora zaidi, kwa vile muhuri ulikuwa mgumu zaidi kutengeneza kuliko mpigo wa kalamu. Mihuri ilipata umuhimu kama huo, hiyo, kwa muda, mtu alikuwa amefungwa kwa muhuri wake, ingawa ilibandikwa bila ridhaa yake. /7/ Hatimaye muhuri ukahitajika, ili hati ziwe na athari yake ya zamani. /8/
Agano au mkataba chini ya muhuri haikuwa tena ahadi iliyothibitishwa vizuri; ilikuwa ni ahadi ya asili tofauti, ambayo aina tofauti ya hatua ilikuja kutolewa. /1/ Nimeonyesha jinsi hitaji la kuzingatia lilivyokuwa kanuni ya sheria ya msingi, na pia kwa nini haikupata nafasi yoyote katika uwanja wa maagano. Isipokuwa maagano kutoka kwa hitaji ikawa kanuni ya sheria kuu pia. Mtu ambaye alikuwa ameweka mkono wake kwenye mkataba, kutoka kwa kufungwa kwa sababu alikuwa amekubali kuwa, na kwa sababu kulikuwa na maandishi ya kuthibitisha hilo, /2/ sasa ilishikiliwa kwa nguvu ya muhuri na kwa tendo pekee kama lililotofautishwa na maandishi mengine yote. Na kudumisha uadilifu wa nadharia isiyotosheleza, muhuri ulisemekana kuzingatiwa.
Siku hizi, wakati mwingine hufikiriwa kuwa ni kifalsafa zaidi kusema kwamba agano ni mkataba rasmi, ambayo inasalia pamoja na mkataba wa kawaida wa makubaliano, kama ilivyotokea katika sheria ya Kirumi. Lakini hii sio njia ya kufundisha sana ya kuiweka pia. Kwa maana moja, kila kitu ni namna ambayo sheria inaitaka ili kutoa ahadi inayofunga juu na juu ya usemi tu wa wosia wa mtoa ahadi.. Kuzingatia ni fomu kama vile muhuri. Tofauti pekee ni, kwamba aina moja ni ya utangulizi wa kisasa, na ina msingi kwa maana nzuri, au angalau katika na tabia zetu za kawaida za mawazo, ili tusitambue, ambapo nyingine ni kunusurika kutoka kwa hali ya zamani ya sheria, na haina busara kabisa, au isiyojulikana sana. Naweza kuongeza, hiyo, chini ya ushawishi wa kuzingatia mwisho, sheria ya maagano inavunjwa. Katika Majimbo mengi inaaminika kuwa gombo tu au kustawi kwa kalamu ni muhuri wa kutosha. Kutokana na hili ni hatua fupi ya kukomesha tofauti kati ya vyombo vilivyofungwa na visivyotiwa muhuri kabisa., na hili limefanywa katika baadhi ya Mataifa ya Magharibi.
Huku maagano yakidumu katika uzee dhaifu kiasi fulani, na deni limetoweka, ikiacha ushawishi unaosumbua bila kufafanua nyuma yake, sheria nzima ya kisasa ya mkataba imekua kupitia njia ya hatua ya Assumpsit, ambayo sasa lazima ielezewe.
Baada ya ushindi wa Norman vitendo vyote vya kawaida vilianza na maandishi yaliyotolewa na mfalme, na kuamuru mshtakiwa aitwe mbele ya mahakama kumjibu mlalamikaji. Maandiko haya yalitolewa kama jambo la kweli, katika hatua mbalimbali zinazojulikana ambazo walichukua majina yao. Kulikuwa na hati za deni na za agano; kulikuwa na hati za hatia ya kujeruhiwa kwa nguvu kwa mtu wa mlalamikaji, au kwa mali katika milki yake, Nakadhalika. Lakini hati hizi zilitolewa tu kwa hatua ambazo zilijulikana kwa sheria, na bila hati mahakama haikuwa na mamlaka ya kusikiliza kesi. Wakati wa Edward I. kulikuwa na hatua chache tu kama hizo. Kesi ambazo unaweza kurejesha pesa za mwingine zilianguka katika idadi ndogo ya vikundi, kwa kila moja ambayo kulikuwa na aina fulani ya kushtaki na kusema dai lako.
Fomu hizi zilikuwa zimekoma kuwa za kutosha. Kwa hivyo kulikuwa na kesi nyingi ambazo hazikuanguka ndani ya ufafanuzi wa kosa, lakini ambayo ilikuwa sawa kwamba dawa inapaswa kuwekwa. Ili kutoa dawa, jambo la kwanza kufanywa ni kutoa hati. Ipasavyo, sheria maarufu ya 13 Edward I., c. 24, iliidhinisha ofisi ambayo hati za zamani zilitolewa kuunda mpya katika kesi zinazofanana kimsingi na zile ambazo hati zilipatikana., na kuhitaji tiba kama hiyo, lakini sio kabisa kuanguka ndani ya wigo wa maandishi ambayo tayari yanatumika.
Hivyo maandishi ya hatia juu ya kesi yalianza kuonekana; hiyo ni, maandiko yanayoeleza sababu ya kulalamika kwa kosa, lakini si sawa na kosa kama ilivyoshitakiwa katika matukio ya zamani. Kuchukua mfano ambao kwa kiasi kikubwa ni moja ya kesi za mapema, tuseme kwamba mtu ameacha farasi na mhunzi avae viatu, na kwa uzembe akapigilia msumari kwenye mguu wa farasi. Inawezekana kwamba mmiliki wa farasi hakuweza kuwa na maandishi ya zamani, kwa sababu farasi hakuwa miliki yake wakati uharibifu ulifanyika. Mali kali ya hatia inaweza tu kufanywa dhidi ya mtu anayeimiliki. Haingeweza kufanywa na mtu ambaye alikuwa anamiliki mwenyewe. /1/ Lakini kama vile farasi vilema ilikuwa kosa sawa, ikiwa mmiliki alimshika farasi kwa hatamu au alimwacha na mhunzi, na kama kosa lilikuwa sawa na kosa, ingawa sio mmoja, sheria ilimpa mmiliki hati ya kosa juu ya kesi hiyo. /2/
Mfano kama huu hautoi shida; ni kitendo cha kutesa kwa kosa kama kosa lenyewe. Hakuna mkataba ulioelezwa, na hakuna iliyohitajika kwa kanuni. Lakini hii sio ya darasa la kesi zinazopaswa kuzingatiwa, kwani tatizo lililo mbele yetu ni kufuatilia chimbuko la assumpsit, ambayo ni hatua ya mkataba. Alidhani, hata hivyo, ilianza kama hatua ya uasi katika kesi hiyo, na jambo la kugunduliwa ni jinsi uvunjaji wa sheria ulivyowahi kupatikana kwa uvunjaji wa makubaliano tu.
Itakuwa vyema kuchunguza baadhi ya matukio ya awali ambayo ahadi (kudhaniwa) ilidaiwa. Ya kwanza iliyoripotiwa katika vitabu ni ya utawala wa Edward III. /3/ Mlalamikaji alidai kuwa mshtakiwa alijitolea kubeba farasi wa mlalamikaji kwa usalama kuvuka Humber., lakini akapanda mashua, kwa sababu hiyo farasi aliangamia. Ilipingwa kwamba hatua hiyo ilipaswa kuwa agano la uvunjaji wa makubaliano, ama kosa lingine. Lakini ilijibiwa kuwa mshtakiwa alifanya kitendo kisicho sahihi alipopanda boti, na pingamizi hilo lilibatilishwa. Kesi hii tena, ingawa ahadi ilielezwa, vigumu kuanzisha kanuni mpya. Nguvu haikuendelea moja kwa moja kutoka kwa mshtakiwa, kuwa na uhakika, lakini ililetwa na mchanganyiko wa upakiaji wake kupita kiasi na kisha kusukuma kwenye mkondo.
Kesi inayofuata ni ya utawala sawa, na huenda zaidi. /1/ Maandiko yaliwekwa kwamba mshtakiwa alichukua kumponya farasi wa mshtaki wa ugonjwa. (farasi wa W aliyetajwa hapo juu. ya nesi), na kufanya kazi yake kwa uzembe hata farasi akafa. Hii inatofautiana na kesi ya kulaza farasi kwa msumari katika mambo mawili. Haitozi kitendo chochote cha kulazimishwa, wala kwa hakika kitendo chochote, bali ni upungufu tu. Kwa upande mwingine, inaeleza ahadi, ambayo mwingine hakufanya. Mshtakiwa mara moja alipinga kwamba hii ilikuwa hatua ya uvunjaji wa ahadi, na kwamba mshitaki angeleta agano. Mdai alijibu, kwamba hangeweza kufanya hivyo bila tendo, na kwamba hatua hiyo ilikuwa kwa ajili ya kusababisha kifo cha farasi kwa uzembe; hiyo ni, kwa mateso, si kwa kuvunja mkataba. Kisha, Alisema mshtakiwa, unaweza kuwa na kosa. Lakini mdai alijibu hilo kwa kusema kwamba farasi hakuuawa kwa nguvu, lakini alikufa per def. kutibu; na juu ya hoja hii andiko lilihukumiwa kuwa zuri, Thorpe, J. akisema kuwa amemwona mtu akifunguliwa mashtaka ya kumuua mgonjwa kwa kukosa huduma (default katika kuponya), ambaye alikuwa amejitolea kumponya.
Kesi hizi zote mbili, itaonekana, zilishughulikiwa na mahakama kama vitendo safi vya udhalilishaji, bila kujali madai ya ahadi kwa upande wa mshtakiwa. Lakini pia itaonekana kuwa mfululizo wako mbali zaidi na kesi ya kawaida ya uasi. Katika kesi iliyotajwa mwisho, hasa, nguvu ya kuharibu haikuendelea kutoka kwa mshtakiwa kwa maana yoyote. Na kwa hivyo tunakabiliwa na swali, Ni mlinganisho gani unaowezekana ungeweza kupatikana kati ya kitendo kibaya kuleta madhara, na kushindwa kuchukua hatua kabisa?
Ninajaribu kujibu, wacha nionyeshe zaidi kwa mifano ya tarehe fulani ya baadaye. Tuseme mwanamume amejitolea kufanya kazi kwenye nyumba ya mtu mwingine, na kwa kukosa ustadi wake aliharibu mbao za mwajiri wake; itakuwa kama kosa, ingawa sio mmoja, na mwajiri angeshtaki kwa kukiuka kesi hiyo. Hii ilisemwa kama sheria wazi na mmoja wa majaji katika utawala wa Henry IV. /1/ Lakini tuseme hivyo, badala ya kuharibu nyenzo moja kwa moja, seremala alikuwa ameacha tu shimo kwenye paa ambalo mvua ilinyesha na kufanya uharibifu. Mfano wa kesi ya awali ni alama, lakini tuko mbali zaidi na kosa, kwa sababu nguvu haitoki kwa mshtakiwa. Hata hivyo katika kesi hii pia majaji walifikiri kwamba uvunjaji wa sheria ungekuwa uongo. /2/ Wakati wa Henry IV. hatua haikuweza kudumishwa kwa kukataa rahisi kujenga kulingana na makubaliano; lakini ilipendekezwa na mahakama, hiyo, kama andiko lilitaja “kwamba jambo hilo lilikuwa limeanza na kisha kutofanyika, ingekuwa vinginevyo.” /3/
Sasa narudia swali, Je, kungekuwa na ufanano gani kati ya kosa na kosa la kutosha kutoa hati ya kosa katika kesi hiyo?? Ili kupata jibu ni muhimu kutambua kwamba katika kesi zote za awali, kutokujibiwa kulitokea wakati wa kushughulikia mtu au mali ya mlalamikaji., na kusababisha uharibifu kwa moja au nyingine. Kwa kuzingatia ukweli huu, Rejea ya Thorpe kwa mashtaka ya kuua mgonjwa kwa kukosa huduma, na tofauti ya baadaye kati ya kupuuzwa kabla na baada ya kazi kuanza, ni wajawazito zaidi. Ya kwanza bado inakuwa ya kudokeza zaidi inapokumbukwa kuwa hii ndiyo hoja au mlinganisho wa kwanza kupatikana juu ya mada..
Maana ya mlinganisho huo ni wazi. Ingawa mtu ana haki kamili ya kusimama karibu na kuona mali ya jirani yake ikiharibiwa, au, kwa jambo hilo, kumtazama jirani yake akiangamia kwa kukosa msaada wake, lakini akiingilia kati mara moja hana uhuru huo tena. Hawezi kujitoa kwa mapenzi. Ili kutoa mfano maalum zaidi, ikiwa daktari wa upasuaji kutoka kwa wema atakata kitovu cha mtoto aliyezaliwa hivi karibuni, hawezi kuishia hapo na kumtazama mgonjwa akivuja damu hadi kufa. Ingekuwa ni kuua kimakusudi kuruhusu kifo kitokee kwa njia hiyo, kana kwamba nia ilikuwa imeburudishwa wakati wa kukata kamba. Haijalishi kama uovu ulianza na kitendo, au na upungufu unaofuata.
Hoja hiyo hiyo inatumika kwa dhima ya raia. Seremala hahitaji kwenda kufanya kazi kwenye nyumba ya mtu mwingine hata kidogo, lakini ikiwa anakubali imani ya mwingine na kuingilia kati, hawezi kuacha kwa mapenzi na kuacha paa wazi kwa hali ya hewa. Hivyo katika kesi ya farrier, alipokuwa amemchukua farasi, hakuweza kuacha wakati muhimu na kuacha matokeo kwa bahati. Hivyo, bado kwa uwazi zaidi, wakati ferryman ilichukua kuchukua farasi kuvuka Humber, ingawa maji yalimzamisha farasi, vitendo vyake vya mbali vya kupakia boti yake kupita kiasi na kuisukuma kwenye mkondo wa maji katika hali hiyo ilisababisha hasara, naye aliwajibika kwa hilo.
Katika kesi zilizotangulia, jukumu lilikuwa huru la mkataba, au angalau ilizingatiwa hivyo na majaji waliowaamua, na alisimama juu ya kanuni za jumla zinazotumika kwa mwenendo wa mwanadamu hata kwa sheria ya jinai. Tukio la mara moja la uharibifu unaolalamikiwa linaweza kuwa ni kutokuwepo kwa kuruhusu utendaji wa nguvu za asili. Lakini ikiwa unaunganisha, kama ilivyounganishwa kwa kweli, na mashirikiano ya awali, una mwenendo na mwenendo ambao, kuchukuliwa kwa ujumla, imesababisha au kusababisha madhara.
Pingamizi linaweza kusisitizwa, kuwa na uhakika, kwamba kuna hatua kubwa ya kumwajibisha mtu kwa matokeo ya matendo yake ambayo angeweza kuyazuia, kumfanya awajibike kwa kutoingilia mwenendo wa maumbile wakati hakuianzisha wala kuifungua mlango wa kufanya madhara., na kwamba kuna tofauti hiyo kati ya kutengeneza shimo kwenye paa na kuiacha wazi, au kukata kamba na kuiacha ivuje damu, kwa upande mmoja, na kisa cha msafiri anayepokea farasi mgonjwa na kuacha tahadhari zinazofaa, kwa upande mwingine. /1/
Inaonekana kuna majibu mawili kwa hili. Kwanza, haieleweki kuwa tofauti hiyo ilitangazwa na mahakama iliyoamua kesi ambayo nimeitaja. Ilidaiwa kuwa mshtakiwa alifanya tiba yake kwa uzembe kiasi kwamba farasi huyo alikufa. Huenda haikutokea kwa majaji kwamba mwenendo wa mshtakiwa ungeenda mbali zaidi ya kutokuwepo kwa mfululizo wa hatua za manufaa.. Pengine ilidhaniwa kuwa ilijumuisha mchanganyiko wa vitendo na kupuuza, ambayo yalichukuliwa kwa ujumla yalifikia kushughulika vibaya na jambo hilo.
Katika nafasi inayofuata, inatia shaka kama tofauti hiyo ni nzuri kwa misingi ya kiutendaji. Inaweza kuwa hivyo, ili mradi tu mtu aruhusu uaminifu kuwekwa ndani yake, ni lazima atumie tahadhari anazozijua yeye, ingawa hajafanya mkataba, na yuko huru kukataa uaminifu kwa njia yoyote inayofaa. Mtazamo huu unapata kuungwa mkono kutokana na suala ambalo wahusika walifikishwa mahakamani, ambayo ni kwamba mshtakiwa alifanya tiba kama vile alijua jinsi, bila hii, kwamba farasi alikufa kwa kukosa uangalizi wake (tiba?). /1/
Lakini haiwezi kukataliwa kwamba madai ya ahadi yalitoa wazo la ahadi, pamoja na ile ya kuingia kwenye biashara iliyo mkononi. Hakika, kipengele cha mwisho kinapitishwa vya kutosha, labda, bila hiyo. Inaweza kuulizwa, kwa hiyo, kama ahadi haikuhesabu kitu katika kuinua wajibu wa kutenda. Hadi sasa hii inahusisha matokeo kwamba hatua hiyo ilikuwa ya uvunjaji wa mkataba, jibu tayari limetolewa, na inategemezwa na uzito mkubwa sana wa mamlaka ya kutiliwa shaka. /2/ Kumfunga mshtakiwa kwa mkataba, chombo chini ya muhuri kilikuwa muhimu. Kama ilivyoonyeshwa, tayari, hata nyanja ya zamani ya deni ilikuwa imepunguzwa na hitaji hili, na wakati wa Edward III. tendo lilikuwa muhimu hata kumfunga mdhamini. Ilikuwa fortiori sana kuanzisha dhima juu ya ahadi zisizotekelezwa na sheria ya kale. Hata hivyo, pendekezo hilo lilitolewa mapema, kwamba hatua juu ya kesi ya uharibifu kwa uzembe, hiyo ni, kwa kutozingatia tahadhari zinazofaa, madai ya ahadi kwa njia ya kushawishi, kwa kweli ilikuwa ni hatua ya mkataba.
Miaka mitano baada ya hatua ya uzembe katika kuponya farasi, ambayo imeelezwa, hatua ililetwa /1/ katika fomu dhidi ya daktari wa upasuaji, kwa madai kuwa alijitolea kuponya mkono wa mlalamikaji, na kwamba kwa uzembe wake mkono ulilemaa. Kulikuwa, hata hivyo, tofauti hii, kwamba ilielezwa kuwa mkono wa mlalamikaji ulikuwa umejeruhiwa na T.B mmoja. Na kwa hivyo ilionekana hivyo, hata hivyo matibabu mabaya yanaweza kuwa yamezidisha mambo, ulemavu ulihusishwa ipasavyo na T.B., na kwamba mlalamikaji alikuwa na hatua dhidi yake. Hii inaweza kuwa ilisababisha mshtakiwa kupitisha kozi aliyofanya, kwa sababu alihisi kutokuwa na hakika kama kitendo chochote cha kutesa kingeweza kusema uwongo. Alichukua suala juu ya ahadi, kwa kudhani kuwa ni muhimu kwa kesi ya mlalamikaji, na kisha akapinga kwamba maandishi hayakuonyesha mahali pa kufanya, na hivyo ilikuwa mbaya, kwa sababu haikuonyesha ni wapi uchunguzi unafaa kuitishwa kuzungumza na jambo hilo. Maandiko yalihukumiwa vibaya kwa msingi huo, ambayo inaonekana kana kwamba mahakama iliidhinisha maoni ya mshtakiwa. Hakika, mmoja wa waamuzi aliita kitendo cha agano, na kusema hivyo “ya lazima iliweza kudumishwa bila utaalam, kwa sababu kwa jambo dogo mtu hawezi kuwa na karani karibu na kuandika hati” (pur faire hasa). Wakati huo huo kesi za awali ambazo [282] yametajwa yalitajwa na kutegemewa, na ni dhahiri kwamba mahakama haikuwa tayari kwenda zaidi yao, au kushikilia kwamba hatua inaweza kudumishwa kwa manufaa yake mbali na pingamizi la kiufundi. Katika uhusiano mwingine inaonekana kuwa imezingatia hatua kutoka kwa mtazamo wa uasi. /1/
Maswali yoyote ambayo kesi hii inaweza kupendekeza, darasa la vitendo ambalo lilidai kitendo cha mshtakiwa kiliendelea kushughulikiwa kama vitendo vya utesaji kwa muda mrefu baada ya Edward III.. Dhima hiyo ilipunguzwa kwa uharibifu wa mtu au mali baada ya mshtakiwa kuingia kwenye ajira. Na ilikuwa hasa kwa njia ya hoja inayotolewa kutoka kwa sheria ya tort ndipo ilipanuliwa baadaye, kama itakavyoonekana.
Mwanzoni mwa utawala wa Henry VI. pengine ilikuwa bado sheria kwamba hatua hiyo isingedanganya kwa kushindwa tu kutimiza ahadi. /2/ Lakini ilikuwa imependekezwa mara kadhaa, kama ilivyoonyeshwa, kwamba itakuwa vinginevyo ikiwa upungufu au kupuuzwa kulitokea wakati wa utendaji, na mwenendo wa mshtakiwa ulifuatiwa na uharibifu wa kimwili. /3/ Pendekezo hili lilichukua fomu yake ya kushangaza katika miaka ya mapema ya Henry VI., wakati kesi ya seremala kuacha shimo kwenye paa iliwekwa. /4/ Wakati mahakama ilifikia hii, ilikuwa rahisi kwenda hatua moja mbele zaidi, na kuruhusu athari sawa kwa kutokuwepo katika hatua yoyote, ikifuatiwa na uharibifu sawa.
Ni tofauti gani katika kanuni, iliulizwa, miaka michache baadaye, /1/ kati ya kesi ambapo inakubalika kuwa hatua hiyo itadanganya, na ule wa mfua chuma ambaye anajitolea kumpiga farasi viatu na hafanyi hivyo, kwa sababu hiyo farasi huenda kilema,- au wakili, ambaye anajitolea kutetea kesi yako, na, baada ya hivyo kukushawishi kumtegemea, hupuuza kuwepo, ili upoteze? Ilisemekana kwamba katika matukio ya awali wajibu ulitegemea au nyongeza ya agano, na kwamba, ikiwa hatua itategemea suala la nyongeza, ingelala juu ya mkuu. /2/ Ilifanyika kwa kukashifu kwamba hatua ingekuwa ya uwongo kwa kutopata hati fulani ambayo mshtakiwa alikuwa amefanya kupata..
Miaka mitano baadaye kesi nyingine /3/ alikuja juu, ambayo ilikuwa kama ile ya farrier katika utawala wa Edward III. Ilidaiwa kuwa mshtakiwa alijitolea kumponya farasi wa mlalamikaji, na kupaka dawa kwa uzembe hata farasi akafa. Katika hili, kama katika kesi ya awali, suala hilo lilichukuliwa kwa kudhani. Na sasa tofauti kati ya kuacha na kitendo ilielezwa waziwazi, tamko hilo lilifanyika kuwa si lazima liwe na maana yoyote zaidi ya kuacha, na ikasemwa hivyo lakini kwa ahadi hiyo mshitakiwa hangekuwa na deni la kutenda. Kwa hivyo madai ya ahadi ya mshtakiwa yalikuwa muhimu, na suala linaweza kuchukuliwa ipasavyo.
Uamuzi huu kwa uwazi ulitenganisha na wingi wa vitendo katika kesi hiyo tabaka maalum linalotokana na ahadi kama chanzo cha wajibu wa mshtakiwa., na ilikuwa ni suala la muda tu kwa darasa hilo kuwa hatua mpya na tofauti ya mkataba. Mabadiliko haya yalifanyika mara moja, fundisho la kuzingatia, ambayo mara ya kwanza ilitamkwa kwa hakika karibu wakati huo huo, bila shaka ingetumika, na quid pro quo ingehitajika kwa shughuli hiyo. /1/ Lakini wazo la kuteswa halikuachwa mara moja. Sheria hiyo iliwekwa mwanzoni mwa utawala wa Henry VII., kwa mujibu wa maamuzi ya awali, na ilisemekana kwamba hatua hiyo haitakuwa uongo kwa kushindwa kutimiza ahadi, lakini kwa uzembe tu baada ya mshtakiwa kuingia katika ahadi yake. /2/
Hadi sasa kama hatua haikuzidi mipaka ya kweli ya tort, haikuwa muhimu kama kulikuwa na kuzingatiwa kwa shughuli hiyo au la. Lakini wakati kosa lilipofanywa la kudhani kuwa kesi zote, ikiwa inaumiza au la, ambapo dhana ilidaiwa, yalijengwa juu ya ahadi sawa, moja ya hitimisho mbili zenye makosa ilifikiriwa kufuata. Aidha hakuna dhana iliyohitaji quid pro quo yoyote, /3/ kwani hakukuwa na moja katika mifano ya zamani, (wao kuwa kesi ya mateso safi,) ama sivyo mifano hiyo haikuwa sahihi, na quid pro quo inapaswa kudaiwa katika kila kesi. Ilitambuliwa kwa muda mrefu kwa uelewa zaidi au mdogo wa kikomo cha kweli, hiyo, katika hali ambapo kiini cha hatua kilikuwa uharibifu wa uzembe wa mali, kuzingatia haikuwa lazima. /4/ Na kuna baadhi ya athari za dhana kwamba ilikuwa daima superfluous, marehemu kama Charles I.
Katika kesi ya utawala huo, mshtakiwa alibaki na wakili ili kutenda katika shauri la mtu wa tatu, na kuahidi kumlipa ada na matumizi yake yote. Wakili alitoa huduma hiyo, na kisha kuleta deni. Ilipingwa kuwa deni halikudanganya, kwa sababu hakukuwa na mkataba baina ya wahusika, na mshtakiwa hakuwa na quid pro quo. Mahakama ilipitisha hoja hiyo, na akasema kwamba hakukuwa na mkataba au mazingatio ya kusitisha hatua hii, lakini mdai anaweza kuwa ameshtaki kwa kudhania. /1/
Ilikuwa, labda, kuendelea kwa wazo hili, na dhana inayorudiwa mara nyingi kwamba dhana sio mkataba, /2/ ambayo ilitokana na nadharia iliyopanuliwa zaidi ya kuzingatia kuliko ilivyo katika deni. Iliamuliwa kwamba dhana ingekuwa ya kukosea tu au kutokujali. Kesi ambazo zimetajwa za utawala wa Henry VI. zilifuatwa na wengine katika miaka ya mwisho ya Henry VII., /3/ na haikuwa na shaka tena. Hatua kwa sababu kama hiyo ilikuwa wazi kwa uvunjaji wa ahadi, kama ilivyotambuliwa tangu wakati wa Edward III. Ikiwa ndivyo, kuzingatiwa kulihitajika. /4/ Licha ya machafuko ya mara kwa mara, ambayo pia yalikuwa yametatuliwa au kuchukuliwa kuwa ya kawaida katika visa vingi vya wakati wa Malkia Elizabeth. Lakini asili ya haramu ya hatua ambayo ilizua shaka jinsi mbali yoyote kuzingatia wakati wote ilikuwa muhimu, ilifanya iwezekane kushikilia mazingatio ya kutosha ambayo yalikuwa yanadaiwa.
Hali nyingine inaweza kuwa haikuwa bila ushawishi wake. Inaweza kuonekana hivyo, katika kipindi cha kudhani [286] ilikuwa inakua tu katika uwiano wake kamili, kulikuwa na mwelekeo mdogo wa kutambua kuzingatia na sababu ya Kirumi, kuchukuliwa kwa maana yake pana. Neno “sababu” ilitumika kuzingatiwa katika miaka ya mapema ya Elizabeth, kuhusiana na agano la kusimama na kuchukuliwa kwa matumizi. /1/ Ilitumika kwa maana sawa katika hatua ya kudhani. /2/ Katika ripoti iliyotajwa mwisho, ingawa kesi kuu iliweka tu fundisho ambalo lingefuatwa leo, pia ilisemekana kesi isiyojulikana ambayo ilitafsiriwa kumaanisha kwamba shauri lililotekelezwa lilitolewa kwa ombi., lakini bila ahadi ya aina yoyote, ingeunga mkono ahadi iliyofuata ya kulipia. /3/ Kuanzia kwenye mamlaka hii na neno “sababu,” hitimisho lilifikiwa hivi karibuni kwamba kulikuwa na tofauti kubwa kati ya mkataba na dhana; na kwamba, huku kwenye mikataba “kila kitu kinachohitajika kinapaswa kukubaliana na kukutana pamoja, yaani. kuzingatia upande mmoja, na mauzo au ahadi kwa upande mwingine,… kudumisha kitendo juu ya dhana, sawa si lazima, kwa maana inatosha ikiwa kuna sababu inayosonga au kitangulizi cha kuzingatia; kwa sababu gani au kuzingatia ahadi ilitolewa.” /4/
Hivyo, ambapo mshtakiwa alibaki na mlalamikaji kuwa kwa shangazi yake kwa shilingi kumi kwa wiki, ilifanyika kwamba dhana ingedanganya, kwa sababu huduma, ingawa haina faida kwa mshtakiwa, ilikuwa shtaka au madhara kwa mlalamikaji. /1/ Maswali ya zamani yalijadiliwa tena, na maoni ambayo yalikuwa karibu sana kutawala katika deni chini ya Henry VI., ilishinda kwa kudhani chini ya Elizabeth na James.
Mdhamini anaweza kushtakiwa kwa kudhania, ingawa alikuwa ameacha kuwajibika katika deni. /2/ Kulikuwa na suluhisho sawa juu ya ahadi kwa kuzingatia kwamba mlalamikaji angeoa binti ya mshtakiwa.. /3/ Udanganyifu kwamba dhana iliyopanuliwa haikumaanisha mkataba, haikuweza kuwekwa. Kwa kuzingatia uandikishaji huu na mifano ya zamani, sheria ilizunguka kwa muda katika mwelekeo wa malipo kama kiini cha kweli cha kuzingatia. /4/ Lakini mtazamo mwingine ulishinda, na hivyo, kwa kweli, ilifanya mabadiliko katika sheria ya msingi. Mkataba rahisi, kutambuliwa kama kisheria na mahakama za Henry VI., lazima iwe imetokana na faida kwa mdaiwa; sasa ahadi inaweza kutekelezwa kwa kuzingatia madhara kwa aliyeahidiwa. Lakini katika roho ya kweli ya kizamani fundisho hilo halikutengwa au kutofautishwa na tiba iliyolianzisha., na kwa hivyo deni katika nyakati za kisasa limeleta sura iliyobadilika ya jukumu lililowekwa tu kwa kesi ambapo mazingatio yalikuwa ya aina maalum..
Bahati ya baadaye ya assumpsit inaweza kuambiwa kwa ufupi. Ilianzisha mikataba baina ya nchi, kwa sababu ahadi ilikuwa ni madhara, na kwa hivyo tafakari ya kutosha kwa ahadi nyingine. Ilichukua nafasi ya deni, kwa sababu kuwepo kwa wajibu wa kulipa kulizingatiwa tosha kwa ahadi ya kulipa, au tuseme kwa sababu, kabla ya kuzingatiwa kunahitajika, na mara tu dhana ingesema uwongo kwa kutokujali, hatua hii ilitumika kukwepa malipo ya mshtakiwa. Iliongeza kwa kiasi kikubwa idadi ya mikataba inayoweza kutekelezeka, ambayo hapo awali ilikuwa imefungiwa kwa madeni na maagano, ambapo karibu ahadi yoyote inaweza kushtakiwa kwa kudhania; na ilianzisha nadharia ambayo imekuwa na ushawishi mkubwa juu ya sheria ya kisasa,-kwamba dhima zote za mdhaminiwa zinatokana na mkataba. /1/ Ikiwa umashuhuri ambao ulipewa kandarasi kama msingi wa haki na wajibu wa kisheria ulikuwa na uhusiano wowote na umashuhuri kama huo ambao ulipata hivi karibuni katika uvumi wa kisiasa., ni zaidi ya mkoa wangu kuuliza.
UTAPELI, UBAYA, NA NIA.—NADHARIA YA TORTS.
Na Oliver Wendell Holmes, Mdogo.
Masomo yanayofuata kuzingatiwa ni udanganyifu, uovu, na nia. Katika majadiliano ya makosa yasiyotarajiwa, ugumu mkubwa zaidi wa kushinda ulipatikana kuwa fundisho kwamba mtu hutenda kila wakati kwa hatari yake. Katika kile kinachofuata, Kwa upande mwingine, ugumu utakuwa kuthibitisha kwamba uovu halisi wa aina iliyoelezewa na maneno kadhaa yaliyotajwa hivi punde sio kipengele katika makosa ya kiraia ambayo maneno hayo yanatumika..
Imeonyeshwa, katika kushughulikia sheria ya jinai, hiyo, tunapoita kitendo kiovu katika usemi wa kawaida, tunamaanisha kwamba madhara kwa mtu mwingine yalikusudiwa kutokea, na kwamba madhara kama hayo yalitamaniwa kwa ajili yake mwenyewe kama mwisho ndani yake. Kwa madhumuni ya sheria ya jinai, hata hivyo, dhamira pekee ilionekana kuwa muhimu, na kuwa na matokeo sawa na dhamira ya unyanyasaji uliozidishwa. Kufuatilia uchambuzi, dhamira ilipatikana kuwa imeundwa na kuona mbele ya madhara kama matokeo, pamoja na nia ya kuileta, mwisho ikichukuliwa kuwa nia ya kitendo husika. Kati ya hizi, tena, kuona mbele kulionekana kuwa nyenzo tu. Kama hatua ya mwisho, uwezo wa kuona mbele ulipunguzwa hadi muda wake wa chini kabisa, na ilihitimishwa kuwa, kulingana na vighairi ambavyo vilielezewa, msingi wa jumla wa dhima ya uhalifu ulikuwa ujuzi, wakati wa utekelezaji wa ukweli ambao uzoefu wa kawaida ulionyesha kwamba matokeo fulani mabaya yangeweza kufuata.
Inabakia kuonekana ikiwa upunguzaji sawa unawezekana kwa upande wa kiraia wa sheria, na kama ni udanganyifu, hasidi, makusudi, na makosa ya uzembe yanaweza kuletwa katika mfululizo wa kifalsafa unaoendelea.
Neno la maelezo ya awali litakuwa na manufaa. Imeonyeshwa katika Hotuba ambayo imerejelea kitendo hicho, ingawa dhamira ya kuagiza kila wakati, ni kutojali sheria. Ni mwenye kutaka, na kwa hivyo uratibu uliokusudiwa wa mikazo ya misuli. Lakini dhamira iliyoingizwa na kitendo hicho inaishia hapo. Na mwendo wote wa misuli au uratibu wao hauna madhara mbali na hali zinazoambatana, uwepo ambao haumaanishwi na kitendo chenyewe. Kupiga nje kwa ngumi ni kitendo sawa, iwe inafanyika jangwani au kwenye umati.
Mazingatio yale yale ambayo yamehimizwa kuonyesha kwamba kitendo peke yake, pekee yake, haina na haifai kulazimisha dhima ya kiraia au ya jinai, kuomba, angalau mara kwa mara, kwa mfululizo wa vitendo, au kufanya, ingawa mfululizo unaonyesha uratibu zaidi na dhamira zaidi. Kwa mfano, ni mfululizo uleule wa vitendo vya kutamka sentensi kwa uwongo ikisema kuwa pipa fulani lina Na. 1 Makrill, ikiwa sentensi inatamkwa kwa usiri wa chumbani, au kwa mtu mwingine katika biashara. Kuna, kuwa na uhakika, kwa vyovyote vile, nia zaidi, zaidi ya uratibu wa misuli kwa sauti moja, kudai kuwa pipa fulani lina maudhui fulani,-nia inayoonyeshwa kwa mpangilio wa maneno. Lakini mfululizo wa vitendo na dhamira zote ni tofauti. Hawana hatia wanapozungumzwa peke yao, na ni msingi wa dhima tu wakati hali fulani zinazoambatana zinaonyeshwa.
Nia inayomaanishwa inapozungumzwa kama kipengele cha dhima ya kisheria ni dhamira inayoelekezwa kwa madhara yanayolalamikiwa., au angalau kuelekea madhara. Sio lazima katika kila kesi kufanya uchambuzi kurudi kwenye mikazo rahisi ya misuli ambayo mwendo wa mwenendo unaundwa.. Kwa kanuni hiyo hiyo inayohitaji kitu zaidi ya kitendo kinachofuatwa na uharibifu wa kumfanya mwanaume awajibike, mara kwa mara tunajikuta tuko huru kuchukulia mfululizo ulioratibiwa wa vitendo kama kipengele rahisi, kimsingi kutojali, kwa kuzingatia ni hali gani zaidi au ukweli lazima uwepo kabla ya tabia inayohusika kuwa katika hatari ya mwigizaji. Itaokoa mkanganyiko na hitaji la kurudia ikiwa hii itazingatiwa katika mjadala ufuatao.
aina kuu ya dhima ambayo udanganyifu, uovu, na dhamira inasemekana kuwa vipengele vya lazima, ni udanganyifu, kashfa na kashfa, mashitaka yenye nia mbaya, na njama, ambayo, labda, inaweza kuongezwa trover.
Udanganyifu ni dhana inayotolewa kutoka kwa ulimwengu wa maadili, na kwa maana yake maarufu huingiza uovu kwa udhahiri. Fundisho la sheria ya kawaida kuhusu sheria hiyo kwa ujumla linasemwa kwa maneno ambayo yanapatana tu na hatia halisi., na dhamira zote za hatia. Inasemekana kwamba mwanamume atawajibika kwa kitendo cha udanganyifu ikiwa anatoa uwakilishi wa uwongo kwa mwingine, kujua kuwa ni uongo, lakini akikusudia kwamba mwingine aamini na kutenda juu yake, ikiwa mtu anayeongelewa anaamini, na kwa hivyo anashawishika kutenda kwa madhara yake mwenyewe. Hii bila shaka ni kesi ya kawaida, na ni kesi ya makosa ya kimaadili kimakusudi. Sasa, nini mwenendo wa chama hapa. Inajumuisha kutamka maneno fulani, hivyo akaamrisha kwamba matamshi yao yanatoka nje elimu ya maana ambayo wangeifikisha endapo itasikika. Lakini mwenendo huo kwa ujuzi huo pekee si wa kiadili wala si wa maadili. Nenda hatua moja zaidi, na kuongeza ujuzi wa uwepo wa mwingine ndani ya kusikia, bado kitendo hakina tabia ya kuamua. Vipengele vinavyoifanya kuwa kinyume na maadili ni kujua kwamba taarifa hiyo ni ya uwongo, na nia ambayo itafanyiwa kazi.
Swali kuu basi ni, iwapo dhamira hii inaweza kupunguzwa kwa masharti sawa na ilivyokuwa katika visa vingine. Hakuna ugumu katika kujibu. Ni wazi kabisa kwamba dhamira ya uwakilishi wa uwongo kutekelezwa ingethibitishwa kwa uthabiti kwa uthibitisho kwamba mshtakiwa alijua kwamba upande mwingine unakusudia kuufanyia kazi.. Ikiwa mshtakiwa aliona mapema matokeo ya matendo yake, anatozwa, ikiwa nia yake ilikuwa ni kutaka kushawishi upande mwingine kuchukua hatua, au kutokuwa tayari kwa sababu za kibinafsi kusema ukweli. Ikiwa mshtakiwa alijua ukweli wa sasa (nia ya upande mwingine), ambayo, kulingana na uzoefu wa kawaida, alifanya uwezekano kwamba kitendo chake kingekuwa na matokeo mabaya, anatozwa, kama kweli aliona matokeo au la.
Katika suala hili, hitimisho la jumla linafuata kutoka kwa mfano mmoja. Kwa sasa inakubaliwa kuwa katika hali moja ujuzi wa ukweli wa sasa, kama vile nia ya upande mwingine kuchukua hatua juu ya taarifa hiyo ya uwongo, hutoa uthibitisho wa nia ya kumshawishi kuifanyia kazi, inakubaliwa kuwa kipengele kidogo ndicho kinachohitajika katika kiwanja kikubwa. Maana dhamira inakumbatia maarifa yanayotosheleza kuona mbele, kama ilivyoonyeshwa. Kwa hiyo, unapothibitisha nia unathibitisha maarifa, na dhamira inaweza mara nyingi kuwa rahisi kuthibitisha kati ya hizo mbili. Lakini unapothibitisha maarifa huthibitishi nia.
Inaweza kusemwa, hata hivyo, dhamira hiyo inadokezwa au kudhaniwa katika hali kama ilivyodhaniwa. Lakini hii ni kusaidia tu nadharia ya uwongo kwa hadithi ya uwongo. Ni sawa na kusema kwamba mazingatio hufikiriwa kwa chombo kilicho chini ya muhuri; ambayo ni njia tu ya kupatanisha nadharia rasmi kwamba kandarasi zote lazima zizingatiwe na ukweli ulio wazi kwamba zana zilizotiwa muhuri haziitaji moja.. Kila inaposemwa kuwa jambo fulani ni muhimu kwa dhima, lakini kwamba inakisiwa kwa ukamilifu kutoka kwa kitu kingine, daima kuna msingi wa kushuku kwamba suluhu muhimu inapatikana katika jambo lingine, na wala si katika yale yanayosemwa kudhaniwa kutoka humo.
Kuhusiana na dhamira muhimu ya kudanganya, hatuhitaji kuacha na mfano mmoja ambao umetolewa. Sheria haiendi mbali zaidi ya kutaka uthibitisho wowote wa dhamira hiyo, au kwamba upande mwingine ulihalalishwa kukisia nia hiyo. Ili maana nzima ya mahitaji ni, kwamba mwelekeo wa asili na dhahiri wa uwakilishi, chini ya hali inayojulikana, lazima iwe ni kushawishi maoni kwamba ilitolewa kwa nia ya kuchukua hatua, na hivyo kushawishi matendo juu ya imani yake. Kiwango cha kile kinachoitwa dhamira kwa hivyo ni kiwango cha nje cha tabia chini ya hali inayojulikana, na uchambuzi wa sheria ya makosa ya jinai unashikilia vyema hapa.
Wala hii sio yote. Sheria kufuata mkondo wake wa vipimo, kama ilivyoelezwa katika Mhadhara uliopita, huamua ni mwelekeo gani wa uwakilishi katika kesi fulani,-kama, kwa mfano, kwamba farasi ni nzuri wakati wa kufanya mauzo; au, kwa ujumla, ya taarifa yoyote ya ukweli ambayo inajulikana upande mwingine unakusudia kutegemea. Zaidi ya sheria hizi za kisayansi kuna eneo lisilo wazi la jury.
Kipengele kingine cha maadili katika udanganyifu ni ujuzi kwamba taarifa hiyo ilikuwa ya uongo. Kwa hili sijali kabisa, kwa sababu yote ambayo ni muhimu yanatimizwa wakati vipengele vya hatari vinapunguzwa kwa hatua na ujuzi. Lakini itasaidia katika lengo la jumla la kuonyesha kwamba mwelekeo wa sheria kila mahali ni kuvuka maadili na kufikia viwango vya nje., ikiwa ujuzi huu wa uwongo unaweza kubadilishwa kuwa fomula ambayo sio lazima kuleta hatia, ingawa, bila shaka, kwa ujumla huambatana nayo kwa kweli. Wakati tunaiangalia kwa umakini, tunapata kivuli cha upande wa maadili mbali.
Swali ni, ni hali gani zinazojulikana zinatosha kutupa hatari ya taarifa juu yake anayeitoa, ikiwa inamshawishi mwanaume mwingine kutenda, na inageuka kuwa sio kweli. Sasa, ni dhahiri kwamba mtu anaweza kuchukua hatari ya kauli yake kwa makubaliano ya moja kwa moja, au kwa mtu aliyedokezwa ambaye sheria inasoma katika biashara yake. Anaweza kwa lugha ya kisheria kuthibitisha ukweli wake, na kama si kweli, sheria inachukulia kama udanganyifu, vile vile anapoifanya kuiamini kikamilifu, kama wakati anajua kuwa sio kweli, na njia ya kudanganya. Kama, katika kuuza farasi, muuzaji alimhakikishia kuwa na umri wa miaka mitano tu, na kwa kweli alikuwa kumi na tatu, muuzaji anaweza kushtakiwa kwa udanganyifu katika sheria ya kawaida, ingawa alidhani farasi ni watano tu. /1/ Dhima ya sheria ya kawaida kwa ukweli wa taarifa ni, kwa hiyo, pana zaidi kuliko nyanja ya ulaghai halisi wa maadili. Lakini, tena, inatosha kwa ujumla ikiwa uwakilishi utafanywa kwa uzembe, bila kujua kama ni kweli au uongo. Sasa nini “bila kujali” maana. Haimaanishi kutojali kwa kibinafsi kwa ukweli wa taarifa. Inamaanisha tu kwamba data ya taarifa hiyo ilikuwa haitoshi hivi kwamba mtu mwenye busara hangeweza kuifanya bila kuelekeza kwenye dhana kwamba alikuwa hajali.. Hiyo ni kusema, kurudia uchambuzi ambao umepitia hapo awali, ina maana kwamba sheria, kutumia kiwango cha lengo la jumla, huamua hilo, ikiwa mtu atatoa kauli yake juu ya data hizo, anawajibika, vyovyote ilivyokuwa hali ya akili yake, na ingawa yeye binafsi anaweza kuwa huru kabisa na uovu katika kuutengeneza.
Kwa hivyo hoja sawa na ile ambayo tayari imetumika kwa nia inaweza kutumika kwa maarifa ya uwongo. Maarifa halisi mara nyingi yanaweza kuwa rahisi kuthibitisha kuliko kwamba ushahidi haukutosha kuthibitisha taarifa hiyo, na inapothibitishwa ina kipengele kidogo. Lakini mara tu kipengele kidogo kinaonyeshwa kuwa cha kutosha, inaonyeshwa kuwa sheria iko tayari kutumia kiwango cha nje au cha lengo hapa pia.
Mahakama za usawa zimeweka fundisho kwa masharti ambayo ni sawa kabisa bila kujali hali halisi ya kimaadili ya mshtakiwa hadi kwenda kinyume chake.. Inasemekana kuwa “wakati uwakilishi katika suala la biashara unafanywa na mtu mmoja hadi mwingine kwa hesabu ya kumshawishi kuzoea mwenendo wake., ni jambo lisilowezekana kabisa ikiwa uwakilishi unafanywa ukijua kuwa sio kweli, au ikiwa imefanywa kuamini kuwa ni kweli, kama, kwa kweli, haikuwa kweli.” /1/
Labda maamuzi halisi yanaweza kupatanishwa kwa kanuni nyembamba, lakini kanuni iliyosemwa hivi punde ina urefu wa kusema kwamba katika masuala ya biashara mwanaume hutoa kila kauli (ya aina inayoweza kuchukuliwa hatua) kwa hatari yake. Hii inaonekana kuwa ngumu kuhalalishwa katika sera. Maadili ya kuanzia kwa dhima kwa ujumla haipaswi kusahaulika, na sheria haiwezi bila kuipuuza kumfanya mtu awajibike kwa kauli zenye msingi wa mambo ambayo yangemhakikishia mtu mwenye hekima na busara ukweli wake.. Faida ya umma na umuhimu wa uhuru katika kutoa habari, ambayo inapendelea hata kashfa ya mtu wa tatu, lazima fortiori, inaonekana kwangu, kauli za upendeleo zilizotolewa kwa ombi la chama kinachowalalamikia.
Sheria ya kawaida, kwa kiwango chochote, huhifadhi marejeleo ya maadili kwa kufanya ulaghai kuwa msingi unaotumika. Haina maana kwamba mtu daima huzungumza kwa hatari yake. Lakini kuanzia msingi wa maadili, inatayarisha kiwango cha nje cha kile ambacho kinaweza kuwa ulaghai kwa mwanajumuiya wastani mwenye busara, na inamtaka kila mwanachama kwa hatari yake kuepuka hilo. Kama katika kesi nyingine, hatua kwa hatua ni kukusanya vielelezo vinavyoamua kwamba kauli fulani chini ya hali fulani ziko hatarini kwa chama kinachozitoa..
Mambo ya udanganyifu ambayo huweka hatari ya mwenendo wake kwenye chama ni haya. Kwanza, kutoa taarifa ya ukweli inayodaiwa kuwa mbaya. Pili, uwepo unaojulikana wa mwingine ndani ya usikilizaji. Cha tatu, ukweli unaojulikana unaotosha kuthibitisha matarajio au kupendekeza uwezekano kwamba upande mwingine utachukua hatua kwa kauli hiyo. (Ni ukweli gani unaotosha umeamuliwa mahususi na mahakama katika baadhi ya matukio; katika wengine, hakuna shaka, swali lingeenda kwa jury juu ya kanuni zilizoelezwa hapo awali.) Nne, uwongo wa taarifa hiyo. Hili lazima lijulikane, ama sivyo ushahidi unaojulikana kuhusu suala la taarifa hiyo lazima uwe ambao hautakubali imani kulingana na uzoefu wa kawaida wa mwanadamu.. (Katika hatua hii pia mahakama inaweza kupatikana kuweka sheria maalum katika baadhi ya kesi. /1/)
Nafuata sheria ya kashfa. Imesemwa mara nyingi kwamba ubaya ni moja ya vipengele vya dhima, na fundisho hilo limesemwa kwa kawaida kwa njia hii: ubaya huo lazima uwepo, lakini kwamba inachukuliwa na sheria kutokana na kunena tu maneno; ili tena uweze kukataa dhana hii ya uovu kwa kuonyesha kwamba maneno yalisemwa chini ya hali ambayo ilifanya mawasiliano yawe na upendeleo.,-kama, kwa mfano, na wakili katika mwendo wa lazima wa hoja yake, au kwa mtu anayejibu kwa nia njema maswali kuhusu tabia ya mtumishi wa zamani,- na kisha, inasemekana, mdai anaweza kukutana na utetezi huu katika baadhi ya kesi kwa kuonyesha kwamba maneno yalisemwa kwa uovu halisi.
Yote hii inaonekana kana kwamba angalau nia halisi ya kusababisha uharibifu unaolalamikiwa, kama sio ukatili, walikuwa chini ya darasa hili la makosa. Hata hivyo si hivyo. Kwa maana ingawa matumizi ya maneno “uovu” inaelekeza kama kawaida kwa kiwango cha awali cha maadili, sheria kwamba inachukuliwa kuwa ni uthibitisho wa kusema maneno fulani ni sawa na kusema kwamba mwenendo wa waziwazi wa kusema maneno hayo unaweza kuchukuliwa hatua ikiwa matokeo ya uharibifu kwa mlalamikaji yalikusudiwa au la.. Na hii inashindwa na nadharia ya jumla, kwa sababu tabia ya wazi ya maneno ya kashfa ni kumdhuru mtu anayesemwa. Tena, dutu halisi ya ulinzi sio kwamba uharibifu haukukusudiwa,- hiyo haingekuwa utetezi hata kidogo; lakini hiyo, kama ilikusudiwa au la,-hiyo ni, hata kama mshtakiwa aliliona hilo na kuliona kwa furaha,- ukweli na mazingira ambayo alisema ni kwamba sheria iliona uharibifu wa mshtaki kuwa muhimu kidogo kuliko faida ya kuzungumza bila uhuru..
Ni vigumu zaidi kutumia uchambuzi huo kwa hatua ya mwisho ya mchakato, lakini labda haiwezekani. Inasemekana kuwa mlalamikaji anaweza kukutana na kesi ya upendeleo hivyo kutolewa kwa upande wa mshtakiwa., kwa kuthibitisha uovu halisi, hiyo ni, nia halisi ya kusababisha uharibifu unaolalamikiwa. Lakini ubaya huu halisi unafanywaje? Ni kwa kuonyesha kwamba mshtakiwa alijua maelezo aliyotoa ni ya uongo, au kwamba kauli zake zisizo za kweli zilizidi kile ambacho tukio lilihitaji. Sasa je, si dhahiri kwamba sheria inaangalia jambo tofauti kabisa na dhamira ya mshtakiwa? Ukweli kwamba mshtakiwa aliona na aliona mbele kwa furaha uharibifu wa mdai, haina umuhimu zaidi katika kesi hii kuliko ingekuwa mahali ambapo mawasiliano yalikuwa na upendeleo. Swali tena ni suala la maarifa, au viwango vingine vya nje. Na nini hufanya hata maarifa kuwa muhimu? Ni kwamba sababu ya mtu kuruhusiwa katika matukio mengine kutoa mashtaka ya uwongo dhidi ya jirani zake ni kukosa.. Ni kwa ajili ya maslahi ya umma kwamba watu wanapaswa kuwa huru kutoa taarifa bora wawezavyo chini ya hali fulani bila woga, lakini hakuna faida ya umma kwa kusema uwongo wakati wowote; na wakati shtaka linajulikana kuwa la uwongo, au ni zaidi ya kile kinachohitajika na hafla hiyo, si lazima kufanya malipo hayo ili kuzungumza kwa uhuru, na kwa hiyo iko chini ya kanuni ya kawaida, kwamba mashtaka fulani yanafanywa kwa hatari ya chama endapo yatatokea kuwa ya uwongo, kama matokeo mabaya yalikusudiwa au la. Mshtakiwa anawajibika, si kwa sababu nia yake ilikuwa mbaya, bali kwa sababu alitoa mashtaka ya uwongo bila udhuru.
Itaonekana kwamba hatari ya mwenendo hapa inaanza nyuma zaidi kuliko kwa udanganyifu, kwani tabia ya kashfa ina madhara zaidi ulimwenguni. Lazima kuwe na hali fulani zinazoambatana. Ni lazima angalau kuwe na mwanadamu ambaye kauli hiyo inamtaja. Lazima kuna binadamu mwingine ndani ya kusikia ambaye anaelewa kauli, na taarifa lazima iwe ya uongo. Lakini ni ubishi kwamba mwisho wa ukweli huu hauhitaji kujulikana, kama hakika uwongo wa malipo hauhitaji kuwa, na kwamba mwanamume lazima achukue hatari ya hata kauli ya bure kusikilizwa, isipokuwa aliifanya chini ya hali zinazojulikana za upendeleo. Haitakuwa kizuizi kikubwa cha uhuru kumnyima mtu kinga ya kuhusisha shtaka la uhalifu kwa jina la jirani yake., hata anapojidhania peke yake. Lakini haionekani wazi kuwa sheria ingeenda mbali zaidi kama hiyo.
Aina inayofuata ya dhima ni ndogo kwa kulinganisha. Namaanisha hatua ya mashitaka yenye nia mbaya. Mwanamume anaweza kurejesha uharibifu dhidi ya mwingine kwa uovu na bila sababu zinazowezekana kuanzisha mhalifu, au, katika baadhi ya kesi, mashtaka ya kiraia dhidi yake kwa shtaka la uwongo. Uhitaji wa sababu inayowezekana inarejelea, bila shaka, tu kwa hali ya ufahamu wa mshtakiwa, si kwa nia yake. Inamaanisha kutokuwepo kwa sababu inayowezekana katika ukweli unaojulikana kwa mshtakiwa wakati alianzisha shtaka. Lakini kiwango kinachotumika kwa ufahamu wa mshtakiwa ni nje yake. Swali sio ikiwa alifikiria ukweli kuwa sababu inayowezekana, lakini kama mahakama inadhani walifanya hivyo.
Kisha kuhusu ubaya. Mwenendo wa mshtakiwa ni pamoja na kuanzisha kesi juu ya shtaka ambalo kwa kweli ni la uwongo, na ambayo haijashinda. Huo ndio mzizi wa jambo zima. Ikiwa mashtaka yalikuwa ya kweli, au ikiwa mlalamikaji ametiwa hatiani, ingawa sasa anaweza kuthibitisha kwamba alihukumiwa kimakosa, mshtakiwa yuko salama, hata hivyo ubaya wake ni mkubwa, na hata ardhi ndogo aliyokuwa nayo kwa malipo yake.
Tuseme, hata hivyo, kwamba mashtaka ni ya uongo, na haishindi. Inaweza kukubalika kwa urahisi kwamba uovu hapo awali ulimaanisha nia mbaya, nia halisi ya kumdhuru mlalamikaji kwa kutoa shtaka la uwongo. Dawa ya kisheria hapa, tena, ilianza kutoka kwa msingi wa maadili, tukio kwa ajili yake, hakuna shaka, kuwa sawa na ile iliyozaa sheria ya zamani ya njama, kwamba maadui wa mtu nyakati fulani wangetafuta uharibifu wake kwa kuweka sheria ya uhalifu dhidi yake. Kwa kuwa iliadhibiwa kuchanganya kwa kusudi kama hilo, ilihitimishwa, kwa kusitasita, hiyo, wakati mtu mmoja alijaribu kwa uovu kufanya jambo lile lile, anapaswa kuwajibika kwa misingi sawa. /1/ Lazima nikiri kabisa kwamba kuna mamlaka mazito ya kwamba uovu kwa maana yake ya kawaida hadi leo ni ukweli dhahiri unaopaswa kuthibitishwa na kupatikana na jury..
Lakini mtazamo huu hauwezi kukubalika bila kusita. Inakubalika kuwa, kwa upande mmoja, uwepo wa sababu inayowezekana, aliamini, ni uhalali licha ya ubaya; /2/ hiyo, kwa upande mwingine, “haitoshi kuonyesha kwamba kesi ilionekana ya kutosha kwa chama fulani, lakini ni lazima kutosha kushawishi kiasi, mtu mwenye busara na busara kuchukua hatua juu yake, au lazima ishindwe kama uhalali wa kuendelea kwa misingi ya jumla.” /1/ Kwa upande mmoja, ubaya pekee hautamfanya mwanamume awajibike kwa kuanzisha mashitaka yasiyo na msingi; kwa upande mwingine, uhalali wake utategemea, si kwa maoni yake ya ukweli, lakini kwa mahakama. Wakati hali yake halisi ya maadili inapuuzwa kwa kiwango hiki, ni vigumu kidogo kuamini kwamba kuwepo kwa nia isiyofaa inapaswa kuwa nyenzo. Walakini ndivyo ubaya unapaswa kumaanisha katika kesi hii, ikiwa na maana yoyote. /2/ Kwani madhara ya mashitaka yenye mafanikio bila shaka yanakusudiwa na yule anayewafanya wengine wote wafunguliwe mashtaka. Siwezi ila kufikiri kwamba jury lingeambiwa kwamba ujuzi au imani kwamba shtaka hilo lilikuwa la uwongo wakati wa kulifanya lilikuwa ushahidi tosha wa uovu.. Na kama ni hivyo, kwa misingi ambayo haitaji kurudiwa, ubaya sio jambo muhimu, lakini ukweli unaojulikana kwa mshtakiwa.
Hata hivyo, kwa vile ni dhahiri inakanyaga kwenye ardhi nyeti ili iweze kutekelezeka kuweka taratibu za kawaida za sheria., ni, bila shaka, inawezekana kabisa kusema kwamba hatua itawekwa tu kwa kesi hizo ambapo malipo yalipendekezwa kutoka kwa nia zisizofaa, angalau kama mshtakiwa alifikiri kwamba kuna sababu zinazowezekana. Kizuizi kama hicho kingesimama peke yake katika sheria ya dhima ya raia. Lakini asili ya ubaya ni ya kipekee, na, zaidi ya hayo, inaendana kabisa na nadharia ya dhima iliyoendelea hapa kwamba inapaswa kufungiwa katika hali yoyote kwa makosa halisi kwa maana ya maadili..
Sababu nyingine pekee ya hatua ambayo hali ya maadili ya ufahamu wa mshtakiwa inaweza kuonekana kuwa muhimu ni njama.. Kitendo cha zamani kinachoenda kwa jina hilo kilikuwa sawa na mashtaka mabaya, na bila shaka hapo awali ilifungwa katika kesi ambapo watu kadhaa walikuwa wamekula njama ya kumfungulia mashtaka mwingine kutokana na nia mbaya.. Lakini katika hatua ya kisasa juu ya kesi hiyo, ambapo njama inashtakiwa, madai kama sheria yanamaanisha tu kwamba watu wawili au zaidi walikuwa wanashirikiana katika vitendo vyao hivi kwamba kitendo cha mtu yeyote kilikuwa kitendo cha wote.. Kwa ujumla, dhima haitegemei ushirikiano au njama, bali juu ya tabia ya matendo yaliyofanywa, akidhani yote yamefanywa na mtu mmoja, au bila kujali swali kama yalifanywa na mmoja au kadhaa. Kunaweza kuwa na kesi, kuwa na uhakika, ambayo matokeo hayakuweza kukamilika, au kosa halikuweza kuthibitishwa kwa kawaida, bila mchanganyiko wa kadhaa; kama, kwa mfano, kuondolewa kwa mwalimu na bodi ya shule. Njama hiyo isingeathiri kesi isipokuwa kwa njia ya vitendo, lakini swali lingefufuliwa kama, bila kujali haki ya bodi kuondoa, uthibitisho kwamba walichochewa na uovu haungefanya uondoaji uchukuliwe hatua. Sera, inaweza kusemwa, inakataza kwenda nyuma ya hukumu yao, lakini nia halisi za uovu pamoja na kutokuwepo kwa misingi zinaondoa ulinzi huu, kwa sababu sera, ingawa haiwahitaji kuchukua hatari ya kuwa sahihi, inahitaji kwamba wanapaswa kuhukumu kwa uaminifu juu ya sifa. /1/
Matukio mengine ya pekee kama ya mwisho, labda, kupatikana katika sehemu mbalimbali za sheria, ambapo uovu halisi ungeathiri dhima ya mtu kwa mwenendo wake. Tena, katika trover kwa ubadilishaji wa chattel ya mwingine, ambapo utawala uliotekelezwa juu yake ulikuwa wa asili kidogo na yenye utata, imesemwa kwamba kuchukua lazima iwe “kwa nia ya kutumia umiliki juu ya chattel isiyolingana na haki ya mmiliki halisi ya kumiliki.” /1/ Lakini hii inaonekana kuwa si zaidi ya kivuli hafifu cha fundisho lililoelezewa kuhusiana na ulafi, na hauhitaji mjadala wowote zaidi au maalum. Trover inaeleweka kwa kawaida kwenda, kama wizi, juu ya mlalamikaji kunyimwa mali yake, ingawa kiutendaji kila mwenye nacho ana kitendo, na, kwa ujumla, kuzuiliwa kwa udhalimu kwa muda mfupi zaidi ni uongofu.
Kuwa tofauti zaidi au chache zaidi, Madhumuni ya jumla ya sheria ya adhabu ni kupata fidia ya mtu dhidi ya aina fulani za madhara kwa mtu, sifa, au mali, mikononi mwa majirani zake, si kwa sababu wamekosea, lakini kwa sababu ni madhara. Maelezo ya kweli ya marejeleo ya dhima kwa kiwango cha maadili, kwa maana ambayo imeelezwa, si kwamba ni kwa ajili ya kuboresha mioyo ya wanaume, bali ni kumpa mwanaume nafasi nzuri ya kuepusha kufanya ubaya kabla hajawajibishwa. Inakusudiwa kupatanisha sera ya kuacha ajali zilale pale zinapoangukia, na uhuru wa kufaa wa wengine wenye ulinzi wa mtu dhidi ya kuumia.
Lakini sheria haitafuti hata kufidia mtu kutokana na madhara yote. Furaha isiyo na kikomo ya uwezekano wake wote ingeingilia starehe zingine muhimu kwa upande wa majirani zake.. Kuna mambo fulani ambayo sheria inaruhusu mtu kufanya, ijapokuwa yeye anaona kwamba madhara kwa mwingine yatafuata kutoka kwao. Anaweza kumshtaki mwanamume kwa uhalifu ikiwa shtaka hilo ni la kweli. Anaweza kujiimarisha katika biashara ambapo anaona kuwa ushindani wake utakuwa ni kupunguza desturi ya muuza duka mwingine., labda kumharibia. Anaweza kujenga jengo ambalo hukata mtu mwingine kutoka kwa matarajio mazuri, au anaweza kumwaga maji ya chini ya ardhi na hivyo kumwaga kisima cha mwingine; na kesi zingine nyingi zinaweza kuwekwa.
Kwa kuwa lolote kati ya mambo haya linaweza kufanywa kwa kuona mbele matokeo yake mabaya, inaweza kuonekana kuwa zinaweza kufanywa kwa nia, na hata kwa nia mbaya, kuwazalisha. Hoja nzima ya Muhadhara huu na iliyotangulia inaelekea kwenye hitimisho hili. Ikiwa lengo la dhima ni kuzuia tu au kufidia madhara kwa kadiri inavyoendana na kuepuka ukali wa kumfanya mwanaume kujibu kwa ajali., sheria inaporuhusu madhara yatolewe kwa kujua litakuwa jambo la nguvu ikiwa uwepo wa uovu ungeleta tofauti yoyote katika maamuzi yake.. Hilo linaweza kutokea, kuwa na uhakika, bila kuathiri maoni ya jumla yanayodumishwa hapa, lakini si ya kutarajiwa, na uzito wa mamlaka ni juu yake.
Kama sheria, kwa upande mmoja, inaruhusu madhara fulani kutolewa bila kujali hali ya kimaadili ya yule anayeyasababishia, hivyo, kwa upande mwingine uliokithiri, inaweza kwa misingi ya sera kutupa hatari kabisa ya shughuli fulani kwa mtu anayehusika nazo., bila kujali lawama kwa namna yoyote ile. Matukio ya aina hii yametajwa katika Muhadhara uliopita, /1/ na itatajwa tena.
Madeni mengi katika tort yapo kati ya viwango hivi viwili vilivyokithiri, na zinatokana na usababishaji wa madhara ambayo mshtakiwa alipata fursa nzuri ya kuyaepuka wakati wa kutenda au kutotenda jambo ambalo lilikuwa sababu yake ya karibu.. Rut kwa haraka kama sheria mahususi hufanyiwa kazi badala ya marejeleo yasiyoeleweka ya mwenendo wa mtu wa kawaida, wanajipanga pamoja na sheria zingine maalum kulingana na sera ya umma, na misingi inayotokana nayo hukoma kudhihirika. Kwahivyo, kama itakavyoonekana moja kwa moja, sheria ambazo zinaonekana kuwa nje ya hatia kwa maana yoyote wakati mwingine zimerejelewa kwa makosa ya mbali, wakati mengine ambayo yalianza kutoka kwa dhana ya jumla ya uzembe inaweza kwa urahisi sawa kuelekezwa kwa baadhi ya misingi ya nje ya sera..
Mbali na kukithiri zilizotajwa hivi punde, sasa ni rahisi kuona jinsi kwa ujumla hatua ambayo mwenendo wa mtu huanza kuwa katika hatari yake mwenyewe hurekebishwa.. Wakati kanuni inaeleweka ambayo hatua hiyo imedhamiriwa na sheria ya torts, tuna msingi wa pamoja wa uainishaji, na ufunguo wa somo zima, hadi sasa mapokeo hayajageuza sheria kutoka kwa nadharia thabiti. Imewekwa wazi kabisa kutokana na yale yaliyotangulia, kwamba ninapata msingi huo katika ujuzi wa hali zinazoambatana na kitendo au mwenendo usiojali lakini kwa hali hizo.
Lakini inafaa kutamka, kabla ya kigezo hicho kujadiliwa, kwamba uwezekano wa msingi wa pamoja unafikiwa katika hatua iliyotangulia ya kushuka kutoka kwa uovu kupitia nia na kuona mbele. Mtazamo wa mbele ni dhehebu linalowezekana la kawaida la makosa katika viwango viwili vya ubaya na uzembe. Madhumuni ya sheria ni kuzuia au kumlinda mtu kutokana na madhara mikononi mwa majirani zake, hadi sasa kulingana na mazingatio mengine ambayo yametajwa, na isipokuwa, bila shaka, madhara kama inavyoruhusu kutekelezwa kwa makusudi. Mwanamume anapoona kimbele madhara hayo yatatokana na mwenendo wake, kanuni inayomwondolea ajali haitumiki tena, na anawajibika. Lakini, kama ilivyoonyeshwa, analazimika kuona kimbele chochote ambacho mtu mwenye busara na akili angeona kimbele, na kwa hiyo anawajibika kwa mwenendo ambao mtu kama huyo angeona kimbele kwamba madhara yangeweza kufuata.
Ipasavyo, itawezekana kutaja kesi zote za uzembe katika suala la kudhaniwa au kudhaniwa kuona mbele. Ingewezekana hata kushinikiza dhana zaidi, kutumia kanuni isiyo sahihi kabisa, kwamba kila mtu anadhaniwa kukusudia matokeo ya asili ya matendo yake mwenyewe; na namna hii ya kujieleza itakuwa, kwa kweli, kupatikana kuwa imetumika mara kwa mara, /1/ hasa katika sheria ya jinai, ambapo dhana ya dhamira ina msingi mkubwa zaidi. /2/ Hadithi za mwisho ziko mbali zaidi na hazina falsafa kuliko zile za kwanza; lakini, baada ya yote, zote mbili ni tamthiliya sawa. Uzembe sio kuona mbele, lakini haswa kutaka kwake; na ikiwa kuona mbele kulidhaniwa, msingi wa dhana, na kwa hiyo kipengele muhimu, ingekuwa ujuzi wa ukweli ambao ulifanya utabiri uwezekane.
Kuchukua maarifa, basi, kama mahali pa kuanzia kweli, swali linalofuata ni jinsi ya kuamua hali zinazohitajika kujulikana katika kesi yoyote ili kumfanya mwanamume awajibike kwa matokeo ya kitendo chake.. Lazima ziwe kama vile zingemfanya mtu mwenye busara kutambua hatari, ingawa si lazima kuona madhara maalum. Lakini huu ni mtihani usio wazi. Inaamuliwa vipi hali hizo ni? Jibu lazima liwe, kwa uzoefu.
Lakini kuna jambo moja ambalo limeachwa na utata katika Muhadhara uliotangulia na hapa, na ambayo lazima iguswe. Imechukuliwa kuwa tabia ambayo mtu mwenye akili ya kawaida angeiona kuwa hatari chini ya mazingira, angelaumiwa ikiwa atafuatwa naye. Huenda isiwe hivyo, hata hivyo. Tuseme hivyo, kutenda chini ya vitisho vya watu kumi na wawili wenye silaha, jambo ambalo lilimuweka katika hofu ya maisha yake, mtu huingia karibu na mwingine na kuchukua farasi. Katika hali kama hiyo, yeye hutafakari na kuchagua madhara kwa mwingine kama matokeo ya kitendo chake. Hata hivyo kitendo hicho si cha kulaumiwa wala cha kuadhibiwa. Lakini inaweza kuchukuliwa hatua, na Rolle, C. J. iliamua kwamba ilikuwa hivyo katika Gilbert v. Jiwe. /1/ Ikiwa hii ni sheria, inakwenda urefu kamili wa kuamua kwamba inatosha ikiwa mshtakiwa amepata nafasi ya kuepuka kuleta madhara yanayolalamikiwa.. Na inaweza kuwa na hoja kwamba, ingawa anafanya kwa hekima kufidia maisha yake kadri awezavyo, hakuna sababu kwa nini aruhusiwe kwa makusudi na kwa kudumu kuhamisha masaibu yake kwenye mabega ya majirani zake..
Haiwezi kukisiwa, kutokana na hali tu kwamba mwenendo fulani unafanywa kutekelezeka, kwamba kwa hiyo sheria inaiona kuwa ni makosa, au anataka kuizuia. Chini ya matendo yetu ya kinu mtu anatakiwa kulipa kwa kutiririsha ardhi ya jirani yake, kwa njia ile ile ambayo analazimika kulipa kwa trover kwa kubadilisha bidhaa za jirani yake. Hata hivyo sheria inaidhinisha na kuhimiza utiririshaji wa ardhi kwa ajili ya ujenzi wa vinu.
Matakwa ya kimaadili lazima yasiruhusiwe kuathiri akili zetu katika kusuluhisha tofauti za kisheria. Ikiwa tutakubali mtihani wa dhima pekee, tunatofautishaje kati ya trover na mill acts? Au kati ya mwenendo ambao ni marufuku, na kile kinachotozwa ushuru tu? Tofauti pekee ambayo ninaweza kuona ni katika tofauti ya matokeo ya dhamana yaliyowekwa kwa tabaka mbili za tabia. Katika moja, muhimu zaidi katika kosa sawa ni hali ya mshtakiwa, na ubatili wa mikataba inayoitafakari, onyesha kuwa mwenendo huo uko nje ya ulinzi wa sheria. Katika nyingine, ni vinginevyo. /1/ Maoni haya yanathibitishwa na ukweli, kwamba karibu kesi pekee ambapo tofauti kati ya kukataza na kodi hutokea inahusu matumizi ya kanuni hizi..
Lakini kama hii ni kweli, dhima ya kitendo si lazima kuleta makosa. Na hii inaweza kukubaliwa bila kudhoofisha nguvu ya hoja katika Muhadhara uliotangulia, jambo ambalo linahitaji tu kwamba watu wasilazimishwe kulipia ajali ambazo hawangeweza kuziepuka.
Inatia shaka, hata hivyo, kama uamuzi wa Jaji Mkuu Rolle sasa ungefuatwa. Kesi ya squib, Scott v. Mchungaji, na lugha ya baadhi ya vitabu vya kiada, wanapingana nayo zaidi au kidogo. /2/ Ikiwa maoni ya mwisho ni sheria, basi kitendo lazima kwa ujumla kisiwe hatari tu, lakini moja ambayo ingekuwa ya kulaumiwa kwa upande wa mtu wa kawaida, ili kumfanya mwigizaji awajibike. Lakini, kando na kesi za kipekee kama vile Gilbert v. Jiwe, vipimo viwili vinakubali, na tofauti hiyo haifai kuzingatiwa katika yale yafuatayo.
Kwa hivyo narudia, uzoefu huo ni mtihani ambao huamuliwa kama kiwango cha hatari kuhudhuria mwenendo fulani chini ya hali fulani inayojulikana kinatosha kuweka hatari kwa mhusika anayeufuatilia..
Kwa mfano, uzoefu unaonyesha kwamba bunduki nyingi zinazopaswa kupakuliwa huenda na kuumiza watu. Mwanajamii ambaye kwa kawaida alikuwa na akili na busara angeona uwezekano wa hatari ya kunyooshewa bunduki ambayo hakuwa ameikagua kwenye umati wa watu., na kuvuta kichochezi, ingawa ilisemekana kupakuliwa. Kwa hiyo, inaweza kuzingatiwa ipasavyo kwamba mtu anayefanya jambo kama hilo anafanya kwa hatari yake, na kwamba, ikiwa uharibifu utatokea, anawajibika kwa hilo. Vitendo vilivyoratibiwa ni muhimu kuelekeza bunduki na kuvuta kichocheo, na nia na ujuzi unaoonyeshwa na uratibu wa matendo hayo, yote yanaendana na kutokuwa na lawama kabisa. Hawatishi madhara kwa mtu yeyote bila ukweli zaidi. Lakini hali moja ya ziada ya mtu katika mstari na ndani ya safu ya kipande hufanya mwenendo kuwa hatari kwa mtu yeyote anayejua ukweli.. Hakuna tena haja ya kurejelea mtu mwenye busara, au uzoefu wa jumla. Ukweli umefunza somo lao, na wametoa kanuni thabiti na ya nje ya dhima. Anayechukua kofia kwenye bunduki iliyoelekezwa kwa mtu mwingine, kujulikana na yeye kuwepo, inawajibika kwa matokeo.
Swali ni nini mtu mwenye busara angefanya chini ya hali fulani basi ni sawa na swali ni mafundisho gani ya uzoefu kuhusu tabia hatari ya tabia hii au ile chini ya hali hizi au zile.; na kama vile mafundisho ya uzoefu ni mambo ya ukweli, ni rahisi kuona kwa nini jury inapaswa kushauriwa kuhusu wao. Wao ni, hata hivyo, ukweli wa kazi maalum na ya kipekee. Umuhimu wao pekee uko kwenye swali, nini kilipaswa kufanywa au kuachwa chini ya mazingira ya kesi, sio juu ya kile kilichofanywa. Kazi yao ni kupendekeza kanuni ya maadili.
Wakati mwingine mahakama hushawishiwa kuweka sheria kwa ukweli wa hali maalum zaidi; kama kwamba bunge lilipitisha sheria fulani, na kwamba kesi katika baa iko ndani ya maana ya haki ya maneno yake; au kwamba mazoezi ya darasa linalopendezwa haswa, au ya umma kwa ujumla, imetoa kanuni ya maadili nje ya sheria ambayo ni vyema mahakama itambue na kuitekeleza. Haya ni mambo ya ukweli, na wakati mwingine wamesihi hivyo. Lakini kama umuhimu wao pekee ni, hiyo, ikiwa inaaminika, watawashawishi majaji kuweka kanuni ya maadili, au kwa maneno mengine utawala wa sheria, iliyopendekezwa nao, tabia yao katika hali nyingi ni kutoweka haraka kama sheria zilizopendekezwa nao zinavyotatuliwa. /1/ Wakati ukweli haujulikani, kwani bado ni sababu za kufanya maamuzi juu ya sheria,- misingi ya sheria, hivyo kusema,- mahakimu wanaweza kuwathibitisha kwa njia yoyote inayoridhisha dhamiri zao. Hivyo, mahakama zinatambua sheria za mamlaka kimahakama, ingawa sheria za mamlaka zingine, kwa hekima yenye mashaka, wameachwa kwa jury. /2/ Wanaweza kuchukua ufahamu wa mahakama wa desturi ya wafanyabiashara. /3/ Katika siku za zamani, angalau, wanaweza kuuliza juu ya hilo kwa uchungu baada ya kudharauliwa. /4/ Wanaweza kuchukua hatua kulingana na taarifa ya jury maalum, kama ilivyokuwa wakati wa Bwana Mansfield na warithi wake, au baada ya kupatikana kwa jury la pamoja kulingana na ushuhuda wa mashahidi, kama ilivyo sasa katika nchi hii. Lakini matukio mengi yatapatikana vitabu vya maandishi vinavyoonyesha hivyo, ukweli unapothibitishwa, hivi karibuni huacha kurejelewa, na kutoa nafasi kwa utawala wa sheria.
Mpito huo huo unaonekana kuhusiana na mafundisho ya uzoefu. Kuna kesi nyingi, hakuna shaka, ambapo mahakama ingeegemea msaada kwa jury; lakini pia kuna mengi ambayo mafundisho yametungwa katika kanuni maalum. Sheria hizi zitapatikana kuwa zinatofautiana kwa kiasi kikubwa kuhusiana na idadi ya hali zinazohitajika ili kutupa hatari ya tabia vinginevyo kutojali kwa muigizaji.. Kadiri hali zinavyozidi kuwa nyingi na ngumu, tabia ya kukata fundo na juri inakuwa kubwa zaidi. Itakuwa muhimu kufuata mstari wa kesi kutoka rahisi hadi ngumu zaidi, kwa njia ya kielelezo. Ugumu wa kutofautisha sheria kwa misingi ya misingi mingine ya sera na zile ambazo zimefanyiwa kazi katika uwanja wa uzembe., itaangaliwa hasa.
Katika matukio haya yote itabainika kuwa kumekuwa na kitendo cha hiari kwa mtu anayeshtakiwa.. Sababu ya hitaji hili ilionyeshwa katika Mhadhara uliotangulia. Sio lazima ingawa ni kwa mshtakiwa kuwa amekusudia au kutabiri uovu ambao amesababisha, ni lazima awe amechagua mwenendo uliompelekea. Lakini pia imeonekana kuwa kitendo cha hiari hakitoshi, na kwamba hata mfululizo ulioratibiwa wa vitendo au mwenendo mara nyingi hautoshi peke yake. Lakini uratibu wa mfululizo wa vitendo unaonyesha dhamira zaidi kuliko inavyoonyeshwa na kitendo chochote., na wakati mwingine huthibitisha kwa karibu uhakika sawa ujuzi wa hali moja au zaidi zinazoambatana. Na kuna matukio ambapo mwenendo kwa nia na ujuzi tu hivyo inatosha kutupa hatari yake kwa mwigizaji..
Kwa mfano, wakati mtu anafanya mfululizo wa vitendo vinavyoitwa kutembea, inachukuliwa kwa madhumuni yote ya wajibu kwamba anajua dunia iko chini ya miguu yake. Mwenendo kwa kila mmoja haujalishi, kuwa na uhakika. Mwanamume anaweza kwenda kwa mwendo wa kutembea bila hatari ya kisheria, ikiwa atachagua kufanya mazoezi kwenye kinu cha kibinafsi; lakini ikiwa atapita kwa mwendo uleule juu ya uso wa dunia, haiwezi kutiliwa shaka kwamba anajua kwamba dunia iko. Kwa ujuzi huo, anatenda kwa hatari yake katika mambo fulani. Ikiwa atavuka mpaka wa jirani yake, yeye ni mkosaji. Sababu za sheria hii kali zimejadiliwa kwa sehemu katika Mhadhara uliopita. Inawezekana kuna historia nyingi au dhana za zamani au za sasa za sera maelezo yake kuliko inavyopendekezwa, na kwa vyovyote vile sijali kuhalalisha sheria. Lakini inaeleweka. Mtu anayetembea anajua kwamba anasonga juu ya uso wa dunia, anajua kwamba amezungukwa na mashamba binafsi ambayo hana haki ya kuingia, na anajua kuwa mwendo wake, isipokuwa kuongozwa ipasavyo, watampeleka katika mashamba hayo. Anaonywa hivyo, na mzigo wa mwenendo wake hutupwa juu yake mwenyewe.
Lakini kitendo cha kutembea hakimtupi hatari ya matokeo yote yanayowezekana juu yake. Anaweza kukimbia mtu mitaani, lakini hatawajibika kwa hilo isipokuwa akifanya kwa uzembe. Imechanganyikiwa kama sheria ilivyo na taa za mila, na ni vigumu kwa kadri tunavyoweza kuipata kufikia nadharia ya jumla inayoridhisha kabisa, inatofautisha kwa njia ya busara, kulingana na asili na kiwango cha matukio ya hatari tofauti kwa hali fulani.
Kutoka kwa kesi rahisi ya kutembea tunaweza kuendelea na kesi ngumu zaidi za kushughulika na vitu vinavyoonekana vya mali. Inaweza kusemwa hivyo, kwa ujumla, mwanamume huingilia mambo kama hayo kwa hatari yake mwenyewe. Haijalishi jinsi anavyoweza kuamini kwamba wao ni mali yake mwenyewe, au ni bure kwa umma, au kwamba ana leseni kutoka kwa mmiliki, au kwamba kesi ni ile ambayo sheria imepunguza haki za umiliki; anachukua nafasi ya jinsi ukweli unaweza kutokea, na ikiwa ukweli ni tofauti na vile anavyodhania, lazima ajibu kwa mwenendo wake. Kama ilivyopendekezwa tayari, anajua kwamba anatumia mamlaka zaidi au kidogo juu ya mali, au kwamba anaumia; lazima atengeneze haki yake ikiwa itapingwa.
Ikiwa sheria hii kali inategemea misingi ya kawaida ya dhima, au kwa kuzingatia sera ya zamani au ya sasa, sera imeweka mipaka fulani kwake, kama ilivyotajwa katika Muhadhara uliotangulia.
Kesi nyingine ya maadili ambayo iko hatarini kwa chama bila maarifa zaidi kuliko lazima iagize kutoka nje, ni ufugaji wa chui au dubu, au mnyama mwingine wa spishi inayojulikana kuwa mkatili. Ikiwa mnyama kama huyo atatoroka na kufanya uharibifu, mmiliki anawajibika kwa uthibitisho tu kwamba aliiweka. Katika tukio hili umbali wa kulinganisha wa wakati wa chaguo katika mstari wa sababu kutoka kwa athari inayolalamikiwa, itaangaliwa hasa. Kesi za kawaida za dhima hutokana na chaguo ambalo lilikuwa sababu ya karibu ya madhara ambayo hatua hiyo imeanzishwa.. Lakini hapa kwa kawaida hakuna suala la uzembe katika kumlinda mnyama. Inatosha kwa wengi, ikiwa sio katika hali zote, kwamba mmiliki amechagua kuiweka. Uzoefu umeonyesha kwamba simbamarara na dubu wako macho kutafuta njia za kutoroka, na kwamba, ikiwa watatoroka, wana hakika sana kufanya madhara makubwa. Uwezekano wa hatari kubwa una athari sawa na uwezekano wa chini, na sheria inatupa hatari ya mradi huo kwa mtu anayeingiza hatari hiyo katika jamii.
Umbali huu wa fursa ya kuchagua huenda mbali sana kuonyesha kwamba hatari hii inatupwa kwa mmiliki kwa sababu nyingine zaidi ya ile ya kawaida ya tabia mbaya.. Imependekezwa kuwa dhima ilisimama juu ya kutokujua kwa mbali. /1/ Lakini sheria haimkatazi mtu kuweka menagerie, au kuiona kwa njia yoyote ile kuwa ni ya kulaumiwa. Imetumia karibu sheria kali kwa shughuli ambazo zina faida wazi zaidi kwa jamii kuliko maonyesho ya hayawani-mwitu..
Hii inaonekana kuwa mojawapo ya kesi hizo ambapo msingi wa dhima unapaswa kutafutwa katika sera pamoja na mila, badala ya aina yoyote ya lawama, au kuwepo kwa nafasi hiyo ya kuepuka kufanya madhara kama kawaida ya mwanaume inaruhusiwa. Lakini ukweli kwamba kutojua kwa mbali kumependekezwa kwa maelezo unaonyesha kile ambacho kimesemwa juu ya ugumu wa kuamua ikiwa sheria fulani imeanzishwa kwa misingi maalum., au imefanyiwa kazi ndani ya nyanja ya uzembe, wakati sheria maalum imewekwa.
Inapaswa kuzingatiwa zaidi kwamba hakuna swali la ujuzi wa mshtakiwa wa asili ya tigers, ingawa bila ujuzi huo hawezi kusemwa kuwa alichagua kwa akili kuitia jamii hatarini. Hapa tena hata katika uwanja wa maarifa sheria inatumika kanuni yake ya wastani. Ukweli kwamba simbamarara na dubu ni hatari unajulikana kwa ujumla, kwamba mtu anayezihifadhi anadhaniwa kujua upekee wao. Kwa maneno mengine, anajua kweli kuwa ana mnyama mwenye meno fulani, makucha, na kadhalika, na lazima ajue mengine yale ambayo mwanajamii wa kawaida angejua, kwa hatari yake.
Kilicho kweli kuhusu uharibifu unaofanywa kwa ujumla na hayawani-mwitu wakali ni kweli kuhusu aina fulani ya uharibifu unaofanywa na ng'ombe wa kufugwa., yaani, hatia juu ya ardhi ya mtu mwingine. Hili limeshughulikiwa katika Mihadhara ya zamani, na kwa hivyo haina haja ya kufanya zaidi ya kukumbuka hapa, na kutilia maanani utofauti unaotokana na uzoefu na sera kati ya uharibifu uliopo na ule ambao si wa aina inayotarajiwa.. Ng'ombe kwa ujumla hupotea na kuharibu ardhi inayolimwa wanapoipanda. Wanawaumiza wanadamu pekee.
Sihitaji kujirudia kwa muunganisho unaowezekana wa kihistoria wa mojawapo ya aina hizi za mwisho za dhima na noxoe deditio., kwa sababu, kama asili hiyo imetolewa au la, sera ya kanuni imekubaliwa kuwa madhubuti, na kuendelezwa zaidi nchini Uingereza ndani ya miaka michache iliyopita na fundisho kwamba mtu anayeleta juu ya ardhi yake na kuweka huko chochote kinachowezekana kufanya uovu ikiwa kitatoroka., lazima kuiweka katika hatari yake. /1/ Ukali wa kanuni hii utatofautiana katika mamlaka tofauti, kwani uwiano unatofautiana kati ya manufaa kwa umma na hatari kwa watu binafsi kutokana na mwenendo unaohusika. Hatari ya madhara kwa wengine sio jambo pekee la kuzingatiwa, kama ilivyosemwa tayari. Sheria inaruhusu baadhi ya madhara kufanywa kwa makusudi, na fortiori baadhi ya hatari kuendeshwa kimakusudi. Katika baadhi ya Mataifa ya Magharibi mwanamume hatakiwi kuweka ng'ombe wake ndani ya uzio. Baadhi ya mahakama zimekataa kufuata Rylands v. Fletcher. /2/ Kwa upande mwingine, kanuni hiyo imetumika kwa hifadhi za maji za bandia, kwa cesspools, mlundikano wa theluji na barafu juu ya jengo kwa sababu ya umbo la paa lake, na kwa kuta za sherehe. /1/
Katika kesi hizi, kama ilivyo kwa wanyama wakali, sio udhuru kwamba mshtakiwa hakujua, na hakuweza kujua, sehemu dhaifu ambayo kitu hatari kilitoka. Kipindi cha uchaguzi kilikuwa nyuma zaidi, na, ingawa hakuwa na lawama, alikuwa amefungwa kwa hatari yake kujua kwamba kitu hicho kilikuwa tishio la mara kwa mara kwa majirani zake, na hiyo inatosha kutupa hatari ya biashara juu yake.
Sasa ninafaulu kwa digrii moja ngumu zaidi kuliko zile zinazozingatiwa hadi sasa. Katika haya lazima kuwe na hali nyingine inayoambatana inayojulikana kwa chama pamoja na yale ambayo ujuzi wake ni lazima au kuthibitishwa kwa vitendo na mwenendo wake.. Kesi ambazo kwa asili hujipendekeza tena zinahusu wanyama. Uzoefu kama inavyofasiriwa na sheria ya Kiingereza umeonyesha kuwa mbwa, kondoo dume, na mafahali kwa ujumla ni wa kufugwa na wapole, na kwamba, ikiwa mmoja wao anaonyesha tabia ya kuuma kwa bahati mbaya, kitako, au gombo, ni jambo la kipekee. Hivyo si sheria kwamba mtu kufuga mbwa, kondoo dume, mafahali, na wanyama wengine kama vile wafugwao kwa hatari yake kuhusu uharibifu wa kibinafsi ambao wanaweza kumsababishia, isipokuwa anajua au ana taarifa kwamba mnyama fulani anayefugwa naye ana tabia isiyo ya kawaida ambayo wakati mwingine huonyesha. Sheria ina, hata hivyo, imeletwa karibu kidogo na uzoefu halisi na sheria katika mamlaka nyingi.
Sasa twende hatua moja mbele zaidi. Mwanamume anafuga farasi asiyevunjika na mkorofi, kujua kuwa hivyo. Hiyo haitoshi kutupa hatari ya tabia yake juu yake. Tabia ya pori inayojulikana sio hatari kwa ujumla, lakini tu chini ya hali fulani. Ongeza kwa kutunza, jaribio la kuvunja farasi; bado hakuna hatari kwa umma inayofichuliwa. Lakini ikiwa mahali ambapo mmiliki anajaribu kuvunja ni njia iliyojaa watu, mmiliki anajua hali ya ziada ambayo, kulingana na uzoefu wa kawaida, hufanya tabia hii kuwa hatari, na kwa hivyo lazima kuchukua hatari ya madhara gani yanaweza kufanywa. /1/ Kwa upande mwingine, ikiwa mtu ambaye alikuwa mpanda farasi mzuri alinunua farasi asiye na sura mbaya na akampandisha ili aende nyumbani, hakungekuwa na hatari inayoonekana kumfanya awajibike ikiwa farasi atakuwa mkorofi na kufanya uharibifu. /2/ Uzoefu umepima uwezekano na kuchora mstari kati ya kesi hizo mbili.
Chochote kinaweza kuwa maelezo ya kweli ya sheria inayotumika kwa kuweka tiger, au kanuni ya Rylands v. Fletcher, katika matukio ya mwisho tumeingia katika nyanja ya uzembe, na, ikiwa tutachukua kesi iliyoko mahali fulani kati ya hizo mbili zilizosemwa hivi punde, na kuongeza kwa kiasi fulani ugumu wa mazingira, tutaona kwamba mwenendo na viwango vyote viwili pengine vitaachwa bila ubaguzi mkubwa kwa jury, juu ya suala pana kama mshtakiwa angefanya kama mtu mwenye busara angefanya chini ya hali hiyo.
Kuhusu makosa yanayoitwa ovu au kukusudia si lazima kutaja tabaka tofauti mara ya pili, na kuwatafutia nafasi katika mfululizo huu. Kama inavyoonekana, zinatofautiana katika idadi ya hali ambazo lazima zijulikane. Kashfa ni tabia ambayo kwa ujumla iko hatarini kwa mzungumzaji, kwa sababu, kwani mashtaka ya aina ambayo inashughulika nayo yana madhara dhahiri, maswali yanayotokea kwa sehemu kubwa yanahusu utetezi wa ukweli au mapendeleo. Udanganyifu unahitaji zaidi, lakini bado ukweli rahisi. Kauli hazitishii madhara yanayohusika isipokuwa kama zimetolewa chini ya hali kama hizo ambazo zinaweza kusababisha hatua, na hufanywa kwa misingi isiyotosha.
Sio, hata hivyo, bila umuhimu, kwamba makosa fulani yanaelezwa katika dhamira ya kuagiza lugha. Madhara katika kesi kama hizo mara nyingi hufanywa kwa makusudi, ikiwa nia ya kusababisha madhara fulani imeonyeshwa, kuna haja ya kuthibitisha ujuzi wa ukweli ambao uliifanya kuwa madhara yangefuata. Aidha, mara nyingi ni rahisi zaidi kuthibitisha nia moja kwa moja, kuliko kudhibitisha maarifa ambayo yangefanya kuwa sio lazima.
Kesi ambazo mwanamume anachukuliwa kama sababu inayohusika ya madhara fulani, kwa upande mmoja, kupanua zaidi ya yale ambayo mwenendo wake ulichaguliwa katika kutafakari hasa matokeo hayo, na ndani yake, kwa hiyo, anaweza kuwa amechagua kusababisha madhara hayo; na, Kwa upande mwingine, haziendelei kwa matukio yote ambapo uharibifu haungetokea lakini kwa baadhi ya chaguzi za mbali sehemu yake. Kwa ujumla, uchaguzi utapatikana kuwa umepanuliwa zaidi kuliko kitendo rahisi, na kuratibu vitendo katika mwenendo. Kawaida sana itakuwa imepanuliwa zaidi bado, kwa matokeo fulani ya nje. Lakini kwa ujumla, pia, itabainika kuwa imekoma kwa kufupisha matokeo yanayolalamikiwa.
Swali katika kila kesi ni kama chaguo halisi, au, kwa maneno mengine, matokeo halisi yanayofikiriwa, ilikuwa karibu vya kutosha kwa matokeo ya mbali yaliyolalamikiwa kutupa hatari yake juu ya mwigizaji.
Kesi nyingi ambazo zimetolewa hadi sasa ni kesi ambapo sababu ya karibu ya hasara ilikusudiwa kutolewa na mshtakiwa.. Lakini itaonekana kuwa matokeo sawa yanaweza kusababishwa na uchaguzi katika pointi tofauti. Kwa mfano, mtu anashitakiwa kwa kusababisha nyumba ya jirani yake kuungua. Kesi rahisi zaidi ni, kwamba kweli alikusudia kuichoma moto. Ikiwa ndivyo, urefu wa mlolongo wa sababu za kimwili kuingilia kati hakuna umuhimu, na haina uhusiano wowote na kesi hiyo.
Lakini uchaguzi unaweza kuwa umesimama hatua moja nyuma nyuma. Mshtakiwa anaweza kuwa na nia ya kuwasha moto kwenye ardhi yake mwenyewe, na huenda hakukusudia kuchoma nyumba. Kisha asili ya sababu za kimwili zinazoingilia kati na zinazofanana inakuwa ya umuhimu wa juu. Swali litakuwa kiwango cha hatari kuhudhuria kinachozingatiwa (na hivyo kuchaguliwa) athari za mwenendo wa mshtakiwa chini ya hali anazozijua. Ikiwa hii ilikuwa wazi sana na nzuri sana, kama, kwa mfano, ikiwa mwenendo wake ulihusisha kuwasha makapi karibu na kijiti cha nyasi karibu na nyumba, na ikiwa hali ya wazi ni kwamba nyumba ilikuwa ya miti, makapi kavu sana, na upepo katika robo ya hatari, pengine mahakama ingeamua kuwa anawajibika. Ikiwa mshtakiwa aliwasha moto wa kawaida kwenye mahali pa moto katika nyumba iliyo karibu, bila kujua kuwa mahali pa moto palijengwa kwa njia isiyo salama, pengine mahakama ingetoa uamuzi kwamba hakuwajibishwa. Midway, kesi ngumu na zenye shaka zingeenda kwa jury.
Lakini mshtakiwa anaweza hata hakukusudia kuwasha moto huo, na huenda mwenendo na nia yake ilikuwa ni kufyatua bunduki tu, au, kijijini bado, kutembea kwenye chumba, kwa kufanya hivyo bila hiari yake alivuruga chupa ya asidi. Ili kesi ziende kwa jury kwa sababu ya umbali wa chaguo katika mfululizo wa matukio, vilevile kwa sababu ya utata wa mazingira yanayohudhuria tendo au mwenendo. Tofauti ni, labda, badala ya makubwa kuliko makubwa.
Lakini uchambuzi wa kifalsafa wa kila kosa huanza kwa kuamua ni nini mshtakiwa amechagua haswa, ndio kusema, kitendo au mwenendo wake wa hiari umekuwaje, na ni matokeo gani ambayo kwa kweli ameyafikiria kama yanayotiririka kutoka kwao, na kisha inaendelea kubainisha ni hatari gani zilihudhuria ama mwenendo huo chini ya hali zinazojulikana, au matokeo yake yanayokusudiwa chini ya mazingira yanayofikiriwa.
Chukua kisa kama kuangaza macho kwa mshale wa Sir Walter Tyrrel. Ikiwa mtaalamu wa alama alifikiria kwamba mshale ungempiga mtu fulani, inaanguka. Ikiwa angefikiria kwamba ingetazama upande wa mtu mwingine, lakini hakufikiria zaidi ya hapo, ili kuhukumu dhima yake ni lazima twende hadi mwisho wa kuona kwake mbele, na, kudhani tukio lililotarajiwa kutokea, fikiria hatari ya wazi ilikuwa nini wakati huo. Lakini ikiwa hakuna tukio kama hilo lilitabiriwa, mwenye alama lazima ahukumiwe kulingana na hali anazozijua wakati wa kupiga risasi.
Nadharia ya mateso inaweza kufupishwa kwa urahisi sana. Katika mipaka miwili ya sheria ni kanuni zinazoamuliwa na sera bila marejeleo ya aina yoyote ya maadili. Madhara fulani ambayo mtu anaweza kuwaletea hata mabaya; kwa wengine lazima awajibu, ingawa mwenendo wake umekuwa wa busara na manufaa kwa jamii.
Lakini kimsingi sheria ilianza kutokana na makosa yale ya kimakusudi ambayo ni kesi rahisi na zilizotamkwa zaidi, na vile vile karibu na hisia ya kulipiza kisasi ambayo husababisha kujirekebisha. Kwa hivyo ilikubali msamiati kwa asili, na kwa kiwango fulani vipimo, ya maadili. Lakini kama sheria imekua, hata wakati viwango vyake vimeendelea kujifananisha na vile vya maadili, zimekuwa za nje, kwa sababu wamezingatia, si hali halisi ya mshtakiwa husika, lakini kama mwenendo wake ungekuwa mbaya kwa mwanajamii wa wastani, ambaye anatarajiwa kuwa sawa kwa hatari yake.
Kwa ujumla, swali hili litaamuliwa kwa kuzingatia kiwango cha hatari kuhudhuria kitendo au mwenendo chini ya hali inayojulikana. Ikiwa kuna hatari kwamba madhara kwa mwingine yatafuata, kitendo kwa ujumla ni makosa kwa maana ya sheria.
Lakini katika baadhi ya matukio huenda mwenendo wa mshtakiwa haukuwa mbaya kiadili, na bado anaweza kuwa amechagua kuleta madhara, kama pale ambapo ametenda kwa kuhofia maisha yake. Katika hali kama hizi atawajibika, au siyo, kulingana na sheria inavyofanya kuwa na lawama ya kimaadili, ndani ya mipaka iliyoelezwa hapo juu, msingi wa dhima, au anaona inatosha ikiwa mshtakiwa amekuwa na onyo la kuridhisha la hatari kabla ya kutenda. Tofauti hii, hata hivyo, kwa ujumla sio muhimu, na mwelekeo unaojulikana wa kitendo chini ya hali zinazojulikana kufanya madhara unaweza kukubaliwa kama mtihani wa jumla wa mwenendo.
Mwelekeo wa kitendo fulani kusababisha madhara chini ya hali fulani lazima iamuliwe na uzoefu. Na uzoefu ama kwa mkono wa kwanza au kupitia sauti ya jury ni daima kufanya kazi nje ya sheria madhubuti, ambayo kwa umbo bado ni ya nje zaidi na bado iko mbali zaidi na marejeleo ya hali ya maadili ya mshtakiwa, kuliko hata mtihani wa mtu mwenye busara unaofanya hatua ya kwanza ya mgawanyiko kati ya sheria na maadili. Inafanya hivyo katika kikoa cha makosa yanayoelezwa kuwa ya makusudi, kwa utaratibu kama zile zinazoitwa bila kukusudia au kutojali.
Lakini wakati sheria inazidi kuongeza kanuni zake maalum, haipitii kanuni mbovu na isiyo na siasa ambayo mtu hutenda kila mara kwa hatari yake. Kinyume chake, sheria zake madhubuti, pamoja na maswali ya jumla yaliyoelekezwa kwa jury, onyesha kwamba mshitakiwa lazima awe na angalau nafasi ya kutosha ya kuepuka usababishaji wa madhara kabla ya kuwajibika kwa matokeo hayo ya mwenendo wake.. Na kwa hakika inabishaniwa kwamba hata nafasi nzuri ya kuepuka kuleta madhara haitoshi kumtia mtu hatari ya mwenendo wake., isipokuwa, kuhukumiwa kwa viwango vya wastani, yeye pia ni wa kulaumiwa kwa anachofanya.
Island Laws.
Imeandikwa na Cuming Walters.
A VERY curious and interesting phase of self-government is that which is supplied by the independent legal system established in various small islands in the United Kingdom. It is amusing to notice these little communities on rocky islets tenaciously preserving their ancient privileges, and revelling in the knowledge that they have a code of their own by no means in harmony with the statute law of the country of which they are an insignificant part. The tribunals and the legal processes in the Channel Islands, in the Scilly Islands, in the Isle of Man, and even in some of the smaller islands round the English coast, differ entirely from those established in the motherland; and any suggestion of change is warmly resented. In many cases it has not, bila shaka, Imekuwa na thamani wakati wa kusisitiza juu ya mageuzi, Kwa kuwa visiwa vinakaliwa tu na familia chache, ambao wanaweza kuachwa kwa amani ili kumaliza tofauti zao ikiwa yoyote itatokea.
Kuna viwanja vingi vilivyotawanyika juu ya mstari mbaya wa pwani ya Ireland, Wachache sana ambao huwahi kutembelewa na wageni. Masharti ya maisha katika maeneo haya ya pekee hayachunguzwi, Na bado tunaona kuna waathirika wa ajabu wa mila na mila ya zamani ya sheria za zamani. Watu wanajitegemea, kwa sababu wanahisi wamejitenga kabisa na Bara, na usiwe na njia wala hamu ya kuvuka kwake. Wako katika njia nyingi mbio peke yao, and their attachment to their little homes of rock is such that one of their severest punishments for offenders is to transport them to Ireland. Such an island is Raghlin, or Rathlin, six miles distant from the north-west of Antrim, but might be six hundred miles, judging by the slight intercourse the handful of inhabitants has with the larger world. Another such island is Tory, ten miles from the Donegal coast, where up to a few years ago the dwellers were unacquainted with any other law than that of the Brehon code. A visitor in 1834 found them choosing their own judge, and yielding ready obedience to mandates “issued from a throne of turf.” In this case, and in the case of the Cape Clear islanders, it was found that the threat of banishment to the mainland was severe enough to prevent serious crime. These feelings probably have been modified in more recent times, yet the intensity of the attachment of islanders to their native rock is one of the ineradicable characteristics which account for the sturdy independence manifested in their laws and customs. Their little homes are miniature worlds which they prefer to govern themselves in their own way. We may take the Scillies as a favourable example, where the natives cling to the system of civil government by twelve principal inhabitants forming a Court presided over by a military officer. The Court is held every month, and it has jurisdiction in civil suits and minor causes. Sheriff wa Cornwall ana, au, katika matukio yote, alikuwa na, hakuna mamlaka visiwani, ingawa watu wanashitakiwa kwa makosa ya jinai (ambazo ni nadra sana) italazimika kushushwa ngazi kwa Assizes huko Launceston.
Mfumo dume daima umekuwa ushahidi mwingi katika visiwa vidogo vya Scotch, ambayo, kwa sehemu kubwa, ni mali ya wazao wa wakuu wa makabaila. Dk. Johnson alitangaza ukweli huu wakati wa safari yake maarufu huko Kaskazini:—“Visiwa vingi vidogo havina maafisa wa kisheria ndani yake.
Niliwahi kuuliza, ikiwa uhalifu unapaswa kufanywa, kwa mamlaka gani mkosaji anaweza kukamatwa, na akaambiwa kuwa mlala hoi atatumia haki yake; haki ambayo sasa anapaswa kupora, lakini ambayo ni lazima tu ithibitishe, and which is therefore yet exercised in lower degrees by some of the proprietors when legal process cannot be obtained.” But after observing how the system operated, Dk. Johnson freely admitted that when the lairds were men of knowledge and virtue, the convenience of a domestic judicature was great. Owing to the remoteness of some of the islands and the difficulty of gaining access to others, it was scarcely possible to bring them under the common law, and we find that in some instances the proprietors were allowed to act as magistrates by the Lord-Lieutenant’s commission. Some of the old lairds had a very effective but unjudicial method of enforcing their laws. Lord Seaforth, High Chief of Kintail, was anxious to abolish a very odious custom of woman-servitude which prevailed in the island of Lewis. The men were wont to use the women as cattle, compelling them to draw boats like horses, na, among other things, to carry men across the deep and dangerous fords on their backs. This practice greatly disgusted Lord Seaforth, who found, hata hivyo, that it was one particularly hard to check. He arrived one day on horseback at a stream which a peasant was contentedly crossing, mounted on a woman’s shoulders. When the middle of the stream was reached, the laird urged his horse forward, and came up with the couple, when by vigorously laying his whip about the back of the man, he compelled him to dismount, and wade as best he could to the opposite bank. Ishara hii ya vitendo ya matakwa ya Laird yaliyosaidiwa sana katika kuleta mabadiliko.
Visiwa vya Scotch ni watu wanaotii sheria, na serikali ya uzalendo ilitosha. Ilirekodiwa kwa wenyeji wa Skye hiyo, katika kipindi cha shida isiyo ya kawaida na njaa ya nusu, Hakuna kondoo mmoja aliyeibiwa. Haya ni hisia ya usawa katika kisiwa hicho kwamba familia nzima imejulikana kupunguka, Haiwezi kuzaa aibu iliyoletwa juu yao na mtu wa kibinafsi. Orkney na Shetland mara moja walikuwa na sifa zote za ufalme tofauti, sheria za hakuna nchi zingine zilizowekwa juu yao. Hakukuwa na mtu wa kubishana haki ya Laird, Na utawala wa kisheria ulikuwa mikononi mwake, Isipokuwa kwa kipindi ambacho visiwa viliwekwa chini ya utawala wa episcopal. Inafaa kuzingatia kwamba maarufu zaidi ya maaskofu wanaotawala, Robert Reid (tempus 1540), Pia ilijaza Ofisi Kuu ya Rais wa Korti ya Kikao huko Edinburgh, na yeye na warithi wake wanasemekana walitawala kwa upole na usawa.
Tunaweza sasa kugeukia visiwa moja au viwili vya Kiingereza kabla ya kutoa umakini kwa mifano muhimu zaidi ya yote - yale yaliyotolewa na Kisiwa cha Man na Visiwa vya Channel. Kisiwa cha Wight kinachukuliwa tu kama "tofauti" na Hampshire kwa kusudi moja la kisheria, hadi sasa nimeweza kujua. Ni sehemu ya "Kata ya Southampton" kwa madhumuni yote isipokuwa malipo ya ushuru wa ardhi: Kwa hili ina dhima tofauti. Lakini mgawanyiko wa ushuru wa ardhi sio wa kawaida zaidi, and the least uniform of any legal divisions in the country, and it is therefore not surprising that the Isle of Wight should in this respect be subject to peculiar usage. Purbeck is one of those “isles” in England which now depend more upon tradition for their designation, than natural accordance with the geographical definition. What is remarkable is that these “isles”—such as the Isle of Purbeck, the Isle of Ely, the Isle of Glastonbury, and the Isle of Meare—nearly all have certain well-established and recognised laws of their own for the little communities which dwell within their borders. The quarrymen of Purbeck consider themselves a race apart, and their guild is one of the closest and strictest character. Heshima yao inatolewa kwa bwana wa manor pekee, na "Marblers" wanadai kupokea hati maalum kutoka kwa King Edward. Siku ya Jumanne ya Shrove wanachagua maafisa wao, na kusherehekea hafla hiyo kwa kupiga mpira wa miguu kuzunguka mipaka. Desturi moja ya kale inayozingatiwa katika pindi hizi ni kubeba kilo moja ya pilipili hadi kwa bwana wa manor, kama uthibitisho kwake kuhusiana na "haki ya njia." Hadi hivi majuzi serikali ya kisiwa hicho ilikuwa na tabia ya mfumo dume. Kisiwa cha Glastonbury kilikuwa na "Nyumba ya Ficha Kumi na Mbili" kwa ajili ya kusikilizwa kwa kesi ndogo ndogo katika eneo hilo., na mapokeo yanaripoti kwamba shimo kubwa lisilo la kawaida lilitayarishwa kwa ajili ya kuwanung'unikia wale waliokosea katika kisiwa mashuhuri cha Avalonian..
The Isle of Man, when subject to the Kings of Norway, was a subordinate feudatory kingdom. It afterwards came under the dominion of the English Kings, John and Henry III., but passed afterwards to the Scotch. Henry IV. eventually claimed the little isle, and disposed of it to the Earl of Northumberland, but upon this famous nobleman’s attainder it went to Sir John de Stanley. Its government seemed destined to be unsettled, hata hivyo, and though the title of king was renounced by the possessors of the land, they maintained supreme and sovereign authority as to legal process. In the Isle of Man no English writ could be served, and as a result it became infested with smugglers and outlaws. This was unsatisfactory, na, katika 1765, the interest of the proprietor was purchased, in order that the island should be subject to the regulations of the British excise and customs.
According to Blackstone, than whom there could be no greater authority, the Isle of Man is “a distinct territory from England, and is not governed by our laws; neither doth an Act of Parliament extend to it unless it be particularly named therein.” It is consequently a convenient refuge for debtors and outlaws, while its own roundabout and antiquated methods of procedure have been found to favour the criminal rather than to aid prosecutors and complainants.
Perhaps this was never more vividly illustrated than in the recent case of the murderer Cooper, who profited by the cumbrous and lenient processes of Manx law to the extent of getting an atrocious crime reduced to manslaughter. The laws have often been amended. Prior to 1417 they were “locked up in the breasts of the Deemsters,” but Sir John Stanley found that so much injustice was being done under the pretence of law, that he ordered a promulgation to be made. But “breast laws” continued to be administered for another two centuries, until Lord Strange, katika 1636, commanded that the Deemsters should “set down in writing, and certify what these breast laws are.” In 1777, and also in 1813, the laws of the island were again amended, and every criminal was allowed three separate and distinct trials before different bodies. First the High Bailiff hears his case, then the Deemster and six jurymen, na, thirdly, if he has been committed for trial, he is brought before the Governor and the Deemsters. By the time the case gets to the final court it has usually been “whittled down” to the smallest possible proportions, and doubts have often been raised whether justice is not marred by misplaced and unwarranted lenity. Another strange practice is that the Manx advocates combine the parts of barrister and attorney. The law is hard upon debtors, who can be lodged as prisoners in Castle Rushen, if it is suspected that they are about to leave the island; but there are no County Courts. Kwa upande mwingine, there are Courts of Law of almost bewildering variety—the Chancery Court, the Admiralty, the General Gaol Delivery, the Exchequer, the Ecclesiastical, the Common Law, the two Deemsters’ Courts for the north and south of the island, the Seneschal’s Court, the Consistorial, the Licensing, and the High Bailiff’s. Each sheading, or subdivision, has its own coroner or sheriff, who can appoint a “lockman” as his deputy; and each parish (there are seventeen) has its own captain and a “sumner,” whose duty in old times was to keep order in church and “beat all the doggs.” Manx law had, and perhaps to some extent still has, a similar reputation either for allowing criminals in the island to escape easily, or for permitting English criminals to remain unpunished; hence the old ribald verse which represents the Devil singing—
“That little spot I cannot spare,
For all my choicest friends are there.”
The Deemster’s oath is a curiosity in itself:—“I do swear that I will execute the laws of the isle justly betwixt party and party as indifferently as the herring’s backbone doth lie in the midst of the fish.” Formerly the elective House of Keys possessed judicial as well as legislative functions, but this power was taken from it by the Act of 1866. Laws are initiated in the Council and the Tynwald Court, which promulgates them, consists of the members of the Council, and the House of Keys, who unite for the occasion. Tynwald Day as described by Mr. Hall Caine is an interesting, historic, but not an impressive ceremony. A thousand years ago the Norsemen established a form of government on the island, and every fifth of July the Manxman has his open-air Parliament for the promulgation of laws. But it is a gala day rather than a day of business. “Reluctantly I admit,” writes Mr. Hall Caine, “that the proceedings were, ndani yao wenyewe, long, tiresome, ineffectual, formless, unimpressive, and unpicturesque. The senior Deemster, the amiable and venerable Sir Wm. Drinkwater, read the titles of the new laws in English. Then the coroner of the premier sheading, Glenfaba, recited the same titles in Manx. Hardly anybody heard them; hardly anybody listened.”
The Channel Islands were part of the Duchy of Normandy, and their laws are mostly the ducal customs as set forth in an ancient book known as “Le Grand Coustumier.” Acts of the English Parliament do not apply to these Islands unless specifically mentioned, and all causes are determined by their own courts and officers. In Mr. Ansted’s standard work on the Channel Islands (revised and edited by E. Toulmin Nicolle, 1893), a long chapter is devoted to the whole subject, and it is so complete and well expressed that I venture without much alteration of phraseology to summarise its leading points. Jersey and Guernsey have diverged greatly from each other in their legal customs, and it is also curious to find that each of the smaller islands possesses its own particular constitutions and courts. The rights and customs of the “States,” which are an outcome of the mediæval Royal Court, have constantly undergone modification and have been remodelled, but they retain many of the ancient characteristics. The Bailiff (Bailli), or chief magistrate, is the first civil officer in each island, and usually retains his office for life. He presides at the Royal Court, takes the opinions of the elected Jurats, and when their voices are equal has a casting vote both in civil and criminal cases. The Bailiff is not required either in Jersey or Guernsey to have had a legal education. He is appointed by the Crown, but has usually held some position at the island bar. Formerly the advocates practising in the court of Jersey were nominated by the Bailiff, and were limited to six in number. Katika 1860, hata hivyo, the bar was thrown open to every British subject who had been ten years resident in the island, and who was qualified by reason of being a member of the English bar, having taken a law degree at a French University, and having passed an examination in the island. In Guernsey the advocates are also notaries, and frequently hold agencies. The judicial and legislative powers in Jersey are to some extent separate, but in Guernsey they are intimately associated—a fact which accounts for much of the difference in custom in the two islands.
The ancient Norman law contained in “Le Grand Coustumier” dates back to the thirteenth century, was badly revised in the time of Queen Elizabeth, and became the Code. Trial by jury was established in 1786, and the laws on the subject have undergone considerable change. There is a committing magistrate, and the trial takes place at the Criminal Assizes of which there are six in the year. The jury numbers twenty-four; if twenty agree, the verdict is taken; if less than twenty the prisoner is set free. Minor offences are referred to a court of Correctional Police presided over by a magistrate who is independent of the Royal Court. The same magistrate presides over the court for the recovery of small debts, and there is no appeal from his decision. Then there are subsidiary courts for various police purposes, while the Court of Héritage entertains suits regarding real estate. The arbitrary operation of these Courts may have very evil results, especially for strangers who are unlearned in the peculiarities of Jersey law. I find a striking example of this in a magazine of June 15th, 1861, in which a hard experience is detailed with comments which appear to be fully justified by the circumstances. The writer says:-
“Before leaving England I had had a serious quarrel with a former friend and medical attendant, and no long time elapsed after our arrival in the island, before this gentleman sent me in a bill of monstrous proportions—a true ‘compte d’apothecaire’ as the French express it. At that time I was quite ignorant of the singular constitution of Jersey law, and how it placed me in the power of any man who chose to sue me whether I owed him money or not. I wrote to the doctor, refusing to pay the full amount of his claim, and referring him to a solicitor in London. He was, hata hivyo, better acquainted with the Jersey law than myself, as the result will show. Here, before proceeding with my story, I will enter into some explanation of the law of debtor and creditor as it exists in Jersey. This law enables the creditor to enforce his demands summarily, depriving the party sued of his liberty, and leaving him in gaol till the costs of his imprisonment have swelled the amount to be paid: and further, supposing the defendant ultimately gains his suit, and proves his non-liability, no damages for false imprisonment are obtainable. The law leaves him no remedy, for the plaintiff makes no affidavit; and a simple letter from England, requesting a Jersey advocate to enforce payment of a claim, is enough to cast the defendant at once into prison, prior to any judicial investigation into the merits of his case.
“Thus, in Jersey, every man (unless he be a landed proprietor) is at the mercy of every other man, both in the island and out of it. In short, one man can arrest another simply by drawing up an imaginary account on a common bit of paper, and handing it to the nearest lawyer, who will send his clerk with the sheriff’s man and imprison the unfortunate victim in default of immediate payment. What is worse still, an arrest can be carried into effect, by means of a simple letter sent through the post. The exception in favour of land-owners of course includes the owners of house property, an exception which mostly benefits Jersey-men, as few but natives possess property in the island. It is only a proprietor who must be sued before he can be imprisoned. If the Jersey laws confined the persons merely of strangers sued by the inhabitants of the island, in the arbitrary manner described, the justice of such a practice might still be defended on the plea of preventing them from leaving the island; but no excuse can be found when the Jersey law is made an instrument in the hands of strangers, living out of the jurisdiction of the island, and when it is used to enforce payment of debts incurred in another place, and in which no inhabitant of the island is interested, and when (as sometimes happens) it is employed as a means of extortion. In the first case it can be urged that, angalau, it gives protection to the islander, which may be all proper enough, though the system is liable to abuse. In the second, the injustice and folly of the law is flagrant. By what right or reason ought the Jersey code, without previous inquiry, to deprive one man of his liberty at the demand of another, when both are strangers, and when the dispute relates to matters wholly beyond its pale, and in reference to which it has no means of obtaining information on oath? Yet such is the case, and thus the Jersey law is converted into a mere tool of iniquity and oppression. In speaking of this strange anomaly in Jersey law, I am not referring to bills of exchange, or to securities of any sort, but merely to simple debts, free from any acknowledgment or signature whatever. In any other Court, such claims would not be entertained for a moment. Surely the law is barbarous enough for the people of Jersey, without its consequences being extended beyond its circumference. Lakini, as matters stand at present, the case stands thus: A and B fall out together. Now B is a rogue. They go to law together, and B demands of A more than he is entitled to. The courts in England are about to decide upon the merits of the case. Meanwhile B learns that A is gone to Jersey for a short time on business, perhaps connected with this very affair, such, kwa mfano, as looking up an important witness. What does B do? He immediately sends off a letter enclosing his little account to a Jersey lawyer, instructing him to demand payment or lock up A forthwith. The lawyer obeys, bila shaka; A storms—protests—all in vain. He is incarcerated, and is told he may explain as much as he likes afterwards; lakini, in the meantime, must go to prison, au pay. At last poor A, whose liberty is important to him, wearied with the delays which it is the interest of the Jersey lawyers to raise in his suit for judgment, pays the demand into court (au greffe) to be adjudicated on—costs of law, costs of imprisonment and all. The latter item includes 10s. every time the prison door is opened to let him pass on his way to court—a journey he has too often to perform without much approach to a dénoûment, and whither he is obliged to go under escort like a criminal; and this process is repeated several times, without the cause even being called on for hearing. Worst of all, when A comes out, he has to decide upon the merits of the case. Meanwhile no remedy against B, WHO, bila shaka, being satisfied, withdraws his suit at home.”
Another seeming anomalous process may be cited. An appeal lies from some of the small Courts to the full Court, au Nombre Supérieur, but the jurats who sit in the Court of First Instance are not debarred from sitting in the Full Court when an appeal from their own judgment is being heard! All the proceedings are carried on in the French language, which is again extremely inconvenient for the English residents. The Bailiff comments on the evidence and on the arguments of the pleaders, collects the opinion of the jurats, and delivers judgment. In Guernsey the decisions are given in private. “Pleadings in these courts are very simple,” anasema Bw. Ansted. “The plaintiff must serve on the defendant a summons or declaration, setting forth the nature of his claim, and in some cases the reasons on which it is grounded are added. If not sufficiently definite the declaration is sent back by the Court for amendment. If the defendant means to plead any objections by way of demurrer or special plea, these are at once heard and disposed of. If the parties join issue on the merits of the case, the Court hears the parties, or their counsel, and decides. If the case be intricate the parties are sometimes sent before the Greffier—in Guernsey before one of the jurats,—who reports, condensing the matter in dispute, and presenting the points to the court for decision.” Trial by jury does not exist in Guernsey. The court at Alderney is subordinate to that of Guernsey. The jurisdiction in matters of correctional police is final where the offence can be punished by a month’s imprisonment or a fine not exceeding £5; otherwise it is referred to Guernsey for trial. The Court of Sark, which has undergone many strange vicissitudes since its institution in 1579, consists of the seneschal, or judge, the prévôt and the greffier, all appointed by the feudal lord, or seigneur. The seneschal is an absolute authority in small cases, but his right of punishment is limited to the narrow bounds of inflicting a fine of about four shillings, and of sentencing to three days’ imprisonment. All cases demanding severer treatment are relegated to the Guernsey Courts. Enough has been said to show that Mr. Ansted was justified in declaring that though the islanders were unfitted by their habits and education for any radical change in their peculiar institutions, yet “the practice of the law courts both in Jersey and Guernsey has long been felt to be in many cases cumbrous, not to say objectionable. Hakika, where so much that is personal interferes in the administration of justice, and where personal and family influence cannot but be felt, it is not astonishing that reasonable complaints are sometimes heard.” Three times during the present century Royal Commissions have enquired into Jersey law, but their recommendations have been systematically ignored. No remedies have been carried out, and the islanders cling with extraordinary pertinacity to customs which are notoriously abused and to priveleges which are opposed to fair-dealing. The Channel Islands and the Isle of Man are standing evidence of the danger incurred by such independence of legal authority as they have hitherto been permitted to enjoy.
Post-Mortem Trials.
Na George Neilson.
IT might be thought that a man’s death made an end of him, and that his mere body had no rights or duties except that of getting decently buried. The middle age had other ideas. The dead still had status and duties. Continental laws recognised acts of renunciation in which a widow laid the keys on her husband’s corpse, or tapped his grave with the point of a halberd. The body of a murdered person, au, it might be his hand merely, might be carried before the judge to demand vengeance. By English thirteenth century law legal possession of real estate was thought to remain in a man, not until he died, but until his body was borne forth to burial. The dead might be a very potent witness, as shewn by the ordeal of bier-right, a practice founded on the belief that the murderer’s touch would cause the victim’s wounds to bleed afresh. Thus variously qualified to act as witness or prosecutor as occasion required, it is not surprising to find the dead as defendant also.
English history remembers the strange scene enacted in the monastery of Caen in 1087, when William the Conqueror lay dead there, and the ceremonials of his interment were interrupted by a weird appeal. Ascelin, the son of Arthur, loudly claimed as his, neither sold nor given, the land on which the church stood, na, forbidding the burial, he appealed to the dead to do him justice. More than one old English poem turned its plot round the ancient canon law, by which a burial might be delayed for debt. The dead was arrestable: a law afterwards set aside, “for death dissolved all things.” But in more codes than one death did not dissolve liability for the consequences of high treason.
In Scotland, in the year 1320, at the “black parliament” of Scone, several Scotsmen were convicted of conspiracy against King Robert the
Bruce. Most of them were drawn, hanged, and beheaded. But a Scottish historian of the time tells us that Roger of Mowbray, one of the accused, having died before his trial, “his body was carried to the place, convicted of conspiracy, and condemned to be drawn by horses, hung on the gallows, and beheaded.” It is to the credit of Bruce that he did not allow the corporal part of the sentence to be carried out, although many entries in the charter rolls[24] shew that the consequent escheats of the traitor’s lands served to reward the loyalty of others. His body convicted of conspiracy! How came this singular procedure into Scottish practice?
Nchini Uingereza, towards the close of the fourteenth century, although escheats were not less keenly looked after than in Scotland—and that sometimes in cases where men had died unconvicted,—the purpose of attainder appears to have been effected without the expedient of calling the dead to the bar. The dead, hata hivyo, was convicted. In the case of Robert Plesyngton, kwa mfano, katika 1397, the judgment of Parliament bore an express conviction of treason, "noun-obstant la mort de dit Roberd.” In 1400, John, Earl of Salisbury, challenged for treason by Lord Morley, was killed before the day appointed for the duel. The court not only adjudged him a traitor, but on grounds eked out by Roman law subjected his sureties in costs to his accuser—said costs including the handsome fee of 100s. and twelve yards of scarlet cloth to the lawyer Adam of Usk.
In all features save perhaps that of the actual presence of the body in the trial, warrant can be found for the Scottish practice in Roman law. The offence of “majesty,” or high treason, formed an exception to the great humane general rule that responsibility for crime ended with the criminal’s breath. Under the Lex Julia death was no defence to a charge of “majesty;” proceedings could be raised to stamp the dead man’s name with the brand of treason; his kinsmen might if they chose deny and defend; but if they failed to clear him his goods were confiscated and his memory damned. There is in the annals of Rome at least one instance of a death-sentence of this sort pronounced after the accused was in his grave. Nor was its scope confined absolutely to high treason. The Church had a quiet way of appropriating tit-bits of barbaric policy for pious uses. The Emperor Theodosius said that the inquisition for heresy ought to extend to death itself; and as in the crime of majesty, so in cases of heresy, it should be lawful to accuse the memory of the dead. The Popes endorsed the analogy, for heretics had goods, which sometimes were worth forfeiting. The spiritual authority however was of more moment. The Church claimed the power to bind and loose even after death, and a Welsh twelfth century bishop did not stand alone when he carried it so far as to scourge the body of a king who had died excommunicate. On the same principle dead heretics—dead before sentence of heresy—were burnt.
It was by a close following up of Roman jurisprudence, with, peradventure, some added light from the law and practice of the Church, that the French devised their procés au cadavre, by which the memory of a dead traitor was attacked. Its special application was to lesemajesty described as divine and human, the former an elastic term covering offences against God and religion. Allied to this latter category, though not exactly of it, was the mortal sin of suicide. Self-slaughter was so deeply abhorrent to mediæval thought as not only to be reckoned more culpable, but to call for more shameful punishment, than almost any other crime. So coupling the traitor and the self-slayer in the same detestation, the law assailed both by the same strange post-mortem process, na (by methods of reasoning which Voltaire was one of the first to ridicule) consigned their souls to perdition, their memories to infamy, and their bodies to the gibbet. The treatment of the suicide was peculiar in its refinements of symbolic shame. The body was, by the customary law (kwa mfano, of Beaumont), to be drawn to the gibbet as cruelly as possible, pour monstrer l’experience aux aultres. The very door-step of the house in which he lay was to be torn up, for the dead man was not worthy to pass over it. Impalement, transfixture by a stake, though well enough known on the continent as a punishment of the living, became there and in England alike, the special doom of the suicide. Yet the procés au cadavre had no footing in English law, and although it was already in 1320 received in Scotland, we shall find reason for thinking it not wholly welcome.
After the trial in 1320 before alluded to, the records in Scotland are silent for over two centuries, and it is not until 1540 that the process is heard of again. In that year the heirs of one Robert Leslie were summoned to the court of parliament to hear his name and memory “delete and extinct,” for certain points and crimes of lesemajesty, and his lands and goods forfeited to the king. Legal authorities, obviously forgetful of the fourteenth century instance, follow one another in the mistake of regarding Leslie’s as the first of its kind. The legality of the procedure was called in question at the time. Hakika, so loud was the murmur that it can still be heard in the act passed to put it to silence. “It is murmurit,” says the enactment, “that it is ane noveltie to rais summondis and move sic ane actioun aganis ane persoun that is deide, howbeit the commoun law directly providis the samin.” The three estates of parliament therefore on the motion of the lord advocate, declared unanimously “all in ane voce, but variance or discrepance,” that the cause was just and conform to common law. In another case of the following year the charge and judgment were enrolled in the Acts of Parliament. The widow and the heir of the late James Colville were summoned “to see and hear that the said deceased James, whilst he lived had committed the crime of lesemajesty.” The deliverance of parliament as tribunal was by its terms an actual sentence upon the dead—that the deceased James “hes incurrit the panis of crime of lesemajeste” for which causes the court decerned “the memoure of the said umquhile James to be deleit,” and his possessions confiscated to the crown. Parliament which had unanimously voted the procedure well based in law, found that it was dangerous. It was necessary to restrict its scope. Katika 1542, it is on parliamentary record[44] that “the lordis thinkis the said act [yaani., ya 1540], ower generale and prejudiciale to all the barions of this realme.” This would never do:—an act prejudicial to the barons! So it became statute law in 1542, that it should apply only to cases of grave treason, public and notorious during the offender’s life, and that prosecution for the future must be raised within five years after the traitor’s death. It was a reasonable restraint, not always observed.
During the reigns of Mary and James VI. a number of trials occurred in which this singular process was resorted to, and in some, kama si wote, of which the body of the dead appeared at the bar. Occasionally it was embalmed for the purpose. It had been a part of the border code, prevalent on the marches of England and Scotland, that an accused should, although dead, be brought to the place of judgment in person. Katika 1249, the marchmen of both realms had declared the law in that sense. They said that, in any plea touching life and limb, if the defendant died the body of him should be carried to the march on the day and to the place fixed between the parties, because—concludes this remarkable provision —“no man can excuse himself by death.” And in the end of the sixteenth century the borderers had not forgotten the tradition their forefathers had inherited in the thirteenth, for in 1597, when Scotsmen and Englishmen were in fulfilment of their treaty obligations presenting their promised pledges, the custom was scrupulously observed on the English side. All were there,—all, though all included one that was no more. “Thoughe one of the nomber were dead, yet was he brought and presented at this place.” They evidently believed on the borders, which Sir Robert Cary with some reason called an “uncristned cuntry,” that a man could best prove that he was dead by attendance in person.
In trials for treason this principle was pushed in some instances to strange extremes. Probably one underlying reason of this, at a date so late, was to make sure that no formality should be lacking to make the forfeiture effective. But the main reason one must believe lay in its being a traditional observance. In the trial in 1600, of the Earl of Gowrie and his brother for an alleged attempt on the king’s life, the privy council on the preamble that it was necessary to have their corpses kept and preserved unburied, issued an act to that effect, and the treasurer’s accounts contain an entry “for transporting of the corpis of Gowrie and his brother.” Their bodies were accordingly produced at the trial, and the sentence which pronounced them guilty of treason and lesemajesty during their lifetime, declared their name, memory, and dignity extinguished, and ordained that “the dead bodeis of the saidis Treatouris,” should be hanged, quartered, and gibbetted. Their “twa hedis,” a grim diarist tells, were set upon the tolbooth, “thair to stand quhill the wind blaw thame away.”
The last case in the annals, in which this revolting Scottish “practick” was put into effect, occurred in 1609. Robert Logan, of Restalrig, had been nearly three years in his grave when it was given out that he had been a party to the alleged Gowrie conspiracy against King James. A process was at once taken in hand to proscribe his memory and escheat his property. As death was no excuse, neither was burial; and the ghastly form was gone through of exhuming the bones for presentation at the trial. It was a case plainly within the exception provided for in the act of 1542, for the man was not “notourly” a traitor, he had died in repute of loyalty: but the Crown was eager for a conviction. Much incredulity had been rife with regard to the Gowrie conspiracy. The evidences now adduced were—on the surface at any rate, ingawa, labda, as many critics still think, on the surface only,—circumstantial and strong. The prosecution was therefore keenly pressed, and the reluctance of some of the judges overcome. A jocular jurist-commentator on these post-mortem trials, has remarked that the bones of a traitor could neither plead defences, nor cross-question witnesses. But in the dawn of the seventeenth century they could turn the sympathy of the court against the charge, as it appears they did in Logan’s case. The proofs, hata hivyo, looked overwhelming, and the forfeiture was carried without a dissenting voice from the bench—from the bench, because it was, as all Scots treason-trials then were, a trial by judges only, not by judge and jury. Logan’s memory was declared extinct and abolished, and his possessions forfeited. The judgment, hata hivyo, wreaked no vengeance on the exhumed remains. Humanity was asserting itself even in the trial of the dead, and that institution itself was doomed. Although in disuse ever after, it did not disappear from the theory of law until 1708, when the act 7 Anne, chapter 21, prescribing jury-trial for treason, assimilated the Scots law on the subject to that of England, and thus brought to an unregretted end one of the most gruesome of legal traditions.
Barbarous Punishments.
By Sidney W. Clarke.
THAT the world has become more merciful as it has grown older, is a truism at once apparent to anyone who gives even a cursory glance at any of the numerous works dealing with the criminal laws of the olden time. Still the approach to the most excellent quality has been regretably and painfully slow, and it is surely a stain on the boasted enlightenment of the nineteenth century, that the century had run through nearly three-fourths of its existence before the terrible and vindictive punishment of drawing and quartering disappeared from our statute book. In most States the early laws have been of a blood-thirsty and fear-inspiring nature, but what excuse can be urged for the fact that until the fourth day of July, in the year of Grace 1870, the punishment ordained by law for the crime of high treason, was that the unfortunate offender should be drawn on a hurdle to the place of execution, there to be hanged by the neck till he be dead; that his head be severed from his body; that his body be divided into four quarters; and that his head and quarters be at the disposal of the Crown. In Blackstone’s time the sentence was still more savage, au, as the great Commentator puts it, “very solemn and terrible.” It was that the offender be drawn to the gallows, and not be carried or walk; “though usually,” says Blackstone, “by connivance, at length ripened by humanity into law, a sledge or hurdle was allowed to preserve the offender from the extreme torment of being dragged on the ground or pavement;” that he be hanged by the neck and then cut down alive; that his entrails be taken out, and burned before his eyes, while he was still alive; that his head be cut off, his body be divided into four parts, and his head and quarters be at the King’s disposal. What our tender-hearted monarchs did with the quivering pieces of flesh let the stones of Temple Bar, the City Gates, and the Tower bear witness. Here are a couple of extracts from that perennial fountain of information, the diary of Mr. Samuel Pepys. Under date of October 13th, 1660, he writes, “I went out to Charing Cross to see Major-General Harrison,” one of the regicides, “hanged, drawn, and quartered, which was done there, he looking as cheerful as any man could do in that condition.” Note the grim humour of the words in italics. “He was presently cut down, and his head and heart shown to the people, at which there was great shouts of joy.” Again, on October 20th, in the same year:—“This afternoon going through London and calling at Crowe’s, the upholsterer’s, in St. Bartholomew’s, I saw the limbs of some of our new traytors set upon Aldersgate, which was a sad sight to see; and a bloody week this and the last have been, there being ten hanged, drawn, and quartered.”
It will be observed that the masculine gender is used in the foregoing sentences for high treason; kwa, if the offender was a woman, the law with a delicacy (!) one would hardly have expected, recognised that “the decency due to the sex forbids the exposing and publicly mutilating their bodies;” so a woman was simply to be drawn to the gallows, and there burned alive. And these punishments for treason Sir Edward Coke attempted to justify on Scriptural grounds, adding “it is punishment undoubtedly just, for our liege lord the King is lord of every one of our members, and they have severally conspired against him, and should each one suffer.” Evidently justice has not always spelt humanity.
Another of the horrible punishments decreed by English law was that of boiling to death, which in the reign of Henry VIII. was inflicted for poisoning, and recalls the most cruel tortures of China and the Orient, where slicing to death and impalement alive are or were common forms of punishment. The awful fate of being boiled alive was specially devised for the benefit of John Roose, a cook, who had been convicted of throwing poison into a pot of broth intended for the family of the Bishop of Rochester and for the poor of the Parish; katika 1542, Margaret Davey suffered the same lingering death at Smithfield. So fearful were our ancestors of poison, that in Scotland, katika 1601, Thomas Bellie, a burgess of Brechin, and his son were banished for life by the High Court of Justiciary, for the heinous offence of poisoning a couple of troublesome hens belonging to a neighbour. Even the laws of Draco, said on account of their severity to have been written not in ink but in blood, can scarcely compete with these examples of British barbarity. Among the Romans strangulation, precipitation from a rocky height (a mode of carrying out the death sentence still found amongst savage tribes), and lashing to death were forms of punishment. Soldiers guilty of military offences had to run the gauntlet. Upon a given signal all the soldiers of the legion to which the offender belonged fell upon him with sticks and stones, and generally killed him on the spot. Kama, hata hivyo, he succeeded in making his escape, he was thenceforth an exile from his native country. Offending slaves were first scourged and then crucified. They were compelled to carry the cross to the place of execution, and after being suspended were left to perish by slow degrees. Crucifixion was abolished throughout the Roman Empire by Constantine, out of reverence to the sacred symbol. Other cruel punishments were burning alive, exposure to wild animals, and condemnation to fight as gladiators in the arena for the amusement of the citizens. The second of these modes of death, for death was the invariable result, was the one usually meted out to the early Christians—“If the Tiber overflows its banks; if there be a famine or plague; if there be a cold, a dry, or a scorching season; if any public calamity overtakes us; the universal cry of the people is—“To the lion with the Christians Christiani ad leonem!”
Parricide was punished in a strange manner. The criminal, after being scourged, was tied or sewed up in a leather bag, with a dog, a cock, a viper, and an ape to keep him company, and so cast into the sea. The Egyptians punished the same offence by sticking the prisoner all over with pointed reeds, and then throwing him upon a fire of burning thorns, where he lay till he was consumed.
With most nations the Lex talionis, or punishment of retaliation—an eye for an eye, a limb for a limb—has found a place in the penal system. It was not, kweli, always carried out to its logical conclusion, but rather became the subject of many subtle distinctions. Among the Athenians, Solon decreed that whoever put out the eye of a one-eyed person should for so doing lose both his own. But what, iliulizwa, should be done where a one-eyed man happened to put out one of his neighbour’s eyes? Should he lose his only eye by way of retaliation? Ikiwa ndivyo, he would then be quite blind, and would so suffer a greater injury than he had caused. The law of the Jews and Egyptians compelled anyone, who without lawful excuse was found with a deadly poison in his possession, to himself swallow the poison. An instance of a kind of lex talionis in our own country is found in the reign of Edward I., when incendiaries were burnt to death. Another example is that, from the reign of Henry VIII. to that of George IV., to strike a blow and draw blood within the precincts of the King’s palace, entailed on the offender the loss of his right hand. Here are some of the regulations prescribed by the statute 33 Henry VIII., chapter 12, for the infliction of the punishment:-
“viii. And for the further declaration of the solemn and due circumstance of the execution appertaining and of long time used and accustomed, to and for such malicious strikings, by reason whereof blood is, hath been, or hereafter shall be shed against the King’s peace. It is therefore enacted by the authority aforesaid, that the Sergeant or Chief Surgeon for the time being, or his deputy of the King’s household, his heirs and successors, shall be ready at the time and place of execution, as shall be appointed as is aforesaid, to sear the stump when the hand is stricken off.
“ix. And the Sergeant of the Pantry shall be also then and there ready to give bread to the party that shall have his hand so stricken off.
“x. And the Sergeant of the Cellar shall also be then and there ready with a pot of red wine to give the same party drink after his hand is so stricken off and the stump seared.
“xi. And the Sergeant of the Ewry shall also be then and there ready with cloths sufficient for the Surgeon to occupy about the same execution.
“xii. And the Yeoman of the Chandry shall also be then and there, and have in readiness seared cloths sufficient for the Surgeon to occupy about the same execution.
“xiii. And the Master Cook shall be also then and there ready, and shall bring with him a dressing-knife, and shall deliver the same knife at the place of execution to the Sergeant of the Larder, who shall be also then and there ready, and hold upright the dressing-knife till execution be done.
“xiv. And the Sergeant of the Poultry shall be also then and there ready with a cock in his hand, ready for the Surgeon to wrap about the same stump, when the hand shall be so stricken off.
“xv. And the Yeoman of the Scullery to be also then and there ready, and prepare and make at the place of execution a fire of coals, and there to make ready searing-irons against the said Surgeon or his deputy shall occupy the same.
“xvi. And the Sergeant or Chief Ferror shall be also then and there ready, and bring with him the searing-irons, and deliver the same to the same Sergeant or Chief Surgeon or to his deputy when they be hot.
“xvii. And the Groom of the Salcery shall be also then and there ready with vinegar and cold water, and give attendance upon the said Surgeon or his deputy until the same execution be done. “xviii. And the Sergeant of the Woodyard shall bring to the said place of execution a block, with a betil, a staple, and cords to bind the said hand upon the block while execution is in doing.”
In addition to losing his hand, the unfortunate offender was imprisoned for life. It was not until 1829 that this punishment was abolished, after having been in existence for a period of 287 miaka.
A curious mode of punishment, intended to make its victim the object of popular ridicule, was in vogue in the ancient German Empire, where persons who endeavoured to create tumults and to disturb the public tranquility were condemned to carry a dog upon their shoulders from one large town to another.
The penal laws of France were every wit as inhuman as our own—burning alive, breaking on the wheel, hanging, beheading, and quartering were common forms of punishment. Awful atrocities were committed on living victims, such as tearing off the flesh with red-hot pincers, pouring molten lead and brimstone into the wounds, and cutting out the tongue. The following is the sentence passed upon Ravaillac, the assassin of Henry IV., katika 1610:—He was first to be privily tortured and then carried to the place of execution. There the flesh was to be torn with red-hot pincers from his breasts, his arms and thighs, and the calves of his legs; his right hand, holding the knife wherewith he committed his crime, was to be scorched and burned with flaming brimstone; on the places where the flesh had been torn off a mixture of melted lead, boiling oil, scalding pitch, wax, and brimstone was to be poured; after this he was to be torn in pieces by four horses, and his limbs and body burned to ashes and dispersed in the air. His goods and chattels were confiscated; the house in which he was born was pulled down; his father and mother were banished, and his other relatives commanded to change the name of Ravaillac for some other. This sentence was not, surely, a vindication of outraged justice, but rather a purile and barbarous legal revenge.
To return to the laws of our own country. Mutilation of one sort or another was long a favourite mode of punishment; pulling out the tongue for slander, cutting off the nose for adultery, emasculation for counterfeiting money, Nakadhalika. In Foxe’s “Book of Martyrs” there is an account of a miracle which was worked on the person of a mutilated criminal. A Bedfordshire man was convicted of theft, and for his crime his eyes were pulled out and other abominable mutilations were inflicted on him. The sufferer repaired to the shrine of St. Thomas at Canterbury, where after devout and steadfast prayer the parts he had lost were, so we are told, miraculously restored. Anyone who fought with weapons in a church had an ear cut off, or if he had already lost both his ears was branded in the cheek with the letter F.
By an Act passed in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, the punishment for forgery was that the offender should stand in the pillory and have his ears cut off by the common hangman, his nostrils slit up and seared, and then suffer imprisonment for life. Katika 1731 Joseph Cook, aged 70 miaka, underwent this punishment, the mutilation taking place while he stood in the pillory at Charing Cross.
The Coventry Act (22-23 Charles II., chapter 1.) was passed in consequence of Sir John Coventry having been assaulted in the street and his nose slit, out of revenge as was supposed. It enacted that if any person should of malice, aforethought, and by lying in wait, cut out or disable the tongue, put out an eye, slit the nose, or cut off or disable any limb or member of any other person, with intent to maim or to disfigure him, such person, his councillors, aiders, and abettors, should be guilty of felony without benefit of clergy, which implied the punishment of death. This Act was not repealed until 1828, and resulted in at least one curious case. Katika 1772, one Coke and a labourer named Woodburn were indicted under the Act—Coke for hiring and abetting Woodburn, and Woodburn for the actual offence of slitting the nose of one Crispe, who was Coke’s brother-in-law. The intention of the accused was to murder Crispe, and they left him for dead, having terribly hacked and disfigured him with a hedge-bill, but he recovered. An attempt to murder was not then a felony, but under the Coventry Act to disfigure with an intent to disfigure was; and the accused were indicted for the latter offence. Coke, in the course of his defence, raised the point that the attack on Crispe was made with intent to murder him and not with intent to disfigure, kwa hiyo, he contended, the offence was not within the statute under which he was indicted. But the court held that if a man attacked another intending to murder him, with such an instrument as a hedge-bill, which could not but endanger a disfiguring of the victim, and in such attack happened not to kill but only to disfigure, he might be indicted for disfiguring. The jury found the prisoners guilty, and they were condemned and duly executed.
The laws for the protection of trade decreed many cruel punishments. Hivyo, in the reign of Elizabeth, an Act passed for the encouragement of the woollen industry prescribed that the penalty for taking live sheep out of the country should be forfeiture of goods, imprisonment for a year, and that at the end of the year the left hand of the prisoner should be cut off in a public market, and be there nailed up in the most public place. A second offence was punishable with death. By statute 21 James I. chapter 19, anyone unfortunate enough to become a bankrupt was nailed by one ear to the pillory for two hours, and then had the ear cut off. Under the Romans a bankrupt was treated still more unmercifully, for at the option of his creditors he was either cut to pieces or sold to foreigners beyond the Tiber.
A longstanding disgrace to the intelligence and humanity of our countrymen was the fact that in former times burning alive was the inevitable fate of poor wretches convicted of witchcraft, the penal laws against which were not repeated until 1736.
So late as 1712, five so called witches were hung at Northampton, and in 1716 Mrs. Hicks, and her daughter, aged nine, were condemned to death at Huntingdon for selling their souls to the devil. Even children of tender years were not spared, but with their elders alike fell victims to our law’s barbarity; there are many recorded instances of children under ten years of age being executed. In Scotland the last execution for witchcraft took place in 1722.
Space will not permit any attempt to run through the whole gamut of legal iniquities; at most we can only attempt a very incomplete catalogue of the inhumanities at one time or another incident to our penal codes, and with a final horror we must bring this article to an end. The punishment with which we are now about to deal, that of pressing to death, peine forte et dure as it was called, is perhaps the most noteable example of the former barbarity of our law, since it was inflicted before trial on innocent and guilty alike, who refused to plead “Guilty” or “Not Guilty” to an indictment for felony. What this punishment was, which was first instituted in 1406, can best be told by giving the form of the judgment of the court against the person who refused to plead:—That the prisoner shall be remanded to the place from whence he came, and put in some low, dark room, and that he shall lie without any litter or other thing under him, and without any manner of covering; that one arm shall be drawn to one quarter of the room with a cord and the other to another, and that his feet shall be used in the same manner; and that as many weights shall be laid upon him as he can bear, and more; that he shall have three morsels of barley bread a day, and that he shall have the water next the prison, so that it be not current; and that he shall not eat the same day on which he drinks, nor drink the same day on which he eats; and that he shall continue so till he die or answer.
Peine forte et dure was not abolished till 1772, and was frequently undergone by accused persons in order to preserve their estates from being forfeited to the Crown, which would have been the case if they had stood their trial and been found guilty. The year 1741 is probably the last date on which the punishment was inflicted. Katika 1721, two men, Thomas Cross and Thomas Spigot, were ordered to be pressed to death at the Old Bailey. Cross gave in on seeing the preparations made for his torture, but Spigot was made of sterner stuff. In the “Annals of Newgate” is a description of his sufferings:—“The chaplain found him lying in the vault upon the bare ground with 350 pounds weight upon his breast, and then prayed by him, and at several times asked him why he would hazard his soul by such obstinate kind of self-murder. But all the answer that he made was—‘Pray for me, pray for me!’ He sometimes lay silent under the pressure, as if insensible to pain, and then again would fetch his breath very quick and short. Several times he complained that they had laid a cruel weight upon his face, though it was covered with nothing but a thin cloth, which was afterwards removed and laid more light and hollow; yet he still complained of the prodigious weight upon his face, which might be caused by the blood being forced up thither, and pressing the veins as violently as if the force had been externally upon his face. When he had remained for half-an-hour under this load, na 50 pounds weight more laid on, being in all 400 pounds, he told those who attended him he would plead. The weights were at once taken off, the cords cut asunder; he was raised by two men, some brandy was put into his mouth to revive him, and he was carried to take his trial.” In 1735, mwanaume, who pretended to be dumb at the Sussex Assizes, was sent to Horsham Gaol to be pressed to death unless he would plead. He endured in agony a weight of 350 pounds, and then the executioner, who weighed over 16 stones, laid himself upon the board upon which the weights were placed, and killed the wretched man instantly.
Japo kuwa.
Na George Neilson.
MADAI ya taaluma ya sheria kwa utamaduni yalipuuzwa kwa werevu na Burns, alipomfanya Brig Mpya wa Ayr kuwa wa kejeli juu ya madiwani wa jiji la burgh:-
"Wanaume ambao walikua na busara priggin owre hops an' zabibu,
Au kukusanya maoni ya kiliberali katika Bonds na Seisin.
Vifungo na seisin hakika sio uwanja wa kulisha wa kiakili wenye furaha zaidi. “Nakuhakikishia,” alisema John Riddell, kubwa peerage antiquary, "kwamba kutumia wakati wako kutafuta jina au tarehe katika maandishi ya zamani ya kaa haiboresha uwezo wa kufikiria." Riddell alikuwa mkosoaji mkubwa wa Cosmo Innes, ambaye baadaye alikuwa na furaha ya kupitisha maoni juu ya uchunguzi wa Riddell kwamba "labda haiko katika hoja kwamba Bw. Riddell ni bora." Bado machapisho ya sheria yanaonyesha mifano mingi mizuri ya muungano wa uchunguzi wa karibu wa maandishi ya maandishi., kwa mtazamo uliopanuliwa juu ya kanuni za kwanza na kwa ufahamu makini wa kina. Labda Madox alikuwa msomi anayeweza kutumika zaidi kuliko Selden. Mtu anaweza kuona kutoka kando ya Coke, ubora wake usio na kikomo kwa Bacon katika ujuzi kamili kwa mkono wa kwanza wa sheria za Kiingereza za zamani. Lakini wakati yote yanasemwa, tungeweza kufanya vizuri zaidi bila Coke na Madox kuliko bila Bacon au Selden. Inafurahisha kuweza kukata rufaa kwa Chaucer kwa labda pongezi kuu kwa sheria, kwa kuzingatia uwezo wake wa fasihi, ambayo imewahi kupokea. Miongoni mwa mahujaji wote wa Canterbury, hakukuwa na mtu mzito zaidi kuliko Mwanasheria:-
"Sasa ni mtu kama yeye nas,
Na bado alikuwa bisier kuliko yeye.
Kwa muda alikuwa na caas na domes alle
Kwamba kutoka wakati wa Mfalme William walikuwa kuanguka,
Therto yeye code endyte na kufanya kitu
Hakuweza kubana katika uandishi wake,
Na kila sheria anaiweka kwa kukariri.”
Hata hivyo ulikuwa ni ushauri huu uliofunzwa na wenye mafanikio, peke yake wa chama, ambaye alijua kazi za mshairi kupitia na kupitia, na alikuwa na orodha yao kwenye ncha za vidole vyake. Good Master Chaucer kwa mguso huu tunatoa shukrani za dhati! Ilikuwa akilini mwa Herrick alipoandika heshima yake nzuri kwa Selden?
“Mimi, ambao wamewapendelea wengi, kuja kuwa
Neema, sasa mwisho, au umetukuzwa na wewe.”
Weledi na washairi wamekuwa na mambo mengi magumu ya kusema kwa mzaha na kwa dhati kuhusu taaluma ya sheria na kazi yake.. Herrick aliweka mabano sheria na wanasheria wenye magonjwa na madaktari, kwa mtindo akidokeza kwamba uhusiano wa sababu na athari ulikuwepo kati ya jozi zote mbili:-
"Kama sheria nyingi na wanasheria wanavyoelezea,
Si chochote ila madhara ya ufalme.
Hata hivyo hizo mitaa na nyumba zinaonesha
Hifadhi ya magonjwa ambapo waganga hutiririka.”
Ilikuwa ni hadithi ya zamani hii kuunganisha watendaji wa sheria na dawa katika nira moja ya unyanyasaji. Sababu iliyotolewa kwa aina zote mbili katika satire ya mapema ni ya kutosha kujua. Ni kwa sababu walichukua ada! Walter Map alitangaza kanuni ya imani ya Cistercian kuwa hakuna mtu anayeweza kumtumikia Mungu bila mali. Ancient satire equally objected to the service of man, either legally or medically, under these conditions. “The Romaunt of the Rose” has the traditional refrain of other strictures in verse, when it declares that
“Physiciens and advocates,
Gon right by the same yates,yates, gates
They selle hir science for winning.winning, gain
- ···
For they nil in no maner greeno kind of good will
Do right nought for charitee.”
The same idea, precisely, finds voice in the poem attributed to Walter Map, wherein the doctor and the lawyer come together under the lash, because no hope can be based upon either of them unless there be money in the case. “But if the marvellous man see coin, the very worst disease is quite curable, the very falsest cause just, praiseworthy, pious, true, na kumpendeza Mungu.” Labda kejeli hizi za zamani zilikuwa kali zaidi kuliko wakili. "The Romanunt of the Rose" huenda mbali na kusema kwamba ikiwa waganga walikuwa na njia yao,
"Kila mtu anapaswa kuwa sawa,
Na ingawa wanapaka rangi, hawakuweka leki
Baada ya: wakati dhahabu wamechukua
Utunzaji kamili wa litel kwa pindo wanazotengeneza.
Wao wolde kwamba arobaini walikuwa seke saa ons!
Ndiyo, mia mbili kwa nyama na bonis!
Na nipate elfu mbili kama ninavyofikiria
Ili kuongeza utajiri wake.”
Bila shaka watu wa dawa wangekuwa hatarini zaidi kwenye mstari mwingine, kwa maana haikuwa dhihaka bali profesa msomi wa matibabu, Arnauld de Villeneuve, WHO, mwanzoni mwa karne ya kumi na nne, aliwashauri wanafunzi wake kama ifuatavyo:—“Hadhari ya saba,” alisema, "ni ya maombi ya jumla. Tuseme kwamba huwezi kuelewa kesi ya mgonjwa wako, mwambie kwa uthabiti kwamba ini limeziba.” Hakuna profesa wa sheria aliyewahi kuwa na hatia ya kutojali akisema kitu kama hiki!
Upendeleo usioweza kukomeshwa wa umma dhidi ya mashtaka ya kisheria kama makubwa mno ni aina iliyorekebishwa tu ya wazo la zamani lililotolewa mfano hapo juu kwamba mawakili hawapaswi kuwa na ada hata kidogo.. Na hadi leo mtu wa wazi hajawahi kujipatanisha kikamilifu na fundisho kwamba wakili ni wakala tu., na si kuitwa kuketi katika tukio la kwanza katika hukumu juu ya mteja wake, kwa hivyo huko nyuma ulinzi wa kitaalamu wa mhalifu ulionekana kama shughuli ya kinyama.
“Thow I have a man i-slawe,
Na kuipoteza sheria ya mfalme
I Sal fyndyn mtu wa sheria
Nitachukua senti yangu na niruhusu niende."
Jinsi jambo la aibu kuchukua ada lilizingatiwa kwa muda mrefu kama kielelezo cha kushangaza.. "Kabla ya mwisho wa karne ya kumi na tatu,” inasema mamlaka hiyo isiyoshindwa kamwe, "Historia ya Sheria ya Kiingereza" ya Pollock na Maitland,” “tayari kuna taaluma ya sheria, kundi la wanaume wanaopata pesa kwa kuwawakilisha walalamikaji mahakamani na kwa kutoa ushauri wa kisheria. Maendeleo ya darasa hili yamekuwa polepole, kwa maana imepingwa na kanuni fulani za kale.” Miongoni mwa athari hizi za kuchelewesha ni pamoja na kashfa ya nusu ya kidini juu ya usahihi wa malipo - wanaume kama kawaida wanameza ngamia kwanza na kuchuja mbu baadaye.. Bila shaka somo lilipaswa kuangazwa na hadithi za watawa na toba za kitanda cha kifo. Kulikuwa, kulingana na padri wa Carlisle aliyeandika “The Chronicle of Lanercost,”—yakiandika chini ya mwaka wa 1288,—karani kijana katika dayosisi ya Glasgow, ambaye akili yake “ilitolewa kwa mahakama ya matajiri kuliko kuponya roho. Aliitwa Adam Urri, na alijifunza kwa uwongo katika sheria za laic, kupuuza amri za Mungu dhidi ya Praecorialia [hivyo katika maandishi yaliyochapishwa, lakini, swali, Mtawala?] ya Ulpian. Alitumia sheria za Kaizari katika kesi za madai, kwa malipo ya pesa. Lakini alipokuwa mzee na maarufu katika uovu wake huu, na alikuwa akijitahidi kwa werevu wake kuingilia mambo ya maskini mjane mdogo, rehema ya kimungu ilimshika, kuushambulia mwili wake kwa udhaifu wa ghafla, na kuleta akili yake kuomba (angesema) zaidi kwa maisha mengine.” Kulaani kabisa mahakama ya wakili, akageuza jani jipya, alitabiri siku ya kifo chake, na kufa kwa wakati kulingana na unabii, tukiacha kielelezo kilichotumiwa kwa uzembe na yule kasisi kufundisha vizazi vijavyo “jinsi ilivyokuwa pana pengo kati ya utumishi wa Mungu na ubatili wa ulimwengu huu.” Hatutakuwa na makosa katika kuhusiana, kwa maslahi ya kihistoria zaidi, dalili ya ukosefu wa maadili ya ada, na marejeleo muhimu ya Ulpian kama mamlaka katika jukwaa la wanasheria ya karne ya kumi na tatu Scotland.
Miongoni mwa dhana zenye kupendeza za enzi ya kati ilikuwa dhana kwamba yule Mwovu mara nyingi alidhihirisha bidii fulani dhidi ya dhambi.. Alichukuliwa kwa jicho tofauti na lile tunalomchukulia nalo, na aliituza imani kwa kuonekana halisi kama vile watu wa mizimu tu wanaweza kuamuru siku hizi. Baadhi yao hawakuhusika sana, hata hivyo kusifiwa inaweza kuwa lengo na tukio lao. Simeoni wa Durham, mwandishi wa kisasa anayeheshimika, aliandika juu ya kifo cha Mfalme William Rufo katika mwaka huo 1100 kwamba sauti hiyo maarufu iliona kuruka kwa mshale wa Tyrell kama ishara ya “wema na kisasi cha Mungu.” Na akaongeza kwamba karibu wakati huo Ibilisi alikuwa amejionyesha mara kwa mara msituni “na si ajabu, kwa sababu siku hizo sheria na haki vyote vilikuwa kimya.” Mantiki ya hii kwa sababu, haionekani juu ya uso, inakuwa haijulikani sana inapokumbukwa kwamba katika enzi za kati tabia ya Adui Mkuu iko chini ya ile ya Arch-Avenger..
Uhusiano wa moja kwa moja wa si Watakatifu tu bali wa Mungu mwenyewe na mambo ya kibinadamu ulikuwa ni wazo lililo wazi sana kwa akili ya zama za kati hivi kwamba haukuona chochote kisicho cha heshima katika hati ya umiliki iliyochukuliwa kwa jina Kuu., au katika kupanga"Mwenyezi Mungu” kichwani mwa orodha ya mashahidi wa mkataba. Zoezi hili la kianthropomorphic lilitoa fursa kwa mojawapo ya vicheshi vikali vya Walter Map dhidi ya Cistercians.. Abate watatu wa agizo hilo wakiomba kwa niaba ya mmoja wa idadi yao na abasia yake kurejeshwa kwa ardhi fulani na Mfalme Henry II.. kama imetolewa kwa njia ya kudhuru kutoka kwa abasia ya mdai, aliwakilishwa kwa Mfalme katika mahakama yake kwamba kwa ajili ya Mungu imempasa kufanya nchi zirudishwe na wakamhakikishia na kumpa Mungu mwenyewe kuwa mdhamini wao. (mdhamini) kwamba ikiwa atafanya, Mungu angeongeza sana heshima yake duniani. Mfalme Henry aliona ni vigumu kupinga rufaa hiyo aliyopewa lakini alimwita Ramani ya Shemasi Mkuu Walter ili kushauri. Hili alilifanya akijua vyema kwamba mshauri huyu hakuwapenda Wasistercians, na kwamba apate njia inayoweza kutegemewa kutoka kwenye kona kali. Archdeacon alikuwa sawa na hafla hiyo. "Bwana wangu,” alimwambia Mfalme, "wanakupa mdhamini; utamsikia mdhamini wao akijisemea mwenyewe.” “Kwa macho ya Mungu,” alijibu Henry, "Ni haki na inalingana na sababu kwamba wadhamini wenyewe wanapaswa kusikilizwa juu ya suala la dhamana yao." Kisha akiinuka kwa tabasamu murua (si kucheka, kwa uwazi anasema Giraldus wa Cambrensis) mfalme mwerevu alistaafu akiwaacha abati waliokata tamaa wakiwa wamejawa na mkanganyiko.
Ya mahusiano mengi kati ya fasihi na sheria, moja, si kwa njia yoyote ya kuvutia angalau katika orodha, ni wingi wa nukuu za kisheria, misemo, mafumbo na mafumbo ambayo yaliingia kwenye nyavu pana za washairi. Miongoni mwa chakavu kama hizi kuna chache zilizofanikiwa na bado chache za kusikitisha kama moja ambayo mwanahistoria wa metriki., kusogea karibu, siku zake zote mbili na historia yake, alijiona kama ameitwa kwa kifupi induction katika kesi ya Uzee kufika mahakamani kujibu mashtaka mazito, ambapo hakuna msaada kwa ajili yake isipokuwa kwa neema na Bikira kama mtetezi wake.
Elde me maistreis nane brevis ndefu,pata, umri
Ilke day me sare aggrevis,brevis, andika
Tayari nina miondoko ya kijakazikanuni, kila mmoja
Ili kupata hitimishomashimo, ambayo
The quhilk behovis to be of det;ya hiyo, ya haki
Muda wa Quhat wa wakati huo umewekwa
Naweza kujua kuwa njia,wewe ni, kujua
Bot weill mimi maji juu ya kuchelewa schort
Katika mahakama mimi mon appeire
Mashtaka yametolewa hadi hapa
Quhare na help thare is bot grace.bot, bila
Ununuzi wa maikless Madyn monmichael, isiyo na kifani
Msaada huo; na kuchafua hali yangukununua, kununua
I haff maid hir my advocate.mchuzi, kuokoa
Androw wa aya ya Wyntoun ambayo lazima imilikiwe ilikuwa mstari kwenye ndege ya mthibitishaji, na mara nyingi aina ya kawaida ya hati ya kisheria ilitoa kwa huzuni ya kutosha mapungufu ya mawazo yake.. Lakini hapa kwa mara moja hadhi rahisi ya wazo ilimchosha na kumpeleka.
Sheria na Wanasheria wa Jumuiya ya Madola.
Edward Peacock, f.s.a.
THE great Civil War as it is called, that is the struggle between Charles the First and his parliament, is memorable in many respects. No student of modern history can dispense with some knowledge of it, and the more the better, for it was the result of many things which had happened in the far distant past, and we may safely say that the great French Revolution, which produced some good, and such an incalculable amount of evil would have run a far different course to that which it did, had not the political ideals of the men who took part in that terrible conflict been deeply influenced by what had taken place in England a century and a half before.
As to the civil wars which had occurred in England in previous days, little need be said. They were either dynastic—the struggle of one man or one family against another—or they were religious revolts against the Tudors, by those who vainly endeavoured to re-establish the old order of things in opposition to the will of the reigning monarch and the political servants who supported the throne. The struggle between Charles and the Long Parliament was far different from this. That religion in some degree entered into the conflict which was raging in men’s mind long ere the storm burst it would be childish to deny, but it was not so much, except in the case of a very few fanatics, a conflict between different forms of faith as because a great number of the English gentry, and almost the whole of the mercantile class, which had then become a great power, felt that they had the best reasons for believing that it was the deliberate intention of the King and the desperate persons who advised him, to levy taxes without the consent of parliament. This may occasionally have been done in former reigns, but it is the opinion of most of those who have studied the subject in latter days, so far as we can see, without prejudice, that in every case it was illegal. Whether this be so or not, it must be remembered that times were in the days of Charles the First, far different from what his predecessors the Plantagenets and Tudors had known. A great middle class had arisen partly by the division of property consequent on the dispersion of the monastic lands, and partly also by the break up of the vast feudal estates, some of which had fallen into the hands of the Crown by confiscation, others been sold by their owners to pay for their own personal extravagence.
Though murmurs had existed for many years, it was not until the memorable ship-money tax was proposed that affairs became really grave. Had England been threatened by an invasion such as the Spanish Armada, there can be no doubt that a mere illegality in the mode of levying taxes to meet the emergency would have been regarded as of little account, but in the present case there was no overwhelming need, and it must be borne in mind that to add to the national irritation the two first Stuarts were almost uniformally unsuccessful in their foreign wars. It is to Attorney General Noy that we owe the arbitrary ship-money tax. He was a dull, dry, legal antiquary of considerable ability, whose works, such as his Treatise concerning Tenures and Estates; The Compleat Lawyer; The Rights of the Crown, and others of a like character, are yet worth poring over by studious persons. Such a man was well fitted for historical research, no one of his time could have edited and annotated The Year Books more efficiently, but he had no conception of the times in which he lived, the narrow legal lore which filled his mind produced sheer muddle-headedness, when called upon to confront an arbitrary king face to face with an indignant people. That there was less to be said against this form of royal taxation than any other that legal ingenuity could light upon must be admitted, but as events shewed the course he advised the king to take, was little short of madness. John Hampden, who represented one of the oldest and most highly respected races of the English gentry—nobles as they would be called in any land but our own—set the example of refusing to pay this unjust levy. The trial lasted upwards of three weeks, and the men accounted most learned in the law were employed in the case. Sir John Bankes, the owner of Corfe Castle, Sir Edward Littleton, and others were for the King. Oliver Saint John and Mr. Holborn were for Hampden. Concerning Holborn little seems to be known, but Saint John made for himself a great name. His speeches are marvellously learned, shewing an amount of reading which is simply wonderful when we call to mind that in those days all our national records were unprinted, and almost all of them without calendar or index of any sort. It must, hata hivyo, be remembered that in those days lawyers of both branches of the profession were well acquainted not only with the language in which our records were written, but also with the hands employed at various periods, and the elaborate system of contraction used in representing the words.
A full report of this memorable trial is to be found in Rushworth’s Historical Collections, volume ii. parts 1 na 2. Carlyle in his Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, in the emphatic diction he was accustomed to use says that Saint John was “a dark, tough man of the toughness of leather,”[12] but he does not dwell on his great learning and general ability, as he ought to have done. That Saint John’s heart was in his work for his client we are well assured. That from a legal point of view, Hampden was his only client, we well know, but as a matter of fact, it is no exaggeration to say that he represented the people of England. The decision went in favour of the crown, which was from the first a foregone conclusion. It was a legal victory, but like many lesser victories won before and since success was the sure road to ruin. The sum contended for was absurdly small—twenty shillings only—but on that pound piece hung all our liberties; whether we were to continue a free people or whether we were to have our liberties filched away from us, as had already been the case in France and Spain. A sullen discontent brooded over the land, there was no rioting, but in hall and castle, country parsonage and bar-parlour, grave men were shaking their heads and asking what was to come next, all knew that a storm was brewing, the only question was when and where it would burst. Events changed rapidly, and Saint John though he took no very prominent part in the party struggles ere the war broke out, was undoubtedly the chief legal adviser of those who were in opposition to the faction which desired to make England a despotic monarchy. Such was the case during the war which ended in the tragic death of the king, and the establishment of a Republican form of government under the name of the Commonwealth. Saint John once again appears in a public manner which indicates that he was a brave man who had no more fear of the pistol and dagger of the assassin, than he had of the corrupt dealings of those who for a time, to their own imminent peril had misgoverned our country. This time we find him sent by the Commonwealth as ambassador to the seven United Provinces, then as now commonly called Holland, on account of the two provinces of north and south Holland, being by far the most influential states in that republic. The Dutch though republicans themselves, had during the latter part of our Civil War shewn sympathy with the cause of the Royalists. After the execution of the king, this feeling became naturally much intensified. On the other hand our newly established republic was for many reasons both of politics and religion very desirous of being on good terms with a sister commonwealth so very near at hand. To explain matters and perhaps to settle the heads of a definite treaty, the English government sent Isaac Doreslaus, or Doorslaer as their ambassador. He was by birth a Dutchman and a very learned lawyer. He had come to this country before, the war broke out in 1642. He was then made, probably through the influence of his friend Sir Henry Mildmay, “Advocate of the Army.”[13] His great knowledge of Civil Law, which had been much neglected in England in times subsequent to the Reformation, rendered him of great service in his new position of Judge Advocate of the Army. For the same reason he soon afterwards was created one of the judges of the Admiralty Court. He became especially hateful to the Royalists from his having assisted in preparing the charges against Charles the First. In May, 1649, he sailed for Holland as Envoy of the English government to the Hague. He had only spent a short time there, lini, while at supper in the Witte Zwaan (White Swan) Inn, some five or six ruffians with their faces hidden by masks, rushed into the room where he, in company with eleven other guests were sitting. Two of these wretches made a murderous attack on a Dutch gentleman of the company, mistaking him for Dorislaus. Finding out their error they set upon the Envoy and slew him with many wounds, crying out as they did so, “Thus dies one of the King’s judges.” The leader of this execrable gang was Col. Walter Whitford, son of Walter Whitford, D.D. The murderer received a pension for this “generous action”[14] after the Restoration.
The English Parliament gave their faithful servant a magnificent funeral in Westminster Abbey, Juni 14, 1649, but when Charles the Second ascended the throne, his body was disturbed. His dust rests along with that of Admiral Blake and other patriots in a pit somewhere in Saint Margaret’s churchyard.[15] Dorislaus, though a foreigner, ought to rank among our great English lawyers, for his services were devoted entirely to his adopted country. Whatever our opinions may be as to those differences which were the forerunners of so much bloodshed and crime, we must bear in mind that many of the foremost men on both sides were actuated by the highest principles of honour. The study of Canon Law had been prohibited in the preceding century, and the Civil Law with which it has so intimate a connection, though not made contraband, was so much discouraged that it is no exaggeration to say that the knowledge of it was confined to a very few. Selden, whose wide grasp of mind took in almost every branch of learning as it was known in his day, is the only English lawyer we can think of who had mastered these two vast subjects. This is the more remarkable as he was of humble parentage; the son of a wandering minstrel it is said, but from the first his passion for learning overmastered all difficulties. It must, hata hivyo, be borne in mind that according to the custom of those times when his abilities became known, he met with more than one generous patron.
We must for a moment return to Saint John who was selected in 1652, to represent his country in Holland. There was not, as there is now a trained body of men devoted to the diplomatic service. The reasons why Saint John was chosen for this important office are not clear. He was a great and widely read lawyer, who we apprehend was trusted with this difficult mission, not only because the government were assured of his probity, but because the relations between Holland and this country depended on many subtile antiquarian details which a mere student of the laws as they were then, would have been unable to unravel. The basis of the sea codes by which the various nations of Christendom professed to be ruled, was the Laws of Oleron (Leges Uliarences). They were promulgated by Richard the First of England, on an island in the Bay of Acquitaine. How far they were ever suited for their purpose may be questioned, but it is certain that as centuries rolled on, they had though often quoted, ceased to have any restraining power, and as a consequence Spain, England, Holland, and other powers were guilty of constant acts of what we should now call piracy. A lasting treaty with Holland, could Saint John achieve it, would have been of immense advantage, but the Dutch were in no mood for an alliance on equal terms. It was a brave thing for Saint John to undertake so arduous a mission, for he not only run the risk of ignominous failure, but also was in no little danger from the savage desperadoes who thought they did the cause of their exiled master service by murdering the agents of the English government. When Saint John arrived at the Hague he was put off by slow and evasive answers, which soon shewed to him not only that his own time was being wasted, but what was to him of far more account, the honour of his country was being played with. He gave a proud, short, emphatic reply to the Dutch sophistries, and at once returned home again, to cause the celebrated Navigation Act to be passed, forbidding any goods to be imported into England, except in English ships, or in the ships of the country where the articles were produced. This was well-nigh ruin to the trade of the Dutch, who were then the great carriers of the world.
In no sketch however brief of the lawyers of this disturbed time, can the name of William Prynne be entirely passed over, and yet it is not as a lawyer that his name has become memorable. Had he been a mere barrister at law he would long since have been forgotten, but he was an enthusiastic puritan of the presbyterian order, and a no less enthusiastic antiquary. He had probably read as many old records as Saint John or Selden, but had by no means their faculty of turning them to good account. He first comes prominently before us as attacking the amusements of the court, especially theatrical entertainments. For this he was proceeded against in the Star Chamber, sentenced to pay five thousand pounds and have his ears cut off; for an attack on episcopacy he was fined another five thousand pounds and sentenced once more to have his ears cut off. He afterwards bore a prominent part in the trial of Archbishop Laud. All along he continued to pour forth a deluge of pamphlets. He attacked Cromwell with such boldness, that the Protector felt called upon to imprison him in Dunster Castle, where however, his confinement was of a most easy character. He is said while there to have amused himself by arranging the Lutterell Charters, for which that noble home is famous. He took the side of Charles the Second at the Restoration, and as a reward was made keeper of the records in the Tower, a post for which he was peculiarly well fitted.
There is probably nothing which distinguishes the periods of the Commonwealth and the Protectorate more markedly from other times of successful insurrection, than the very slight alteration which the new powers introduced into the laws of England. The monarchy, it is true, was swept away, but the judges went on circuit; the courts of Chancery and common-law sat as usual, the Lords of Manors held their courts, and the justices of peace discharged their various functions as if they had been the times of profoundest peace. No confiscations took place, as had been the case in the reign of Henry the Eighth and his successor, except in cases where the owners had been engaged in what the state regarded as rebellion, and even with regard to those who had fought in what is known as the first war, almost everyone was let off by a heavy fine. A list of these sufferers may be seen in A Catalogue of the lords Knights and Gentlemen that have compounded for their Estates (London Printed for Thomas Dring at the Signe of the George in Fleet Street, neare Clifford’s Inne, 1655.) The book is imperfect and very inaccurate. This is not of much consequence however, as the documents from which it is compiled known as The Royalist Composition Papers, are preserved in the record office, and are open to all enquirers. Those who madly engaged in what is known as the second war, had their estates confiscated by three acts of parliament of the years 1651 na 1652. These were reprinted and indexed for the Index Society katika 1879. These latter had their estates given back to themselves or their heirs on the Restoration. It does not seem that those who were fined, except in a very few cases had any return made to them. There have been few civil wars ancient or modern wherein the unsuccessful have been so tenderly treated. Yet sufferings of the poorer classes among the Royalists must have been very great. Next to the arbitrary conduct of the King and those immediately about his person, was the provocation which the Parliamentarians thought that the established church had given, firstly because many of the bishops and clergy maintained an extreme theory of the Divine Right of Kings, which is said first to have been taught in this country by Archbishop Cranmer. If this opinion were really accepted as more than a mere figure of flattering oratory, it made those who complied with it mere slaves to the sovereign, however tyrannical or wicked he might prove himself. The second ground of resentment was that they thought Archbishop Laud and many of the bishops and clergy, concealed Roman Catholics, “disguised Papists,” as the common expression ran. We do not believe this charge with regard to Laud or most of the others so rashly accused. We are quite sure it was not so if their writings are to be taken as a test of their feelings. Whatever may have been the truth, there is no doubt that even the more tolerant of what may be called the low-church party feared the worst. As early as 11th February, 1629, Oliver Cromwell, who was then member for Huntingdon, made a speech in which he said, “He had heard by relation from one Dr. Beard … that Dr. Alablaster had preached flat Popery at Paul’s Cross, and that the Bishop of Winchester (Dk. Neale), had commanded him as his Diocesan, he should preach nothing to the contrary.”[16] So inflamed, hata hivyo, were men’s minds that as soon as the Parliamentary party was strong enough, Laud was indicted for high treason and beheaded.
One of the first works of the Parliament when strong enough, was to abolish the Book of Common Prayer, and put a new compilation called the Directory in its place. The use of the Prayer Book was forbidden not only in public offices of religion, but in private houses also. For the first offence five pounds was to be levied, for the second ten, and for the third the delinquent was to suffer one year’s imprisonment.[17] Whether this stringent law was rigorously inforced we cannot tell. Probably in many cases the local justices would be far more lenient to the clergy who were their neighbours, that would be the legislators at Westminster, whose passions were fanned by listening to the popular preachers. Not content with interfering with the service-book, various acts were passed relating to “Scandalous, Ignorant, and Insufficient ministers.” That the commissioners who put these acts in force removed some evil persons we do not doubt, but if John Walker’s attempt towards recovering an account of the number and sufferings of the Clergy of the Church of England, who were sequestered … in the Grand Rebellion, be not very grossly exaggerated, which we see no reason, to believe, many innocent persons must have had very hard treatment.
The marriage laws of England were in a vague and unsatisfactory state from the reign of Edward the Sixth, until the Commonwealth time. An attempt was made in 1653 to alter them. Banns were to be published either at Church or in the nearest market town on three market days, after this the marriage was to take place before a justice of peace. Many entries of marriages of this kind are to be found in our parochial registers. English was made the language of the law in 1650, but Latin was restored to the place of honour it had so long held, when the Restoration took place.
Nyumba Ndogo za Mahakama.
THE origin of the decadent institutions located in certain grim and dreary-looking piles of building dotting the district of the Inns of Court proper, and known as the little Inns of Court, is involved in considerable obscurity. They appear to have originally held a similar position to the great seats of legal education as the halls of Oxford and Cambridge do to the Universities. But at the present time their relation to the Inns of Court proper is not very clear, and the uses they serve, otherwise than as residential chambers, are just as hard to discover. This state of mistiness concerning them has existed so long that no one now seems to know anything about them, and the evidence taken more than forty years ago by a Royal Commission did so little to clear away the dust and cobwebs hanging about them that they still remain, in the words of Lord Dundreary, “things that no fellow can understand.”
Lyon’s Inn has since that time been swept
away to make room for the new Courts of Law, without any person evincing the smallest interest in its fate. Concerning this institution all that could be learned by the Royal Commission was contained in the evidence of Timothy Tyrrell, who “believed” that it consisted of members or “ancients,” he could not say which; he believed the terms were synonymous. There were then only himself and one other, and within his recollection there had never been more than five, and they had nothing to do beyond receiving the rents of the chambers. There were no students, and the only payment made on account of legal instruction was a sum of £7 13s. 4d. paid to the society of the Inner Temple for a reader; but there had been no reader since 1832. He had heard his father say that the reader “burlesqued the things so greatly” that the ancients were disgusted, and would not have another. There was a hall, but it was used only by a debating society; and there was a kitchen attached to it, but he had never heard of a library.
New Inn appears to have been somewhat more alive than Lyon’s, though it does not seem to have done any more to advance the cause of legal education. The property is held under the
by a lease of three hundred years from 1744, at a rent of four pounds a year. Among the stipulations of the lease is one allowing the lessors to hold lectures in the hall, but none had been held since 1846, in consequence, it was believed, of the Middle Temple ceasing to send a reader. The lectures never numbered more than five or six in a year; and there is now no provision of any kind for legal education. Samuel Brown Jackson, who represented the inn before the Royal Commission, said he knew nothing concerning any ancient deeds or documents that would throw any light on the original constitution and functions of the body. If any there were, he “supposed” they were in the custody of the treasurer. The only source of income was the rents of chambers, which then amounted to between eighteen and nineteen hundred pounds a year; and the ancients have no duties beyond the administration of the funds.
Concerning the origin of Clement’s Inn, Thomas Gregory, the steward of the society, was unable to afford full information, but he had seen papers dating back to 1677, when there was a conveyance by Lord Clare to one Killett, followed by a Chancery suit between the latter and the principal and ancients of the society, which resulted in a decree under which the property so conveyed became vested in the inn. Some of the papers relating to the inn had been lost by fire, and “some of them,” said the witness, “we can’t read.” The inn, he believed, was formerly a monastery, and took its name from St. Clement. It had once been in connection with the Inner Temple, but he could find no papers showing what were the relations between the two societies, “except,” he added, “that a reader comes once a term, but that was dropped for twenty years—I think till about two or three years ago, and then we applied to them ourselves, and they knew nothing at all about it; the under-treasurer said he did not know anything about the reader, and had forgotten all about it.” It was the custom for the Inner Temple to submit three names to the ancients; na, said the witness, “we chose one; but then they said that the gentleman was out of town, or away, and that there was no time to appoint another.” But no great loss seems to have resulted thereby to the cause of legal education, for it appears that all a reader had ever done was to explain some recent Act of Parliament to the ancients and commoners, there being no students. The inn had no library and no chapel, but as a substitute for the latter had three pews in the neighbouring church of St. Clement, and also a vault, in which, said the witness, “the principals or ancients may be buried if they wish it.”
Some remarkable evidence was given concerning Staples Inn, and the more remarkable for being given by Edward Rowland Pickering, the author of a book on the subject, which publication one of the Commissioners had before him while the witness was under examination. “You state here,” said the Commissioner, “that in the reign of Henry V., or before, the society probably became an Inn of Chancery, and that it is a society still possessing the manuscripts of its orders and constitutions.” “I am afraid,” replied the witness, “that the manuscript is lost. The principal has a set of chambers which were burnt down, and his servant and two children were burnt to death, seventy years ago; and I rather think that these manuscripts might be lost.” Where the learned historian of the inn had obtained the materials for that work is a question which he does not appear to have been in a position to answer; for when asked whether he knew of any trace of a connection between the society and an Inn of Court, he replied, “Certainly, I should say not. It is sixty years since I was there, boy and all.” A very strange answer considering the statement in his book. During the sixty years he had been connected or acquainted with the society, he had never heard of the existence of a reader, or of any association of the inn with legal education or legal pursuits. The only connection claimed for the inn by the principal, Andrew Snape Thorndike, was that, when a serjeant was called from Gray’s Inn, that society invited the members of Staples Inn to breakfast. There is a singular provision respecting the tenure of chambers in this inn by the ancients. “A person,” said this witness, “holds them for his own life, and though he may be seventy years of age, if he can come into the hall, he may surrender them to a very young man, and if that young man should live he may surrender them again at the same age.” If a surrender is not made, the chambers revert to the society.
Barnard’s Inn is a very old one, and the property has been held on lease from the dean and chapter of Lincoln for more than three hundred years. The society consists of a principal, nine ancients, and five companions, which latter are chosen by the ancients; but we fail to gather from the evidence of Charles Edward Hunt, treasurer and secretary of the inn, by what principles the ancients are guided in the selection. We learn, hata hivyo, that applications for admission by solicitors are not allowed. Such a thing had occurred once, but it was as long ago as 1827, and “of course,” said the witness, “we refused him, and he applied to the court, and after some difficulty he got a rule nisi for a mandamus. It came on to be tried before Lord Tenterden, and Lord Tenterden said it could not be granted; that we were a voluntary association, and the court had no jurisdiction.” The applicant seems to have based his claim on the ground that Barnard’s was an Inn of Chancery, na kwamba, as a solicitor, he had a right to be admitted. The matter was scarcely worth contention, as the privileges of the companions are confined to dining in hall and the chance of being made an ancient, that favoured grade being entitled to “their dinners and some little fees.” The books of the society showed no trace of there ever having been any students of law connected with the inn. “The oldest thing I find,” said the witness, “is that a reader came occasionally from Gray’s Inn to read; but what he read about, or who paid him, there is no minute whatever.” He did not know when a reader last came from Gray’s Inn; he thought it was about two hundred years ago. It only remains to be told of Barnard’s Inn that it has not even a library; there had been a few books at one time, the witness told the Commission, but they were sold as useless!
Concerning the remaining little inns—Clifford’s, Symond’s, and Furnival’s—no evidence was taken. They appear to be merely residential chambers, much the same as some of those concerning which we have information in the report of the Royal Commission and the evidence given before it, and the chambers are far from being used exclusively by members of the legal profession. Nearly sixty years ago the present writer found a retired army officer occupying chambers in Clifford’s, and on a later occasion made at Symond’s Inn, the acquaintance of a curate who resided there with his wife and a young family! Concerning Furnival’s Inn, it was incidentally stated by Michael Doyle, who represented Lincoln’s Inn before the Royal Commission, that the latter society received £576 a year under a lease of the former property granted to the late Henry Peto for ninety-nine years, £500 being for rent, and the remainder in lieu of land tax. The witness was, hata hivyo, unable to give any information as to the manner in which, or the date when, the property was acquired by Lincoln’s Inn.
The inquiry by the Royal Commission resulted in the recommendation of some very important changes in the constitution of the little Inns of Court and the administration of the several properties; but these, we learn, have been modified so much in their adoption as to have been of very little value. The societies have long outlived the purposes for which they were instituted, though their principals and officials seem to attach considerable importance to their continued existence. It is probable, hata hivyo, that their raison d’étre being gone, they will all sooner or later go the way of Lyon’s Inn, and become things of the past.